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A nation that traces power to the people's will does not easily digest the
practice of unelected and unaccountable judges' denying the populace
what most of them appear to want. It is no wonder that a substantial
portion of constitutional scholarship deals with the apparent tension be-
tween judicial review and majoritarian democracy. Judicial review in its
conventional guise, however, does not entail a direct conflict between the
judiciary and the people. It is instead the will of a legislature that is being
thwarted in the name of the Constitution. In fact, this very lack of identity
between the people and their representatives forms the foundation for Al-
exander Hamilton's defense of judicial review in The Federalist No. 78:
"[Wihere the will of the legislature declared in its statutes, stands in op-
position to that of the people declared in the constitution, the judges ought
to be governed by the latter, rather than the former."' While we ordina-
rily engage in the fiction that legislative enactments represent majority
will,2 we discard this fiction when courts find that the people's agents
have acted beyond the power delegated to them by the constitutive
document.
1. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 525 (A. Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961) [hereinafter all citations
to the Federalist are to this edition]. In exercising judicial review, Hamilton concluded, the courts act
not in contravention of the people but as "an intermediate body between the people and the legisla-
ture." Id. Although "representatives of the people, in a popular assembly, seem sometimes to fancy
that they are the people themselves," Hamilton would have none of it. Id. No. 71, at 483-84 (A.
Hamilton).
2. But see Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013,
1027 (1984) [hereinafter Storrs Lectures] (rejecting idea that "we can hear the genuine voice of the
American people" when Congress speaks during periods of normal politics (emphasis in original));
Ackerman, Constitutional PoliticslConstitutional Law, 99 YALE L.J. 453, 461-62 (1989) [hereinaf-
ter Constitutional Politics]; Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside Arti-
cle V, 55 U. CHI. L. REv. 1043, 79-87 (1988) (equation of legislature with "the People" is "largely a
fake"). As even Alexander Bickel conceded, "the process of reflecting the will of a popular majority in
the legislature is deflected by various inequalities of representation and by all sorts of institutional
habits and characteristics." A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 18 (1962).
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Although most laws originate in a representative body, the constitutions
of approximately half the states authorize lawmaking by the electorate
itself.' Should the conflict between the lawmaker and judge be played out
differently when the people express their preferences directly rather than
through an agent? Among the tens of thousands of pages written on the
role of courts in a democratic society, this question has received almost no
attention. 4 Judicial opinions resolving constitutional challenges to laws en-
acted by plebiscite seldom explicitly address the matter of the appropriate
standard of review. The unspoken assumption, however, seems to be that
the analysis need not vary as a result of the law's popular origin. The
nearly three dozen Supreme Court cases reviewing ballot propositions
contain scarcely a word on the subject.5 The rare recognition that the law
under attack originated with the electorate is most often followed by a
boilerplate statement like Chief Justice Burger's in Citizens Against Rent
Control/ Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berkeley: "It is irrelevant
that the voters rather than a legislative body enacted [this law] because the
3. See infra note 22. Even in those states that do not provide for statewide initiatives or popular
referenda, direct democracy usually exists in some form. See infra text accompanying notes 22-27.
4. There have been a scattering of student comments on the subject. By far the most thoughtful of
these is Comment, Judicial Review of Laws Enacted by Popular Vote, 55 WASH. L. REV. 175 (1979);
see also Comment, Constitutional Constraints on Initiative and Referendum, 32 VAND. L. REV.
1143 (1979); cf Comment, Judicial Review of Initiative Constitutional Amendments, 14 U.C. DAvis
L. REV. 461 (1980) (discussing judicial review of procedures for initiatives to amend state constitu-
tions). In addition, a few law review articles with somewhat different focuses have addressed the
question. See, e.g., Bell, The Referendum: Democracy's Barrier to Racial Equality, 54 WASH. L.
REV. 1, 22-28 (1978). See also the comments of Laurence Tribe and Jesse Choper in J. CHOPER, Y.
KAMISAR & L. TRIBE, THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS (1981-82), at 242-43
(standard of review should not take into account whether law was enacted by legislature or directly by
people).
5. Because the Court frequently makes no mention of the process by which state laws are adopted,
the figure may in truth be higher than the one cited in the text. Cases in which the Court's opinion
does note the popular origin of the challenged state statute or constitutional provision include Fisher v.
City of Berkeley, 475 U.S. 260, 261 (1986); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 995 n.4 (1983);
Crawford v. Board of Education, 458 U.S. 527, 531-32 (1982); Washington v. Seattle School District
No. 1, 458 U.S. 457, 462 (1982); Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 454 U.S. 1022, 1023 (1981)
(Burger, J., dissenting); Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. City of Berke-
ley, 454 US. 290, 292 (1981); Town of Lockport v. Citizens for Community Action at the Local
Level, Inc., 430 U.S. 259, 262 (1977); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises, 426 U.S. 668, 670
(1976); Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 28 n.2 (1974); Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts
Co., 410 U.S. 356, 357 (1973); Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1, 2 (1971); James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137, 139 (1971); Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 386 (1969); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
109 n.17 (1968); Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 371 (1967); Jordan v. Silver, 381 U.S. 415
(1965); Lucas %. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 715 (1964); Scholle v.
Hare, 369 U.S. 429, 433 (1962) (Harlan, J., dissenting); AFL v. American Sash & Door, 335 U.S.
538, 539 (1949); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 658-59 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring)
(describing "atmosphere heavy with race hatred" surrounding enactment of initiative); Asbury Hospi-
tal v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207, 209 (1945); Columbus Gas & Fuel Co. v. PUC, 292 U.S. 398, 399
(1934); Ex Parte La Prade, 289 U.S. 444, 452 (1933); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 530
(1925); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 231 (1923); Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 224 (1920);
Adams v Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 591 (1917); State of Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565,
566 (1916); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 35 (1915); City of Denver v. New York Trust Co., 229
U.S. 123, 125 (1913); Kiernan v. Portland, 223 U.S. 151, 152 (1912); and Pacific States Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 119 (1912).
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voters may no more violate the Constitution by enacting a ballot measure
than a legislative body may do so by enacting legislation."6
Intuitively, Chief Justice Burger's position seems wrong. If the people
are the sovereign from which all power originates,7 then why should their
expression of will not carry more weight than the legislature's crude effort
to approximate it? If the root difficulty of judicial review is its counter-
majoritarian nature,' why does the argument for judicial intervention not
abate as it becomes clearer what the majority prefers? This claim struck a
responsive chord with Hugo Black. During the oral argument in Reitman
v. Mulkey,9 then Solicitor General Thurgood Marshall called attention to
the fact that California's authorization of discrimination in the private
housing market had been enacted by voter initiative.10 "Wouldn't you
have exactly the same argument," he was asked, if the provision "had
been enacted by the California legislature?" "It's the same argument,"
Marshall replied, "I just have more force with this." "No," interjected
Justice Black, "It seems to me you would have less. Because here, it's
moving in the direction of letting the people of the State-the voters of the
State-establish their policy, which is as near to a democracy as you can
get."1
1
It is more than abstract theories of sovereignty and democracy, however,
that give judicial review of voter lawmaking a different cast. A judicial
decision striking down a voter effort also risks engendering a perception
by the public itself that its will has been subverted. Neglecting voter ex-
6. 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981) (emphasis added); see also Lucas, 377 U.S. at 737 (that challenged
legislative apportionment plan was approved by electorate held to be without Federal constitutional
significance); Felix v. Milliken, 463 F. Supp. 1360, 1375 (1978) (constitutionality of initiative "should
be assessed as though . . . enacted by legislature"). State court decisions reveal a similar tendency to
treat legislation and voter enactments as though they were interchangeable. See, e.g., Wallace v.
Zinman, 200 Cal. 585, 593, 254 P. 946, 949 (1927) (initiative measure has no greater strength or
dignity than any other legislation).
7. See Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and Retroactivity, 1987
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 381, 394-96. As Akhil Amar persuasively demonstrates, however, sovereignty
under the United States Constitution resides in the People of the United States as a whole rather than
in the people of each state. See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987).
While the legislating electorate in a state may be regarded as sovereign for purposes of the state
constitution, it cannot be so treated within the context of the Federal Constitution. See Amar, supra
note 2, at 1063 n.73. I shall return to this theme in later pages.
8. See A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 16.
9. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
10. Although Reitman involved a state constitutional initiative rather than a statutory initiative
the thrust of this paper is equally applicable in both settings. See infra note 28.
11. 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 668 (P. Kurland & G. Casper eds. 1975) [hereinafter LANDMARK BRIEFS].
Justice Black expressed similar sentiments in his majority opinion in James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S.
137, 141 (1971) (provisions for referenda demonstrate "devotion to democracy"), and his dissent in
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 397 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). See also Legislature v.
Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 683, 669 P.2d 17, 35 (1983) (Richardson, J., dissenting) (initiatives
entitled to "very special and very favored treatment" (emphasis in original)).
[Vol. 99: 15031506
1990] Judicial Review of Direct Democracy 1507
pressions thus carries with it a measure of political discomfort unlike that
associated with invalidating legislation.12
The thesis of this Article is that arguments for judicial restraint indeed
play out differently when courts review the constitutionality of direct ex-
pressions of the electorate. My ultimate conclusion, however, is that judi-
cial review of direct democracy frequently calls for less rather than more
restraint. Admittedly, this proposition may seem even more counter-
intuitive than Chief Justice Burger's suggestion that the people's voice de-
serves no more sensitive a judicial ear than is accorded their representa-
tives'. Direct democracy has a strong emotional pull cutting clear across
the political spectrum. The Port Huron Statement, founding document of
the Students for a Democratic Society, called for a shift from representa-
tive to "participatory democracy. '1 3 Ralph Nader endorsed a constitu-
tional amendment for a national initiative.1 4 Conservative politicians and
think tanks trumpet the virtues of popular decision-making.15 Public opin-
ion polls show widespread support for expanding the use of plebiscites.1
Small wonder that Professor Derrick Bell has warned that those who crit-
icize direct democracy risk being labeled "reactionary, if not un-
American,"1 and that public figures in states that provide for direct legis-
12. Former California Supreme Court Justice Joseph Grodin recently described his feelings as
follows: "It is one thing for a court to tell a legislature that a statute it has adopted is unconstitutional;
to tell that to the people of a state who have indicated their direct support for the measure through the
ballot is another." J. GRODIN, IN PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 105 (1989).
13. Students for a Democratic Society, Port Huron Statement (1962), reprinted in J. MILLER,
DEMOCRACY IS IN THE STREETS app. at 333 (1987).
14. Voter Initiative Constitutional Amendment: Hearings on S.J. Res. 67 Before the Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 90-102 (1977)
[hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Ralph Nader).
15. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 14, at 22 (statement of Rep. Guy Vander Jagt); id. at 203
(statement on behalf of Liberty Lobby); J. KEMP, AN AMERICAN RENAISSANCE 189 (1979); P. MC-
GUIGAN, THE POLITICS OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE 1980s: CASE STUDIES IN POPULAR DECI-
SION MAKING 119-21 (1985).
16. Two-thirds of those questioned in a 1987 Gallup survey said that citizens ought to be able to
vote directly on some state and local laws. See T. CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF
INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 79 (1989). A nationwide poll conducted by Cambridge Sur-
vey Research in 1977 found 57% in favor of a constitutional amendment for a national initiative with
only 25% opposed. See Hearings, supra note 14, at 17. Gallup Polls in 1978 and 1981 similarly
found support for a national initiative running better than two-to-one. See T. CRONIN, supra, at
174-75. Nearly identical proportions of Republicans, Democrats, and Independents agreed that the
initiative was a good idea, a result that George Gallup called "an unusual finding on any question of
political significance." Hearings, supra note 14, at 646. David Magleby argues that closer examina-
tion of public opinion polls reveal that the extent of public support for direct democracy may be
exaggerated. While those polled appear to favor plebiscites when the question is worded in general
terms, more precise questioning exposes mixed feelings about the legislative role played by the electo-
rate. D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 7-14 (1984). Nonetheless, as one recent poll of California voters conducted by Common
Cause and the University of Southern California's Institute of Politics and Government discovered,
despite the fact that many people are critical of the state's initiative process and favor reforms, the
overwhelming majority (71%) are unwilling to see the system scrapped. See Wolinsky, Are Citizens
Losing the Initiative?, L.A. Times, Oct. 7, 1988, at Al, col. 1.
17. Bell, supra note 4, at 2.
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lation uniformly refrain from urging elimination-or even substantial
modification-of these provisions."I
This Article is not, however, a commentary on the wisdom or practical-
ity of conducting initiatives or referenda at the state or national level.19 I
consider not whether we should continue to permit citizen lawmaking, but
how courts should go about deciding challenges to the constitutionality of
the voters' enactments.2" Despite the instinctive appeal of Hugo Black's
view that the level of appropriate scrutiny ought to decline as democracy
becomes more direct, I believe that a deeper consideration will reveal that
he is 180 degrees off the mark.
I. THE SCOPE OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY
Several years ago I left my roots in the Northeast and moved to Califor-
nia. My well-traveled East Coast friends and apprehensive West Coast
colleagues admirably prepared me for the culture shock that awaited. As a
consequence of their efforts, earthquakes, orange-tinted hair, and mort-
gages resembling the national budget deficit were taken in stride. No one
prepared me, however, for Election Day. Sometime in mid-October a
massive booklet arrived in my mailbox. At first I thought it was the local
phone directory. Closer examination revealed it to be a "Ballot Pamphlet"
from California's Secretary of State. Its contents included a staggering ar-
ray of bond acts, proposed constitutional amendments and statutory initia-
tives. The pamphlet contained the complete text of each ballot measure
(some running over a dozen pages in print so small that a magnifying
glass, if noi a microscope, was required to read it), summaries prepared
18. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS OF CALIFORNIA, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALI-
FORNIA: A LEGACY LOST? 59 (1984) (no public figure in memory has suggested that initiative be
eliminated or modified and none is likely soon to do so); Allen, The National Initiative Proposal: A
Preliminary Analysis, 58 NEB. L. REV. 965, 1040 (1979) (there has never been serious effort to
eliminate initiative in any state that has ever embraced it).
19. Compare Briffault, Distrust of Democracy (Book Review), 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347 (1985)
(direct legislation remedies some of legislature's shortcoming and complements legislative process) and
Gillette, Plebiscites, Participation, and Collective Action in Local Government Law, 86 MicH. L.
REv. 930 (1988) (criticisms of plebiscites both understate capacity of participation and overstate ca-
pacity of legislative processes to serve public interest) with D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16 (process of
direct legislation has fallen far short of original reformers' expectations) and Bell, supra note 4 (the
more direct democracy becomes, the more it threatens unpopular minorities). On the desirability of a
national initiative process, compare Allen, supra note 18 (favoring adoption of national initiative
process) with Black, National Lawmaking by Initiative? Let's Think Twice, HUM. RTs., Fall 1979, at
28. For recent calls for increasing the degree of citizen participation, see B. BARBER, STRONG DE-
MOCRACY (1984); C. PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1970); Frug, The City
as A Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1980); Lobel, The Meaning of Democracy: Representa-
tive and Participatory Democracy in the New Nicaraguan Constitution, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 823
(1988).
20. The issue of the appropriate standard for reviewing the substance of specific citizen legislation
should be distinguished from the questions of whether a state's very use of the mechanisms of initia-
tive or referendum violates the Constitution when (1) employed generally, see text accompanying notes
201-208, or (2) used selectively for issues disproportionately affecting politically unpopular minori-
ties, see text accompanying notes 360-75.
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by the State's Attorney General, analyses by someone identified as the
Legislative Analyst, arguments in favor of and in opposition to each mea-
sure written by a diverse group of persons chosen by some unexplained
process, and rebuttals to both sets of arguments, often by yet a different
group of mysteriously-selected "representative" voices. Even those able to
make the major time commitment necessary to trudge through the
opus-the 1988 version ran 159 pages-must have found the going tough.
The propositions average over forty-five words per sentence, and recent
studies suggest that only those with a reading level equivalent to that of a
third-year college student could have comprehended the pamphlet.21
Just as I was struggling through the state ballot pamphlet and begin-
ning to wonder how I had graduated law school with a reading level be-
low that of a third-year college student, the postal service delivered an-
other ballot pamphlet. This one was compiled by the Los Angeles City
Clerk and contained text, summaries, arguments-pro and con-and re-
buttals for approximately half-a-dozen city ballot measures. Although the
pages were fewer-the 1988 version ran sixty-four pages-and
smaller-eight and a half by five inches rather than eight and a half by
eleven inches-and the print was a good deal larger, I was too dazed to
exhibit the proper appreciation. By the time a third pamphlet arrived, a
gift from the County Registrar-Recorder with information concerning the
county measures, earthquakes were starting to look appealing.
While Californians' use of plebiscites may be exceptionally heavy, di-
rect democracy is a national phenomenon. The twenty-six state constitu-
tions that authorize voters to initiate legislation or to demand the referral
of legislative enactments22 are but a small measure of its scope. Thirty-six
21. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 138-39.
22. In 21 of these states, citizens may initiate and enact ordinary legislation (Alaska; Arizona;
Arkansas; California; Colorado; Idaho; Maine; Massachusetts; Michigan; Missouri; Montana; Ne-
braska; Nevada; North Dakota; Ohio; Oklahoma; Oregon; South Dakota; Utah; Washington; and
Wyoming). See infra Appendix A. In three additional states (Kentucky, Maryland, and New Mex-
ico), as well as in all the 21 previously named, voters can require the legislature to refer enactments to
the electorate for approval or rejection. Id. Finally, in two more states (Florida and Illinois) the
voters' rights are limited to the initiation of state constitutional amendments (in Illinois the amend-
ments may pertain only to the Legislative Article). The right to initiate a state constitutional amend-
ment is enjoyed as well by the citizens of 15 of the states that allow statutory initiatives (Arizona,
Arkansas, California, Colorado, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and South Dakota). Id. The District of Columbia also pro-
vides for voter initiative and popular referendum. D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-281 (1987).
The extent to which citizen lawmaking actually occurs varies considerably among the 26 states.
Wyoming, which adopted the initiative in 1968, went 16 years without a single initiative qualifying
for the ballot. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 18, at 89. Five states, Arizona, Califor-
nia, Colorado, North Dakota, and Oregon, are at the other end of the spectrum, qualifying well over
one hundred initiatives each between 1898 and 1979. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 71. A
state's historical tradition and political culture, rather than the stringency of the qualifying require-
ments, may be the most critical factor determining frequency of use. See Sirico, The Constitutionality
of the Initiative and Referendum, 65 IowA L. REv. 637, 662 (1980). But see D. MAGLEBY, supra
note 16, at 42 (states with lowest signature thresholds have highest number of measures reaching
ballot).
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states provide for statewide statutory referenda in some form23 and every
state but Delaware requires the approval of the electorate to amend the
state constitution.24 Statewide initiatives and referenda, however, account
for only about two percent of the nation's output of popular legislation.
Plebiscites abound on the local level, even in a large number of the states
that do not authorize them on a statewide basis.2"
Direct democracy comes in a multitude of forms.26 Naturally, the gen-
eral conclusions I offer here will have to be adapted to fit the structure of
a particular state or municipality. The more immediate difficulty caused
by the jurisdictional variations is one of terminology. Usage of terms is not
uniform and the coining of my own may avoid some confusion. For pur-
poses of this Article, I shall divide instances of direct democracy into two
basic subgroups. The first I will call substitutive direct democracy; the
second, complementary direct democracy.
Substitutive direct democracy is direct democracy in its purest current
form. Here the voters can completely bypass the legislative and executive
branches of government. Of course, in a true direct democracy there
would be no legislature to displace, but no such form exists in the United
States today. Thus, the states and municipalities that permit this kind of
direct democracy have a primary representational form of governance but
afford voters the opportunity to substitute plebiscites for the ordinary pro-
cess of lawmaking. In order to exercise this option the voters neither need
legislative permission nor legislative assistance. A measure may be placed
on the ballot by securing a specified number of signatures-usually set at
some percentage of the votes cast in the preceding general election-and
the measure is enacted if a majority of the voters signify their approval.2 7
23. See infra Appendix A. In 24 of these states the voters themselves have the power to force the
legislature to refer legislative enactments to the electorate. See supra note 22. In the remaining states,
referenda occur either because the legislature chooses to consult the electorate or because the state
constitution mandates that legislation relating to certain issues be submitted to the voters before taking
effect. Id. Fourteen states make no provision for statewide statutory referenda (Alabama, Connecticut,
Delaware, Hawaii, Indiana, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Hampshire, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and West Virginia). Id.
24. See infra Appendix A. A discussion of Delaware's process of constitutional amendment ap-
pears in Eule, supra note 7, at 398-99.
25. One study estimates the national volume of local referenda at 10,000 to 15,000 annually.
Hamilton, Direct Legislation: Some Implications of Open Housing Referenda, 64 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 124, 125 (1970). In contrast the number of statewide referenda in a given year ranges from 50
to 350. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, app. C at 205-06.
Thirty-nine states permit or require plebiscites at the local level including several like Minnesota,
Texas, and West Virginia that do not provide for them on a statewide basis. See COUNCIL OF STATE
GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES 1980-81, at 26 n.c (initiatives); REFERENDUMS: A COM-
PARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 71-72 (D. Butler & A. Ranney eds. 1978) [hereinafter
REFERENDUMS] (referenda).
26. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 18, at 13-20 (describing variations among
states); D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 38-39 (Table 3.1).
27. In most cases a simple majority of those voting on the ballot measure is all that is required. A
few states require something more. In Massachusetts, for example, a measure must also receive 30%
of the vote of those who turn out for the election. No doubt these sorts of special requirements are
responses to "voter dropoffs." Sometimes as many as 25% of those who turn out to vote for candidates
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Ordinarily, such a form of plebiscite is called an initiative.28 Initiatives,
however, are often subclassified as direct or indirect. The process just de-
scribed is generally referred to as a direct initiative. An indirect initiative,
on the other hand, requires that the voters' petition be submitted to the
legislature before the issue is placed on the ballot. The legislature has a
specified period of time in which to enact the proposal. If the legislature
fails to do so, the measure is sent to the voters.29 For purposes of my
classification scheme it is largely irrelevant which form of the initiative is
used, so long as the voters ultimately vote on the measure. If the legisla-
ture adopts an indirect initiative, the resulting law should be seen as a
product of representative government, not direct democracy.30 But, if the
legislature rejects it, the ensuing voter effort must be considered substitu-
tive. Since the legislature may not prevent the measure from being placed
on the ballot, the voters still retain the ultimate right to displace com-
pletely the representational framework for lawmaking and substitute a di-
rect one. The process simply takes a little longer.3'
fail to cast votes on the ballot measures. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 46-47. For a listing of
the specific requirements for qualification and approval of statewide statutory initiatives, see COUNCIL
OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1988-89, at 217 (Table 5.14) [hereinafter
BOOK OF THE STATES], and D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 38-39 (Table 3.1). See also Lowenstein,
Campaign Spending and Ballot Propositions: Recent Experience, Public Choice Theory and the
First Amendment, 29 UCLA L. REV. 505, 514 n.25 (1982) (many local propositions require more
than a simple majority for passage).
28. Substitutive direct democracy is not limited to statutory initiatives. Voters in seventeen states
may also initiate amendments to the state constitution. See infra Appendix A. As with the statutory
initiative, the electorate operates completely independent of the legislature, and no more than a major-
ity vote is required for passage. Although the signature requirements for placing constitutional initia-
tives on the ballot are frequently greater than for statutory initiatives, see Comment, The Judiciary
and Popular Democraty: Should Courts Review Ballot Measures Prior to Elections?, 53 FORDHAM
L. REv. 919, 927 n.36 (1985), the vote needed for ratification is usually the same, but see NEv.
CONST. art. XIX, § 2 (voters must approve amendment twice).
Naturally, the fact that the voters enact a constitutional amendment rather than a statute effectively
precludes the possibility of substantive judicial review under the state constitution. See Answer of the
Justices, 377 N.E.2d 915, 916 n.2 (Mass. 1978) ("[Ilt is difficult to comprehend how [a] . . . consti-
tutional amendment can be 'unconstitutional' under [the state] Constitution."). Constitutional initia-
tives may, however, be challenged under the state constitution as procedurally defective or beyond the
scope or subject matter of permissible voter amendments. See generally Fischer, Ballot Propositions:
The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 11 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 43, 50-59 (1983); Comment, Judicial Review of Initiative Constitutional Amendments, supra
note 4, at 468-84. Where a challenge is mounted under the Federal Constitution no consequences
ought to flow from the nature of what has been enacted. The supremacy clause subjects state constitu-
tions and statutes alike to the constraints of the United States Constitution. See Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 79 (1980) (state constitutional provision is "statute" within the mean-
ing of Supreme Court's jurisdiction to review constitutionality of state "statute"); L. TRIBE, AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 647 n.27 (2d ed. 1988) ("The Supreme Court has never found it signifi-
cant [under bill of attainder clause] that the challenged provision was part of the state's constitution
rather than a simple enactment of its legislature."). What is crucial to my thesis is that the legislative
process has been bypassed, not that a certain label has been affixed to the ballot measure.
29. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 35-36. Thirteen states provide for direct initiatives only.
Five states have indirect initiatives only. Three states have provisions for both. See infra Appendix A.
30. Admittedly, it is voter pressure that induces legislative passage, but this may be equally true
where the initiative process has not yet been commenced-or in states where it is not even available.
31. My analysis here may be a bit too facile. While the legislature cannot prevent the proposition
from appearing on the ballot (short of enactment), the legislative detour demanded by the indirect
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While substitutive direct democracy offers a stripped down version of
lawmaking free from the constraints-and, as I shall argue, the safe-
guards-of the legislative framework, complementary direct democracy
adds an additional tier. This form of direct democracy is commonly called
a referendum because the legislation is referred to the electorate for ratifi-
cation.3 2 Here the voters and the legislature must act in concert before a
law may take effect. Legislative passage is prerequisite but inadequate:
Without voter endorsement the legislative effort fails; without legislative
passage the electorate has nothing to vote on.
Referenda come in three versions, 3 differentiated by who or what
prompts the referral. In the first, the so-called mandatory or compulsory
referendum, the state constitution commands submission of certain legisla-
tive enactments to the electorate. This version is often used for debt au-
thorization 3 and is necessary in forty-nine states for legislatively initiated
amendments to the state constitution.3 5 In the second version, often styled
the voluntary referendum, the legislature is given the option to refer mea-
sures to the voters.3" In its final form, usually known as the popular refer-
endum, citizens can petition to force a referral of a previously en-
acted-but not yet effective-legislative measure.3 7
Direct democracy, the conventional history tells us, was a response of
the Progressive Reform movement to the widely perceived corruption and
control of legislatures by corporate wealth. The Progressives' remedy
curbed legislators by placing corrective power in the citizenry.3" Substitu-
initiative may afford opportunities for debate, deliberation, compromise, and amendment that the ini-
tiative process ordinarily lacks. See infra text accompanying notes 231-247.
32. The word "referendum" is, however, often used synonymously with "plebiscite" to refer to all
ballot measures. See T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 2; P. McGUIGAN, supra note 15, at 25; Lowen-
stein, supra note 27, at 508 n.4. As such it can encompass initiatives. See, e.g., REFERENDUMS, supra
note 25, at 23-24.
33. Although there exists a fourth version of the referendum, the advisory referendum, I have
omitted it from my discussion because it results in no enactment and is thus beyond the ambit of
judicial review.
34. See BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 27, at 218-19 (Table 5.15) (listing 14 state constitu-
tions that require referendum for debt authorization).
35. See infra Appendix A.
36. Fourteen states provide for voluntary submission by the legislature. See id. In some states only
certain subject matters may be voluntarily referred. Others leave the scope entirely to legislative
discretion.
37. Twenty-four states provide for popular referenda, see id., but the device is not used fre-
quently, see T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 197, perhaps due in part to the short time frame permitted
for signature collection. See P. McGUIGAN, supra note 15, at 28. Scholarly treatments of direct de-
mocracy frequently lump the popular referendum with the initiative, see, e.g., D. MAGLEBY, supra
note 16, at 1, no doubt because both originate with the voters. This is a little too simplistic. A popular
referendum cannot result in the enactment of law unless a legislature has first passed on the measure
favorably. Where the voters confirm the legislative choice, the popular referendum is more comple-
mentary than substitutive. It is when popular referenda repeal legislative efforts that they most resem-
ble substitutive plebiscites. This, however, is a claim that might be made about any repeal by refer-
enda. It is not unique to the popular referendum. See infra Part III.B.
38. See, e.g., V.O. KEY & W. CROUCH, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA
(1939); L. TALLIAN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INITIATIVE, REFER-
ENDUM AND RECALL PROCESS 34-44 (1977); J. ZIMMERMAN, PARTICIPATORY DEMOCRACY 35, 69
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tive plebiscites, by circumventing the legislative framework, rectify corrup-
tion that impedes legislation. In contrast, the Progressives directed com-
plementary plebiscites against corruption that produces legislation.
Toward this end, the reformers added a new layer to the lawmaking pro-
cess. Thus, the two Progressive reforms simultaneously made it easier and
more difficult to enact laws. One dismantled the system of checks and
balances. The other augmented it. A consideration of judicial review of
direct democracy must be sensitive to the difference. The bulk of my anal-
ysis in Part II focuses on the substitutive form of direct democracy. I con-
sider the theory's peculiar implications for the complementary form in
Part III.B.
II. RETHINKING THE COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN DIFFICULTY
A. Does Direct Democracy Accurately Reflect Majority Will?
Majoritarian democracy, we constantly are reminded, is the core of our
constitutional system. If so, the plebiscite certainly seems to have a strong
claim to being its most treasured instrument. Proponents of direct democ-
racy regularly champion the plebiscite as the means by which to hear the
genuine voice of the people. Oh sure, it would be nice to have town meet-
ings, New England style. But our sheer numbers make that unfeasible,
even if most of us could be counted upon not to show up. The next best
way to gauge the sentiments of the citizenry would seem to be a plebiscite.
(1986). An alternative story is available, Some historians have revealed a darker side to the Progres-
sive Reform movement. Impulse for reform seldom originated with working-class or immigrant
groups. Instead, those who spearheaded it frequently were distinctly middle-class, see R. HoF-
STADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 131-271 (1955), or even upper-class, see S. HAYS, AMERICAN PO-
LITICAL HISTORY AS SOCIAL ANALYSIS 209-14 (1980). Reformers may have been less interested in
expanding popular participation in the governmental process than in grabbing a piece of the pie for
themselves. As historian Leland Baldwin has written, reformers came in different guises. Sometimes
they were "practical idealists, sometimes disgruntled politicians or business elements seeking to over-
throw the old regime, sometimes aspiring young men ready to seize any entree to power." L. BALD-
WIN, THE STREAM OF AMERICAN HISTORY 381 (1952); see also S. HAYS, supra, at 215 ("The
movement for reform in municipal government . . . constituted an attempt by upper-class . . . and
large business groups to take formal political power from the previously dominant lower- and middle-
class elements."); Davidson & Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation: A
Reexamination of Historical and Contemporary Evidence, in MINORITY VOTE DILuTION 78 (C.
Davidson ed. 1984) ("many [Progressive] reformers . . . (sought] to wrest control of municipalities
from laboring classes and ethnic minorities"). There is evidence that expansion of direct democracy
often was designed more as a political tactic to secure immediate victory against the existing political
machine than as an alternative system of sustained decision-making. S. HAYS, supra, at 228-29. The
reformers might have claimed to be neutralizing the powers of the special interests but they more
often than not backed direct democracy devices principally because they favored alternative policy
outcomes. See T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 58-59. It would be foolhardy, of course, to ignore the
geographical variations in the origins and motivations of reform. California's Progressive effort was
largely precipitated by concern over the monopolistic power of the Southern Pacific Railroad, see G.
MOWRY, THE CALIFORNIA PROGRESSIVES (1951), and, in Wisconsin, Progressive support tended to
come from the poor rural portions of the state, see Wyman, Middle-Class Voters and Progressive
Reform: The Conflict of Class and Culture, 68 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 488-504 (1974). It might do well
to recognize, however, that some of the special interest control that often characterizes direct democ-
racy, see infra note 246, may not have been an unintended by-product.
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Compared to direct democracy, the legislature seems far removed from
majority preferences. When we vote for candidates it is often difficult to
know exactly what we are saying. And even if representatives perfectly
mirrored the people who voted for them, inequalities of representation
and all sorts of institutional practices prevent accurate legislative expres-
sions of popular will. 9 When, on the other hand, we are asked to register
our views on a single issue, the assertion that the result reflects the major-
ity's preference has great force. 40
In Part II.B, I shall argue that this quest for more accurate aggregation
of majority will is misguided. The gap between the will of the majority
and the voice of the legislature, it turns out, is there by constitutional
design. But even accepting, for the moment, the underlying premise that
the identification of majoritarian preferences is the central mission of
American government, the accuracy of the plebiscite as a measuring stick
is not beyond questioning. In more ways than we might acknowledge ini-
tially, popular votes do a flawed job of discovering what "the people"
really want. To begin with, less than half of the adult American popula-
tion regularly vote-a level of electoral participation that is by far the
lowest found in any Western country."1 These are scarcely ideal condi-
tions for gauging "the people's" sentiments on any specific issue. What is
worse, significant numbers of those who vote for candidates at the top of
the ballot fail to follow through ("dropoff") when it comes to voting on
initiatives and referenda."2 We legitimately may question whether the full
39. See A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 18; Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court 1988
Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 79 (1989).
40. See Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1144
(1986) (there is good reason to believe that referendum reflects majority's preferences).
41. See W. BURNHAM, THE CURRENT CRISIS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 11, 161 n.1 (1982). Ac-
cording to Burnham, about 44% of the national electorate are "core" voters, about 16% are "periph-
eral," and the remaining 40% are outside the political system altogether. Id. at 46. On the "disappear-
ance" of the American voter, see generally Burnham's historical narrative at 121-65. According to
figures compiled by the Bureau of the Census, there were nearly 170,000,000 Americans of voting age
in 1984. Less than 102,000,000 reported that they had voted in that year's presidential election. See
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce, "Characteristics of Voters in 1984 Presidential
Election," reported in 1989 INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 617. These data exaggerate actual par-
ticipation because official tabulations of the vote suggest substantial overreporting. Id. (Reagan and
Mondale totaled only 92,000,000 votes). Abstention, of course, runs even higher in off-year elections.
42. See T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 67 (5 to 15 percent dropoff in voter participation is com-
mon in state issue elections); D. MAGLEaY, supra note 16, at 100 (on average 15 to 18 percent of
those who turn out do not vote on statewide propositions); Gillette, supra note 19, at 969 n.136
(anecdotal evidence on dropoff in Massachusetts in 1984 and 1986). There is some dispute over the
methodology used to measure voter "dropoff" (the proportion of voters who cast ballots but do not
vote on a particular measure). Magleby compares the rate of voting on ballot measures with the rate
of voting for the candidate contests with the highest turnouts-like gubernatorial elections. Others
have argued that a more appropriate standard of comparison is voter participation in congressional
and state legislative races. Judged by this standard, dropoff rates diminish markedly. See Briffault,
supra note 19, at 1358-59. In addition, it appears that dropoffs may disappear altogether for well-
publicized or hotly contested ballot measures. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 18, at 56
(in California primary elections from 1968 to 1982, initiative or referendum which drew highest
number of votes usually outpolled candidates at top of ballot); T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 3 (more
people voted on California's famous Proposition 13 than in same day's gubernatorial primaries); see
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citizenry share the preferences of the subgroup who actually vote on the
ballot proposition.
Two responses might be offered. First, those who cast votes may be
representative of those who stay home. It is by no means clear, however,
that nonvoters would be divided in the same proportion as voters. Citizens
of higher social and economic status are far more heavily represented
among voters than among those who abstain, a class skew virtually unpar-
alleled in any other political system conducting free elections.4" This bias
is exaggerated by the nature of who "drops-off" for ballot measure voting.
Compared with voters generally, people who typically vote on proposi-
tions are disproportionately well-educated, affluent, and white." Minori-
ties, the poor, and the uneducated are thus doubly underrepresented in the
plebiscite. They are both less likely to turn out and less likely to vote on
propositions if they do.
A second response might be that of estoppel. As the pre-election ads
used to proclaim, "Vote and the choice is yours. Don't vote and the choice
is theirs." In effect, those who choose to stay home are deemed to have
given their proxies to those who go to the polls. This argument, however,
enjoys diminished force if we have built obstacles into the process that
make ballot measures inaccessible to certain groups. As David Magleby
suggests, voters with less education rely more on political parties for vot-
ing cues. When asked to vote on complex and technical issues, they are
less able to translate their political preferences into votes. 45 My own expe-
also B. ZISK, MONEY, MEDIA AND THE GRASS RooTS 69, 74, 80 (1987) (tables breaking down voter
dropoff by issue).
43. Sfe W. BURNHAM, supra note 41, at 11, 121; S. VERBA & N. NIE, PARTICIPATION IN
AMERICA: POLITICAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL EQUALITY 125 (1972). In a 1976 survey of the
Bureau of the Census, 30% of people in lower working-class occupations reported that they had never
voted. Among white males of the propertied middle class the figure was 6%. See id. at 123-24. See
generally R. WOLFINGER & S. ROSENSTONE, WHO VOTES (1980); Bureau of the Census, supra note
41, at 617 (in 1984 Presidential election 61% of employed voted as against 44% of unemployed; 79%
of those with 16 or more years of education voted as against 44% of those with 11 or fewer years). On
minority underrepresentation among voters, see generally Morris, Black Electoral Participation and
the Distribution of Public Benefits, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 273-77 (C. Davidson ed. 1984).
44. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 106-11. A 1968 survey found that while 27% of those
who voted for candidates had some college education, this group constituted 35% of those voting on
ballot issues; middle or upper class voters made up 45% of those voting on candidates, but 52% of
those voting on ballot issues; while whites constituted 87% of those voting for candidates, they made
up 92% of those who voted on ballot issues. See T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 76 (Table 4.4).
45. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 111. Not surprisingly, a 1976 Massachusetts survey revealed
that persons in the lowest income category were the most likely to state that they could not vote on a
proposition because it was too long and they were unable to assess what a yes or no vote would mean.
Id. at 116; see also T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 75 (because ballot-measure democracy requires
voters who can digest and evaluate sophisticated information, it sometimes works to disfranchise cer-
tain kinds of voters). For a general argument that widespread nonparticipation is inappropriately
attributed to the indifference and shiftlessness of the people, see E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-
SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 97-113 (1960) (nonvoting caused by exclusion of people by extralegal process, by
social processes, and by political system's organization and structure). See also Morris, supra note 43,
at 275-77 (examining factors that contribute to low voter turnout among blacks: history of subordina-
tion and deliberate exclusion from politics; socioeconomic and psychological characteristics of black
population; structural or procedural arrangements that discourage voting; leadership styles within
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rience in attempting to understand the ballot pamphlets, let alone the pro-
positions they seek to elucidate, indicates that barriers are significant.
Considering the complexity and obtuseness of some measures, it's a
wonder that anyone knows what he or she is voting on. Not surprisingly,
a recent poll of voters revealed that only fifteen percent of those surveyed
felt that they consistently knew enough about initiative measures to make
a wise decision.46 And here, the direct democracy enthusiasts encounter
their second problem. If the voters are unclear, ignorant or mistaken
about what their vote signifies, then we ought to be wary of attributing
majority support to the prevailing position. Because each individual has
only a minor effect on political outcomes decided by majorities, voters have
little incentive to become well informed."' Those willing to invest the time
will find the deck stacked against them. The propositions themselves tend
to be lengthy, complex, technical, carelessly phrased, and ambiguous.
They cross-reference other statutes and use legal terms of art beyond the
ken of the ordinary voter. It is hard to take issue with those who conclude
that the measures are accessible only to those with substantial college edu-
cation.48 Because political parties seldom take a stand on ballot measures,
external cues are more difficult to come by than in candidate elections. To
compound matters, a ballot is rarely limited to a single measure. The bal-
lot that greeted me when I entered the voting booth this past year con-
tained twenty-nine statewide measures, 49 six citywide propositions, and a
black communities).
46. Another 37% claimed to know enough about the issues involved to make a wise decision on
ballot measures "most" of the time. The remaining 47% admitted to confusion on a regular basis. See
Joint Project of the USC Institute of Politics and Government & Common Cause (1985) (on file with
author). Similar voter perceptions were detected in an earlier mail survey of four western states.
Thus, 41% of Arizona voters surveyed "strongly agreed" that initiative and referendum measures on
the ballot were "so complicated that one can't understand what is going on" with 33% agreeing
"somewhat." In Colorado, 23% strongly agreed and 36% agreed somewhat. In Oregon, the figures
were 20% and 40% and in Washington, 18% and 34%. See T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 74 (citing
R. Benedict & L. Holland, Initiatives and Referenda in the Western United States, 1976-1980: Some
Implications for a National Initiative? 40 (unpublished paper presented at the American Political
Science Association annual meeting, Washington, D.C., August 1980)).
47. See A. DOWNS, AN ECONOMiC THEORY OF DEMOCRACY (1956); Becker, A Theory of Com-
petition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influence, 98 Q.J. EcoN. 371, 392 (1983). This is
particularly so in ballot issue elections where the "information costs" are even higher than in candi-
date elections. See T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 67. It may be, however, that low incentives lead most
voters to refrain from voting altogether. See Gillette, supra note 19, at 969 (consumption benefits
explanation of voting suggests that individuals with little interest in outcome of ballot proposition are
unlikely to vote).
48. David Magleby has applied several academic readability formulas, measuring word difficulty,
sentence length, complexity, and conceptual difficulty, to the short ballot summaries provided voters in
California, Massachusetts, Oregon, and Rhode Island. According to Magleby, the summa-
ries-presumably designed to aid voter understanding-themselves were readable only at the fifteenth
grade level (third year of college) in Massachusetts and Rhode Island and at the eighteenth grade
level (bachelor's degree plus two additional years) in California and Oregon. Magleby concludes that,
judged solely by formal schooling, less than one-fifth the adults in these four states have the capacity
to read and understand the actual ballot question and description. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at
118-19.
49. Two authors have computed that, from 1911 to 1967, there were an average of 22 statewide
propositions on the California ballot every general election. See Wolfinger & Greenstein, The Repeal
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countywide bond issue. Such overloads are guaranteed to so strain the
voters' capacity for education as virtually to ensure decisions inconsistent
with their own desires. To be sure, few jurisdictions can match the Los
Angeles ballot (a fact for which you all should be grateful), but recent
years have shown a proliferation of statewide measures throughout the
nation. The 230 that appeared on the November 1988 ballot in a total of
41 states included the greatest number of initiatives and popular referenda
placed before voters in half a century.5"
Proponents and opponents of the ballot measures do little to assist voter
understanding. Indeed, quite to the contrary, the motivating factor behind
their efforts often seems to be to confuse the voter about the significance of
a "yes" or "no" vote. Illustrations of deceptive advertising and sloganeer-
ing abound. 51 This past year saw the tobacco industry spending twenty-
three million dollars in an effort to defeat an initiative intended to raise
cigarette taxes. The industry ads labelled it "the first initiative which ac-
tually creates crime" (apparently on the bizarre theory, often not revealed
in the billboards and television commercials, that higher tobacco taxes
would encourage cigarette smuggling). Although the initiative ultimately
passed, the deceptive ads contributed to a reduction in voter support from
the seventy-five percent who favored it in a pre-ad poll to the fifty-eight
percent who ultimately voted in favor.52
A recent innovation in obfuscation has been the placement of competing
propositions on the ballot, leaving voters completely baffled about which
one does what. Perhaps the boldest effort at using this new tactic was
engineered by Occidental Petroleum. The Los Angeles City Council had
entered into a contract with Occidental giving the company the right to
drill for oil beneath one of the city's coastal communities. Some concerned
citizens collected signatures for an initiative (Proposition 0) designed to
bar the drilling. Occidental qualified a competing initiative (Proposition
P) which incredibly appeared to oppose offshore drilling. Only the most
perceptive of readers could grasp the hidden intent of Occidental's ef-
fort-to mandate onshore drilling. Occidental then compounded its decep-
tion by advertising Proposition P as environmental legislation and enti-
tling it "The Los Angeles Public Protection, Coastal Protection, and
Energy Resources Initiative." It enlisted a former Governor, Edmund
"Pat" Brown, to write a letter to the voters. Brown urged the defeat of
of Fair Housing in California: An Analysis of Referendum Voting, 62 Am. POL. Scl. REV. 753, 767
n.40 (1968).
50. Set 9 INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM REPORT No. 10, at 15, 18 (Dec. 1988) [hereinafter
INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM REPORT]; see also D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKING 24 (1989)
(charting rise of initiative use).
51. See generally Lowenstein, supra note 27, for a host of outrageous examples. See also LEAGUE
OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 18, at 110-11.
52. See Wolinsky, supra note 16, at 3; L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 1988, at 26, col. 3; INITIATIVE AND
REFERENDUM: THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE! 6-7 (Winter 1989).
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Proposition 0 because, unlike Proposition P, it "contains not a single
word in opposition to offshore oil drilling." A legal effort to strike Occi-
dental's measure from the ballot as fraudulent was denied by a state court
judge, who unwittingly damned the entire California process of direct de-
mocracy by concluding that Proposition P was "probably no more mis-
leading than any other initiative.""3 Any reader confused by this alphabet-
ical parade and forced to refer back to the onset of this paragraph to
discover whose initiative was Proposition 0 and whose was P, is exper-
iencing but a small measure of the voters' bewilderment.
Frequently, voter confusion results simply in a decision to forego voting
on the ballot measure. 54 On other occasions, however, it leads voters to
vote "incorrectly"-contrary to their own desires. Studies of voting on
propositions generally reveal a significant percentage of voters casting bal-
lots at variance with their stated policy preferences. Estimates of this
number generally run from ten to fifteen percent, although occasionally
the figures rise much higher. 5  Sometimes incorrect voting is attributable
to the wording of the proposition. In a 1980 plebiscite on a local rent
control ordinance those desiring to retain rent control were required to
vote against the measure. Over three-fourths of the voters questioned in
exit surveys did not match up their views on rent control with their vote-
on the measure. One quarter favoring rent control incorrectly voted yes
while one half opposing it erroneously cast a negative vote.58 More often,
the complexity of the issue or deceptive campaigns produce the disparity
between desire and vote.
This does not mean that every-or even most-plebiscites are inaccu-
rate reflectors of the desires of those who vote. The extent of incorrect
voting depends on the nature of the issue and the campaign waged. Fo:"
example, the 1964 repeal of fair housing legislation and the 1978 tax re-
volt in California undoubtedly were fair indicators of public sentiment.
57
53. See Palisadian Post, July 28, 1988, at 1, col. 2. Former Governor Brown's letter is on file
with the author. Occidental's campaign unfortunately is part of a rich tradition of seeking to dupe
voters into believing that environmental efforts are anti-conservationist. See, e.g., Lowenstein, supra
note 27, at 529-30.
54. In a recent USC-Common Cause poll of California voters, supra note 46, 68% of those sur-
veyed asserted that they would not vote on ballot measures about which they felt ignorant. If those
polled are being truthful, one has to wonder why "voter dropoffs" on ballot measures are not much
higher than have been reported, see supra note 42, given the large number that confess ignorance, see
supra note 46.
55. See, e.g., Mueller, Voting on the Propositions: Ballot Patterns and Historical Trends in
California, 63 AM. POL. ScI. REV. 1197, 1202-03 (1969) (60% who voted on lottery proposition
marked ballot capriciously); D. Anderson, Voting and Misvoting on the Ohio Election Day Registra-
tion Referendum 13 (unpublished paper presented to the Ohio Association of Economists and Political
Scientists, March 10, 1979) (15% of voters on this Ohio referendum voted at variance with their
stated position), cited in D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 142-43; D. Hensler & C. Hensler, Evaluat-
ing Nuclear Power: Voter Choice on the California Nuclear Energy Initiative 106 (1979) (Rand
Corporation survey) (14% of sample interviewed voted contrary to their stated intentions), cited in T.
CRONIN, supra note 16, at 74.
56. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 143-44.
57. See Wolfinger & Greenstein, supra note 49, at 754-58 (voting on repeal of California's fair
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Even considerable confusion need not necessarily undermine the accuracy
of ballot voting as a gauge of majority preferences. The margin of victory
or defeat may exceed the number of those who vote incorrectly or the
confused voters on either side of the issue may balance each other out.
Further, if the conventional wisdom that confused voters tend to vote "no"
is accurate, 58 incorrect votes cast by those who recognize their own confu-
sion will lead more frequently to false negatives (propositions defeated
even though a majority of those voting really favored them) than false
positives (propositions passed despite majority opposition). Nonetheless,
the possibility that a successful ballot measure may fail to reflect the will
of the majority because of the confusion of some who voted for it can not
be ignored.59
Even if voters on ballot measures were representative of the general
population-as they most assuredly are not-and even if votes were cast
consistent with preferences-which a good deal of them do not appear to
be-it simply may not be possible to assess majority will on the basis of
plebiscitary results.
Take the following illustration: A city council elects to construct a drug
rehabilitation facility in one of the city's three residential neighborhoods.
A referendum is placed on the ballot which designates neighborhood A as
the site. Some citizens of neighborhood A gather signatures for an initia-
tive to preclude placement of such a facility in any residential area. Al-
though a majority of the citizens of neighborhoods B and C favor the
initiative, the second choice of most is that it be built in somebody else's
backyard. Accordingly, both ballot measures pass. Furthermore, it is
equally clear that the council's referendum would have passed just the
same if the designated community had been neighborhood B or C. The
majority, therefore, "desires" to bar drug rehabilitation facilities from
every residential community-and to authorize their placement in any
such community. The possibility of voting paradoxes such as this6" signifi-
housing legislation accurately reflected underlying attitudes); T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 87 (Cali-
fornia voters understood Proposition 13 property tax relief measure).
58. See Briffault, supra note 19, at 1356 (lack of information about initiative proposal leads voters
to vote negative); Comment, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Refonn, 48 S. CAL.
L. REV. 922, 935 (1975) (campaign managers for opponents of initiative measures often attempt to
confuse the voters, relying on political maxim "when in doubt, the electorate votes 'no' "); see also
Joint Project, supra note 46 (voters polled reported that when they lack knowledge they are more
likely to vote "No" than "Yes"). But see B. ZISK, supra note 42, at 170 ("I do not find strong support
for the assertion that the confused voter votes 'no.' "); Lowenstein, supra note 27, at 551-56 (theory
that confused or uncertain voter will resolve doubts by voting "no" is superficial and incomplete).
59. Daniel Lowenstein's extensive study of ballot campaigns dominated by "one-sided spending"
spreading deceptive, superficial and irrelevant messages reveals that the result in certain of these
elections "failed to reflect the will of the majority." Lowenstein, supra note 27, at 570. Nearly all of
Professor Lowenstein's examples, however, are false negatives-ballot measures that failed in spite of
apparent majority support.
60. By the term "voting paradox" I mean broadly the coexistence of coherent individual valua-
tions and a collectively incoherent choice. Voting paradoxes may occur as a result of cycling majorities,
strategic voting, or agenda manipulation. See generally D. BLACK, THE THEORY OF COMMITTEES
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cantly cloud the meaning of popular voting as a measure of majority
preference."'
Of course, the application of these social choice critiques to direct de-
mocracy might prove too much, for no reasonably fair method of combin-
ing individual preferences can avoid the possibility of paradoxical re-
sults.6 2 Thus, it may be impossible to reflect accurately such a thing as the
will of the majority. 3 If so, plebiscites may not be uniquely disabled in
their ability to express popular will. Any form of collective preference
may yield unstable majorities and ambiguous results. This general fallibil-
ity of voting systems has induced Clayton Gillette to assert that "it is
unclear that the problem [of aggregating preferences] affects participatory
processes more than representative ones."'64  It is hard to know how to
assess his claim. Legislatures have a variety of structures, rules, and
norms to ameliorate voting paradoxes.65 Admittedly, some of these devices
are merely arbitrary tools for breaking majority cycles,66 but one must not
discount the impact of deliberation and the opportunities for compromise
and amendment. Legislators may agree to debate until one side convinces
the other6 7 or until someone offers up a new alternative which a majority
is willing to embrace as the body's preference. Deliberation can even lead
to redefinition of the issue. In contrast, the rigidity of plebiscites may en-
hance the possibility of a skewed picture of majority will. Plebiscites offer
only binary choices, but the set of solutions to a given problem is seldom
AND ELECTIONS (1958). An "unstable majority" is present where there exists a group of voters with
the joint power to overturn it in favor of an alternative outcome that they like more. See generally
Schwartz, The Universal-Instability Theorem, 37 PUB. CHOICE 487 (1981). A result is "ambiguous"
where a different profile of preferences might have been obtained by using a different rule of aggrega-
tion. See Coleman & Ferejohn, Democracy and Social Choice, 97 ETHICS 11 (1986). Concrete evi-
dence of paradoxical outcomes, unstable majorities or ambiguous results are difficult to isolate. When
inconsistent results occur in successive elections, we are likely to attribute them to "changed prefer-
ences." On those occasions when conflicting choices emerge from simultaneously presented ballot mea-
sures, we tend to blame voter confusion.
61. See W. RIKER, LIBERALISM AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THE-
ORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE (1982). But see Coleman & Ferejohn,
supra note 60, at 22-24 (Riker overstates implications of instability results of social choice); Cohen,
An Epistemic Conception of Democrac'y, 97 ETHICS 26, 29 (1986) ("judgments of majorities, made
under suitable conditions, provide a reasonable, although imperfect procedure for determining the
general will").
62. See K. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963).
63. See W. RIKER, supra note 61, at 137 (Arrow's Theorem may lead us to suspect that no such
thing as "public interest" exists, aside from subjective-and hence dubious-claims of self-proclaimed
saviors); L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 12 n.6 (given Arrow's Theorem, one may deny that there exists
any meaningful sense in which any process can even hope to "reflect" the will of majority).
64. Gillette, supra note 19, at 933. A similar assumption of the parity of the problem in the two
settings appears in Amar, supra note 2, at 1080 (if social choice critiques destroy the idea of rational
majoritarian legislature, they can equally be deployed to destroy idea of rational majoritarian polity);
see also Coleman & Ferejohn, supra note 60, at 8-9, 24 (1986) (instability and ambiguity do not
alone provide reason for preferring representative democracy over direct democracy).
65. See Farber & Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 873, 901-06
(1987) (Arrow's Theorem may have little direct relevance to legislatures because structures, rules, and
norms prevent cycling majorities).
66. But see id. at 903 (suggesting that many rules themselves have normative value).
67. Id.
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so limited. The fact that we restrict ourselves to two alternatives should
not obscure the fact that we start off with many more. 8 Further, limited
access to the ballot may provide greater opportunities for agenda manipu-
lation by initiative sponsors, enabling them to achieve equilibria not re-
flective of majority tastes.6 9
In the end, enumerating the plebiscite's flaws in expressing majority
preferences can carry us only so far. Regardless of the many ways in
which plebiscites garble the message of majority will, it would be difficult
to argue convincingly that legislatures convey it more clearly.70 Plebiscites
seek to aggregate the preferences of the people. Legislative voting aggre-
gates only the preferences of the representatives. To be sure, these repre-
sentatives often purport to speak on behalf of their constituents, but it is
fanciful to equate the two. If our goal is to assess majority will, the legis-
lature appears to start at a distinct disadvantage. Even if it does better
than plebiscites at aggregating individual preferences, its collective judg-
ment is still one large step away from reflecting popular will. 1
On the other hand, the criticisms I have canvassed take a good deal of
the wind out of direct democracy's sails. The core of the plebiscite's claim
for judicial deference is its superior ability to convey the majority's view-
point. This enhanced capacity to speak on behalf of the people is what
68. See W. RIKER, supra note 61, at 41.
69. Id. at 169-95 (agenda manipulation often enforces equilibrium that majority tastes would not
allow). Because it is extremely rare for binary choices to occur naturally, id. at 59, those who control
the agenda can strategically reduce the alternatives offered, id. at 137. In the example used above, a
group favoring the placement of the drug rehabilitation facility in a residential neighborhood would
frame the choice as between neighborhood A on the one hand and neighborhoods B and C on the
other. In this way they might attain victory-largely as a result of agenda manipulation-even though
the first choice of a majority of voters was to confine such facilities to non-residential areas. Such an
election tells us at most which alternative wins. It does not tells us that the winner would also have
been chosen over another alternative with a better claim to be the social choice. Id. at 238.
70. See generally Riker & Weingast, Constitutional Regulation of Legislative Choice: The Politi-
,al Consequences of Judicial Deference to Legislatures, 74 VA. L. REv. 373 (1988) (notion that
legislative action represents popular will is fundamentally unsound). One may seriously wonder, how-
ever, whether, in certain instances, legislatures do not do better at ascertaining majority will than the
plebiscite. This argument, of course, is dependent on accepting the objective existence of a "majority
will" outside the revealed preferences of voters. If one is willing to reject the equivalence of actual and
revealed preferences, it may well be that legislators occasionally have a better shot at discovering the
actual preferences of the citizenry than does polling an advertising-manipulated, class-biased subgroup
of the people on a nonamendable, binary choice proposition.
71. The aggregation difficulties associated with direct and representative democracy can be com-
pared in a quite different way. Rather than contrasting how voters and legislative bodies fare in
reflecting majority will, one might compare the aggregation of voters' preferences on ballot issues with
the aggregation of their candidate selections. If the voters are unable to act in a meaningful sense in
expressing their will on plebiscites, how can their election of officials be any more "representative"?
See Coleman & Ferejohn, supra note 60, at 21 (if outcomes of social choices are ambiguous and
unstable, we cannot expect officials to take account of such signals in deciding how to behave). Wil-
liam Riker, while conceding that the aggregation problems in both these settings are similar, contends
that the consequences are strikingly different. The point of plebiscites is to uncover the general will.
In contrast, Riker argues, all that voting for officials has to do is permit the people to get rid of their
rulers-an intermittent, sometimes random, even perverse popular veto. Elections for representatives
are therefore unembarrassed by their failure to reveal a coherent popular will. W. RIKER, supra note
61, at 241-46.
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Justice Black was talking about when he called the ballot proposition "as
near to a democracy as you can get." If the relationship between voter
expressions and the majority's true desires is clouded by the functional
disfranchisement of the lower classes, the confused, manipulated, and
deceived quality of the votes cast, and the incoherence of the resulting
aggregation, then direct democracy's edge over representative government
is not as great as it first appeared" 2-even under a constitution that gives
pre-eminent importance to unchecked majority rule. As it turns out, how-
ever, the United States does not have such a constitution.
B. The Constitutional Filtering of Majority Will
If the Constitution's Framers were keen on majority rule, they certainly
had a bizarre manner of demonstrating their affection. The Federalist No.
10 hardly qualifies as an ode to the virtues of simple majoritarianism. On
the contrary, it may be the ultimate in "Dear John" letters, addressed to
transient majorities wherever they might be found. To be sure, Madison
directs his venom at the threat of factions, "whether amounting to a ma-
jority or minority of the whole," '73 but the latter, he believed, could be
restrained "by regular vote." Minority factions might "clog the adminis-
tration," and "convulse the society," but they would "be unable to execute
. . . [their] violence under the forms of the Constitution. '74 Majority fac-
tions were far more to be feared, willing as they might be to sacrifice "the
public good and the rights of other citizens" to their "ruling passion or
interest. ' 75 This theme runs throughout The Federalist. "If a majority be
united by a common interest," wrote Madison in The Federalist No. 51,
"the rights of the minority will be insecure."7 6 "[T]here are particular
moments in public affairs," he opined in The Federalist No. 63, "when
the people stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage,
or misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call for
measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready to la-
ment." Government must provide "safeguard[s] against the tyranny of
[such] passions.""
Madison and Hamilton 8 had plenty of company in their distrust of
majorities. As Charles Beard has cynically noted, simple direct majority
72. Riker has a compelling point here. Populism, he argues, depends on the existence of popular
will discovered by voting. But, if voting does not reveal a will, if the people speak in meaningless
tongues, populism as a concept is rendered quite empty. W. RIKER, supra note 61, at 239.
73. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 U. Madison).
74. Id. at 60 (J. Madison).
75. Id. at 60-61 U. Madison).
76. Id. No. 51, at 351 (J. Madison).
77. Id. No. 63, at 425 U. Madison); see also id. No. 49, at 343 U. Madison) (government should
regulate and control passions of public).
78. See, e.g., id. No. 71, at 482 (A. Hamilton) (when interests of people are at variance with their
inclinations, elected representatives are duty bound to withstand people's temporary delusions).
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rule "was undoubtedly more odious to most of the delegates to the Con-
vention than was slavery."'79 Indeed, some historians contend that the cen-
tral problem that prompted the convening of the delegates at Philadelphia
was not the weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation but concern over
an excess of populism in the state governments.80 What Madison called
the "inconveniences of democracy" threatened creditor rights and individ-
ual property interests.8 ' And the delegates-representing the
"haves"-had plenty to fear from the masses of "have nots."
It is idle (but fun nonetheless) to speculate how the delegates might
have responded to a proposal that the Constitution contain provisions for
initiatives or referenda. Such devices were virtually unknown to them. 2
But everything about the tone of the Convention suggests that they would
have looked upon such a scheme "with a feeling akin to horror."8" This
impression is reinforced by the fate of a proposal to include in the First
Amendment a right of the people to "instruct their representatives."
Madison and his fellow Federalists labored mightily-and success-
fully-to block this attempt, fearing the consequences should the repre-
sentatives feel bound to follow the instructions."
All of this is pretty odd conduct for a lot supposedly committed to rul-
79. See Beard's introductory comments in DOCUMENTS ON THE STATE-WIDE INITIATIVE, REF-
ERENDUM AND RECALL 29 (C. Beard & B. Schultz eds. 1912) [hereinafter DOCUMENTS]. At the
Convention, Edmund Randolph complained of "the. . . follies of democracy," Elbridge Gerry called
democracy "the worst of all political evils," and Roger Sherman prayed that the people "have as little
to do as may be about the government." See Lobel, supra note 19, at 827-28.
80. See, e.g., Wood, Democrac. and the Constitution, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITU-
TION 1-17 (R. Goldwin & W. Schambra eds. 1980). But see H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,
336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949) (sole purpose for which Virginia initiated movement which ultimately
produced Constitution was to deal with economic Balkanization); Eule, Laying the Dormant Com-
merce Clause to Rest, 91 YALE L.J. 425, 430 (1982) (commercial warfare between states generally
regarded to be the primary catalyst for Convention of 1787).
81. See I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 134-35 (M. Farrand ed.
1966). Bruce Ackerman argues, quite persuasively, that Madison's concern about democratic excesses
was not limited to the fear of materialistic special interests. No less threatening were factions based
upon narrow ideological ends-for example, the effort by sectarian groups to establish their own
Church. See Ackerman, Storrs Lectures, supra note 2, at 1022 n.16; see also Diamond, Decent, Even
Though Democratic, in How DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTIrtrrION, supra note 80, at 29 (Madison
was troubled not only by "poor" majorities but also by majorities united by attachment to particular
religion, philosophical point of view, or spellbinding demagogue).
82. Participatory government of a very limited kind did exist in eighteenth-century America. Al-
though some have traced decision-making by referendum back as far as seventeenth-century Massa-
chusetts, see T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 12, its first statewide use appears to have occurred when
the citizens of Massachusetts ratified their state constitution less than a decade before the Philadelphia
Convention. See REFERENDUMS, supra note 25, at 68-69; Eule, supra note 7, at 394-95.
83. DOCUMENTS, supra note 79, at 28-29 (no one has any warrant for assuming that Founders
would have countenanced a system of initiatives or referenda applied either to state or national
affairs).
84. See Amar, supra note 2, at 1058-60; 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 733-45 (U. Gales ed. 1789); 5 THE
FOUNDERS' CONSTIrtrrION 200-06 (P. Kurland & R. Lerner eds. 1987); Sunstein, Beyond the Re-
publican Revi'al, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1559 n.113 (1989); Note, The Unconstitutionality of Voter
Initiative Apphcations for Federal Constitutional Conventions, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1525, 1541
n. 116 (1985). The phrasing was changed to: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging . . . the
right of the people . . . to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST., amend.
I.
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ing with the consent of the people. At a minimum it counsels some hesita-
tion when we talk in hushed tones of the Framers' dedication to "majority
will." It may be too extreme to speak in terms of the "counter-
majoritarian premise" of the Constitution, 5 but we must certainly recog-
nize that majoritarianism. "cannot be the whole story." ' Regardless of the
clear intent of the delegates in Philadelphia to seek a direct link with the
people by relying on popularly elected state conventions to ratify the Con-
stitution,87 the people were to have no such direct role when it came to
ordinary lawmaking-at least not at the Federal level.8"
The Federalist "solutions" to the threat of majority faction are well
known to reiders of constitutional scholarship and there is little that I can
add to that literature.8" There are, however, two reasons peculiar to my
85. See Farber, The Originalisin Debate: A Guide for the Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085,
1099 (1989) (those who recognize that Constitution does not establish unmodified majoritarianism
often talk about "counter-majoritarian premise" of Constitution); see also E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER,
supra note 45, at 116 (somewhere along the line we started reading the Constitution as if it were a
democratic document). Calling the Constitution "counter-majoritarian" seems a bit of an overstate-
ment. However much it had to be qualified and guarded, Madison and the Federalists nevertheless
seemed to believe that the principle of majority rule was at the core of Republican government. See,
e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 22, at 139 (A. Hamilton) ("fundamental maxim of republican government
. . . requires that the sense of the majority should prevail"). See also Madison's defense of majority
rule as "the least imperfect" of all regimes in J. MADISON, Majority Governments, in THE MIND OF
THE FOUNDER: SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON 408-417 (M. Meyers
ed. 1981) (letter dated 1833 but probably never sent). Undoubtedly, followers of Charles Beard regard
the Federalists' many expressions of devotion to majority rule as mere posturing and propaganda. See
C. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1913) (Constitution was fun-
damentally anti-popular act masquerading in name of "the People"); see also Wood, supra note 80,
at 15 (Federalists were compelled in ratifying debate and in their publications to minimize, even to
disguise, elitist elements of the Constitution). But even if the Federalists cloaked their aristocratic
document with a democratic mantle in order to induce ratification, the mantle has become a treasured
part of our legacy. Even those enamoured with original intent as a guidepost for interpretation will
have to demonstrate why the controlling intent should be that of the persons who wrote the Constitu-
tion rather than those they persuaded to ratify it. The key therefore may not be whether the Framers
meant what they said but whether the state conventions thought that they did.
86. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1980); see also
Choper, On the Warren Court and Judicial Review, 17 CATH. U.L. REV. 20, 38 (1967) (Constitu-
tion is antimajoritarian in important sense).
87. See generally Eule, supra note 7, at 394-96. No such direct link, however, is mandated for
constitutional amendments. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920) (where Congress has required
that state legislature ratify amendment, state constitutional provision requiring that amendment be
submitted to general referendum is without effect); AFL-CIO v. Eu, 36 Cal. 3d 687, 686 P.2d 609,
206 Cal. Rptr. 89 (1984) (voter initiative seeking Federal constitutional convention to consider pro-
posed Balanced Budget Amendment-or requiring state legislature to make such request-does not
conform to Article V which gives voters no direct role in the amending process); Harper v. Walter-
mire, 691 P.2d 826 (Mont. 1984) (to same effect as Eu). But see Amar, supra note 2 (Article V is not
exclusive; current majority of People enjoy unenumerated right to amend Constitution in ways not
explicitly set out in Article V); infra note 109. See generally Note, supra note 84.
88. See infra Part II.D for a discussion of limitations imposed on the structure of state govern-
ment. For an excellent account of the Federalist's "dualistic conception of political life," distinguishing
the people's role in constitutional politics from their more limited and indirect role in normal politics,
see Ackerman, Storrs Lectures, supra note 2, and Ackerman, Constitutional Poltics, supra note 2.
89. See, e.g., D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST (1984); How DEMO-
CRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 80; G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST
(1981); G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969); Ackerman,
Storrs Lectures, supra note 2, at 1023-31; Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29, 38-48 (1985).
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endeavor here that warrant a short reiteration. First, and most obvious,
the reader will note that most of the ways the Constitution devises to filter
majority preferences are absent from direct democracy-at least from the
substitutive version." To gauge how much of a risk these missing filters
pose to individual rights we must first comprehend what the Framers
were trying to accomplish and how well their venture has fared. Second,
and not nearly as apparent, I shall suggest that the role of the judiciary in
the enforcement of Federal constitutional rights can only be understood in
the context of this grand scheme of "solutions." Where courts are but one
of many checks on majority preferences, they serve predominantly as a
safety net to catch those grains of tyrannical majoritarianism that slip
through when the constitutional filtering system malfunctions.9 Most ar-
guments for judicial restraint, I shall suggest, ought not to be perceived as
pro-majoritarian. They are more on the order of "everything in its place."
The claim is not that majorities do not need checking, but that courts are
just one of several "solutions" to majority factions. The delicate balance
put in place by the Framers is disturbed as much by judicial hyperactivity
as by judicial dormancy. Where, however, the filtering system has been
removed, courts must play a larger role-not because direct democracy is
unconstitutional, nor because it frequently produces legislation that we
may find substantively displeasing or short sighted, but because the judici-
ary stands alone in guarding against the evils incident to transient, impas-
sioned majorities that the Constitution seeks to dissipate. Only when we
understand the contextual setting in which we ordinarily visualize judicial
review can we formulate a picture of it when it is removed from its tradi-
tional context.
My assertion that the Federalists' "solutions" to the threat of majority
faction must inform the judicial role in reviewing direct democracy does
not overlook the fact that it was principally the structure of the national
government that commanded their attention. It may not be obvious that
the Framers' structural checks on majorities have relevance to state law-
making processes. In Part II.D.1, I seek to demonstrate the relevance by
exploring the constitutional provision guaranteeing each state a "Republi-
can Form of Government." No claim is made that this clause demands
90. Complementary direct democracy appears to provide an additional filtering device. Thus legis-
lative enactments that have survived the various Federalist "solutions" must surmount one more hur-
dle-voter ratification. At first glance, therefore, complementary direct democracy looks like yet an-
other check against majority tyranny. No law takes effect unless it passes through both the
representative and plebiscitary process. As it turns out, however, this account is too simplified. See
intfra Part III.B.
91. If this standard strikes readers as driven by Carolene Products they have not misread me. In
my earlier work I have embraced a process-based vision of judicial review. See Eule, supra note 80, at
428; Eule, supra note 7, at 384-85. For a general description of judicial review as a policing of the
mechanisms of representative government, see J. ELY, supra note 86. It is not necessary, however, for
the reader to embrace my vision of judicial review of legislative action in order to accept the thesis of
this Article.
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strict adherence to the Federal form in the framing of state government.
Nonetheless, the clause captures a distinctive vision-a vision that can be
appreciated only by first understanding the Framers' sense of republican-
ism and its contrast with unfiltered democracy. The constitutional scheme
embraced by the Framers runs majoritarian preferences through a com-
plex filtering mechanism. Its two primary components may be called the
Representation Filter and The Divided Power Filter. Its fall-back posi-
tion, adopted largely as an accommodation to the Antifederalists, may be
called the Entrenched-Rights Safety Net.
1. The Representation Filter
The true distinction between the "pure democracies of Greece" and the
American government, explained Madison, "lies in the total exclusion of
the people in their collective capacity from any share in the latter."2 It
was this distinction that the Federalists believed might permit our govern-
ment to succeed where other democracies had failed. The problems posed
by majority factions were most acute in a direct democracy. Placing the
exclusive power of ordinary lawmaking in governors distinct from the gov-
erned checked "the inducements to sacrifice the weaker party, or an ob-
noxious individual." Public views can be "refine[d] and enlarge[d] . . . by
passing them through the medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose
wisdom may best discern the true interest of their country, and whose
patriotism and love of justice, will be least likely to sacrifice it to tempo-
rary or partial considerations." ' 3 This was not a wholly naive or elitist
vision of representatives as morally and intellectually superior ac-
tors-although it is certainly not above criticism on either ground.94 The
vision was a broader one. Its scope encompassed the virtues of deliberation
and cooperation.
A major impetus for the representation filter-and one that has re-
ceived added attention as a consequence of the work of Cass Sun-
stein"5-is the opportunity it affords for deliberation and debate. Popular
92. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 428 U. Madison) (emphasis in original).
93. Id. No. 10, at 61-62 (J. Madison). As Gary Wills so nicely puts it, the image is of "refining"
in which a substance is passed through several processes to reach a pure state. Civic virtue is present
in the people but it is in an impure state, mingled with private interest and local bias. Through
refining, the interest is purged. G. WILLS, supra note 89, at 226.
94. Madison's suggestion that the large size of the voting base would make it difficult for "unwor-
thy candidates to practice with success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried," THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 63 U. Madison), seems overly optimistic-although he can hardly be faulted
for failing to anticipate the impact of the mass media or runaway campaign spending. See also THE
FEDERALIST No. 3, at 15 (J. Jay) (once efficient national government is established, best men in
country will consent to serve); J. Madison, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 9 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 357 (R. Rutland & W. Rachal eds. 1975) (calling for process of elec-
tions as will extract from society purest and noblest characters it contains). But see H. PsrKIN, THE
CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 195 (1967) (Madison less concerned with moral or political superior-
ity of representatives than with their capacity to withstand factional interests).
95. See Sunstein, supra note 89 (arguing for judicial review that encourages legislative
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masses too quickly form preferences, fail adequately to consider the inter-
ests of others, and are overly susceptible to contagious passions and the
deceit of eloquent and ambitious leaders. 6 In contrast, the deliberative
process offers time for reflection, exposure to competing needs, and occa-
sions for transforming preferences. Public debate among those of equal
status and eloquence thus ultimately leads to realization of the common
good. Whether this conceptualization of the legislative process is too car-
toon-like to retain contemporary force is a question I leave for a later
point in this Article.9" It is hard, however, not to feel persuaded by Akhil
Amar's suggestion that while "we cannot force white voters to listen to
blacks in their neighborhoods, . . . black legislators can interact with and
influence their white colleagues."9"
That black legislators have influence with their white colleagues is at-
tributable more than anything else to the ongoing nature of representative
decision-making. Isolated decisions-like plebiscites-create few opportu-
nities for trade-offs and little need for the establishment of continuing re-
lationships. One just wins or loses.99 Representative government engen-
ders cooperation because winners and losers return to meet again. Only,
the next day brings different issues and shifting alliances. No one is al-
ways in the majority; therefore, no one can afford to turn a deaf ear to the
needs of competing interests. I do not necessarily mean to suggest that the
Federalists understood representative deliberation exclusively as a process
of bargaining and trade-offs. Their version may have been closer to a
form of collective reasoning.100 Under this utopian account legislators lis-
ten to one another because they are virtuous and because they share a
common goal of discovering the public good. It is, however, no small part
of the Federalists' genius that their design achieves many of its aims even
when the actors fail to play their roles as hoped. Indeed, the Federalists
planned for that very eventuality.
2. The Divided Power Filter
Because men were not angels, a government of representatives was
needed to govern them. But because the governors themselves were men
"deliberation").
96. See J. MADISON, supra note 85, at 410 (unmailed letter of James Madison listing evils inci-
dent to popular assemblages).
97. See infra Part III.A.
98. Note, Choosing Representatives by Lottery Voting, 93 YALE L.J. 1283, 1304 (1984).
99. See Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self-Determination: Competing Judicial
Modes of Local Government Legitimacy, 53 IND. L.J. 145, 182 (1977-78).
100. Which way one comes out on this depends in part on whether one views the Federalist vision
as republican-where representatives would transcend special interests-or pluralist. Compare Sun-
stein, supra note 89, at 46 ("The notion that politics might be conducted solely as a process of balanc-
ing and trade-offs . . . was far from the federalist understanding.") with H. PITKIN, supra note 94,
at 195 (legislature provides forum in which social conflict "can be controlled by balancing and
stalemating").
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rather than angels, controls on government were also necessary."' 1 The
Federalists anticipated two ways in which the system of representation
might fail. If representatives became too isolated, and the threat of regular
elections was inadequate to tether them to the public good, they might
"forget their obligations to their constituents. 1 0 2 Thus guards were
needed against oppressive government leaders. At the same time, the Fed-
eralists feared that government leaders might prove too responsive to pop-
ular will and the representation filter would be an inadequate trap
against majority tyranny." One solution, however, served to diminish
both threats., Instead of a single representation filter, the Constitution
would install several. Governmental authority would be divided so that no
single entity would retain sufficient power to rule alone. The Federalists
divided power both between distinct state and Federal governments (feder-
alism) and-at least at the Federal level-among separate and distinct
departments (separation of powers). These divisions of power were
designed to check both the people's agents and the people themselves. The
concept of "rule" would be so diffused as to make its oppressive use by
government leaders untenable. In like manner, "an unjust combination of
a majority of the whole" would be rendered improbable. The multiplicity
of interests and sects would limit the people's power to act as a collective
body and thereby ensure the security of minority civil and religious
rights.104 The idea of divided power as a distinctive filtering mechanism is
somewhat misleading. The vision is not really of a vertical chain of suc-
cessive filters, each of which receives an ever smaller amount of tyrannical
decisions. More accurately, the image is of a horizontal line of separate
representation filters, each of which receives input from a different source
but the cumulative outputs of which are needed to generate sufficient
power to make the machine run. Majority tyranny will occasionally slip
through a defective filter. But the taint that it produces in the end product
will be merely fragmentary. Only a multiple breakdown will threaten the
citizenry. Even this possibility, however, seemed too great a risk to some.
101. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (J. Madison).
102. See id. No. 62, at 418 (J. Madison).
103. See id. No. 51, at 351 (J. Madison):
It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the society against the oppression of
its rulers; but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part . . . .If a
majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.
104. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 351-52 (J. Madison); see also United States v. Brown, 381
U.S. 437, 443 (1965) ("[I]f governmental power is fractionalized, . . . no man or group of men will
be able to impose its unchecked will."); J. MADIsoN, supra note 85, at 412 (unmailed letter of James
Madison) (those who framed and ratified Constitution believed that by dividing powers of govern-
ment, "unjust majorities would be formed with still more difficulty"); THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at
324 (J. Madison) (accumulation of all power in same hands, whether of one, few, or many "may
justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny").
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3. The Entrenched-Rights Safety Net
For the most part, the Framers believed that individual protection from
majoritarian excesses could be secured more effectively by fragmenting
power than by express limitation.'0° They nonetheless harbored concerns
over the adequacy of the divide and weaken strategy. What if the northern
majority wanted to prohibit the slave trade? What if a large group of
states ganged up to tax the exports of a too successful neighbor or deprive
its ports of a natural advantage? What if the elaborate filtering system did
not prove sufficient to protect the creditor minorities from the majority's
will that debts be excused?10 6 It was clear that a few matters would have
to be entrenched-placed beyond the reach of majority preferences,
filtered or not.'0° This did not mean that the rights selected for this pro-
tection were to be completely immune from encroachment by the political
process. But a majority vote of ordinary legislatures would not suffice.
Instead, the Framers erected an elaborate structure for alteration of the
identified values' 08-one adorned with several filtering mechanisms. The
amendment process was to be conducted by representatives. The people
would enjoy no direct role under Article V.'09 The exercise of the power
was to be divided. The concurrence of each House of Congress plus the
105. See THE FEDERALIST No. 84 (A. Hamilton); 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVEN-
TION OF 1787, at 617-18 (M. Farrand ed. 1966); L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 2.
106. Admittedly, the Framers' fear on this point was principally with majority tyranny on the
state level. Accordingly the contracts clause casts its protective net over the state political process only.
No doubt the Framers believed that the extended nature of the republic, the limited scope of power
delegated to the Federal government, and the background of those who were likely to serve in the
Congress (especially the Senate) would lessen the possibility of this kind of majority oppression at the
national level. See I THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 431 (M. Farrand ed.
1966) (Remarks of James Madison) (Senate will protect minority of opulent against majority). That
they were not, however, entirely satisfied with reliance on these abstract safeguards is demonstrated
by the inclusion of the ex post facto clause, applicable to the Federal government as well as to the
states. See Crosskey, The Ex-Post-Facto and the Contracts Clauses in the Federal Convention: A
Note on the Editorial Ingenuity of James Madison, 35 U. CHI. L. REV. 248 (1968). But see Calder v.
Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (ex post facto clause not applicable to non-criminal legislation).
Support for the proposition that Calder provides a historically inaccurate rendition of the clause is
collected at Eule, supra note 7, at 427 n.219.
107. Most of the limitations on the federal government appear in Article I, § 9 (e.g., imposition of
21 year bar on outlawing of slave trade; preclusion of tax on any article exported from state; ban on
titles of nobility). See also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3 (limiting crime of treason to levying war against
United States and forbidding "Corruption of Blood" as punishment for such crime). Express limita-
tions on the exercise of state legislative power appear in Article I, § 10 and in Article IV.
Some of these entrenched limitations seem designed more to provide a fair legislative process than to
ensure particular substantive results. Thus the prohibition against ex post facto laws and bills of
attainder-applicable at both the Federal and state level-prevent focused legislation and thus appear
to anticipate the concerns of the equal protection clause. Cf J. ELY, supra note 86, at 90 (ex post
facto and bill of attainder clauses "prove on analysis to be separation of powers provisions").
108. It is undoubtedly true, however, that the Framers were far more interested in entrenching
the institutional structure that the Philadelphia Convention had labored to produce than in immuniz-
ing the few substantive values identified in the body of the Constitution from majority intrusion.
109. See supra note 87. Article V does afford Congress the option to substitute popular ratifying
conventions for the state legislatures. Congress need not, however, use the convention route, see United
States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931), and in fact it has used this method of ratification only once.
See Eule, supra note 7, at 415 n.169.
1990] 1529
The Yale Law Journal
state legislatures would be prerequisite to change. 10 Finally, supermajori-
ties were required both at the Federal level-where a two-thirds vote was
necessary to propose an amendment-and at the state level-where ratifi-
cation required the approval of three-fourths of the state legislatures.
With majority will so cabined it is hardly surprising that Antifederalists
like Patrick Henry viewed Article V as the very antithesis of democ-
racy.111 Yet, at the same time that they were condemning the immutable
nature of the Constitution, the Antifederalists sought to augment its en-
trenched protections by affixing a bill of rights to the Constitution. Al-
though some leading Antifederalists, like George Mason and Elbridge
Gerry, feared majority tyranny as much as Madison,' as a group they
were a good deal more trusting of popular decision-making than were the
Federalists. Their advocacy of a bill of rights was prompted less by a lack
of faith in the people themselves than by a distrust of the organizations
and institutions that presumed to speak for the people.11 ' It is not without
some irony therefore that their legacy is perhaps the single most striking
counter-majoritarian check in the entire constitutional scheme.
While occasionally the Bill of Rights affords the people security against
nonresponsive or despotic rulers, few would doubt that its more significant
role has been to protect individuals from the tyranny of the group. We
have little to fear from legislation lacking popular support. Usually the
ordinary political process can be counted upon to "correct" it. Instead it is
the law with widespread approval that poses the greatest danger to indi-
vidual rights. As James Madison noted, "the invasion of private rights is
chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts of Government contrary to the
sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the Government is the
mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents." 1 4 Although
initially resistant to the inclusion of a bill of rights, Madison was later to
press for congressional adoption of the first ten amendments, recognizing
in it yet another device for filtering majoritarian preferences-for it af-
forded a role for the judiciary in curbing the more immediately responsive
and accountable branches. 15
110. Although Article V allows the state legislatures partially to bypass Congress at the proposal
stage by convening a Constitutional Convention, the Constitution does not permit Congress to be cut
out of the amendment loop altogether. It is not clear, however, exactly what the congressional role
would be in assessing the sufficiency of the state's application for such a Convention or in defining its
scope or procedures. To date the Convention method for proposing amendments has never been
utilized.
111. See 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 216-17 (H. Storing ed. 1981) ("majority" of com-
munity must have right to alter their government).
112. See G. WOOD, supra note 89, at 484.
113. Id. at 520.
114. J. MADISON, To Thomas Jefferson, in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 298 (R.
Rutkind & C. Hobson eds. 1977) (letter dated Oct. 17, 1788).
115. See G. WooD, supra note 89, at 542-43. See also Madison's speech in the House of Repre-
sentatives, June 8, 1789. J. MADISON, Consent and Consensus, in THE MIND OF THE FOUNDER:
SOURCES OF THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JAMES MADISON, supra note 85, at 169, 171-72 (Bill of
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C. The Constitutional Context of Judicial Review
1. Is the "Difficulty" With Judicial Review Really a Counter-
Majoritarian One?
Edward Corwin once testified before Congress that the "people who say
the framers intended [judicial review] are talking nonsense . . and the
people who say they did not intend it are talking nonsense." ' 6 Admit-
tedly, the constitutional text and historical record may be inconclusive."1 7
Yet no contemporary scholar relies on these ambiguities to assert the total
absence of judicial power to pass on the constitutionality of legislative acts.
Acquiescence has long since legitimated judicial review. Current debate
instead revolves around the extent to which the power may properly be
exercised. This does not mean, however, that the Framers' efforts are of
no relevance. Ultimately the controversy over the scope of the judicial role
boils down to reconciling judicial review-the invocation of power by an
unelected and largely unaccountable governmental body-with a society
that deems itself democratic. Democracy is a slippery term. And it seems
odd indeed to attempt to effect a balance between the competing tensions
without paying careful attention to the constitutional picture of
democracy.
Alexander Bickel unwittingly has led us astray- The "root difficulty" of
judicial review, he taught us, is its "counter-majoritarian" nature." His
error is less in his theory than in his terminology. American democ-
racy-as portrayed in the Constitution at least-is not synonymous with
majoritarianism. It was not intended as such, nor does it so operate.
Bickel understood that. He described judicial review as thwarting "the
will of representatives." What we mean by democracy, he said, "is much
more sophisticated and complex than the making of decisions in town
meeting by a show of hands."'1 9 It is rather "the policy-making power of
representative institutions" that "is the distinguishing characteristic of the
system" and, he concluded, "[j]udicial review works counter to this char-
acteristic."120 Yet Bickel too cavalierly glides over the distinctions between
representative government and majoritarianism when it comes to labeling
the "difficulty" with judicial review. It is a significant oversight. The very
Rights may be one means "to control the majority" and will enable judiciary to be "an impenetrable
bulwark" against encroachment upon enumerated rights).
116. Reorganization of the Federal Judiciary: Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Senate Comm. on
the Judiciary, Part 2, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 176 (1937). Corwin's comments were in response to a
question regarding only judicial review of congressional acts.
117. But see A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 15 (historical hypotheses are not "provable with mathe-
matical precision. But it is as clear as such matters can be that the Framers . . .expected that the
federal courts would assume a power-of whatever exact dimensions-to pass on the constitutionality
of actions of the Congress and the President, as well as of the several states.").
118. Id. at 16.
119. Id. at 17.
120. Id. at 19.
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premise of the structure erected by the Framers rests on the fundamental
differences between the two.
The "difficulty" with judicial review entails its reconciliation with the
constitutional version of democracy, not with some abstract form that ex-
alts unfiltered majoritarianism. It would be more accurately conceptual-
ized as a "counter-representative" or "counter-republican" difficulty. The
Framers rejected simple majority rule because of their fear of factions. In
its place they installed a representative structure which simultaneously en-
joyed a relative detachment from and an ultimate accountability to the
populace. And to ensure that neither detachment nor accountability got
the upper hand, they separated and divided the repositories of power. The
role of the judge can only be assessed within the confines of this frame-
work. Jonathan Macey seems closer to the mark when he identifies the
tension as one between the judicial checking role-implicit in a system of
checks and balances-and the lawmaking function of the legislature ex-
plicitly set forth in Article L2'
It would be foolhardy, of course, to contend sweepingly that reverence
for majority rule has nothing to do with the case for judicial restraint. It
may be true that legislative enactments ordinarily reflect majoritarian
preferences. While the Framers designed the filter system to (occasionally)
block the passage of laws enjoying majority support, they did not intend to
enable enactment in the face of majority opposition.122 Moreover, it is
certainly accurate to say, as John Ely does, that even if legislatures are
not wholly democratic, they are certainly more democratic-however de-
fined-than courts.123 But conceding that legislative enactments often re-
present majority will does not make the central problem with judicial re-
view a counter-majoritarian one. Legislative products represent far more
than a simple aggregation of majority will. The enactments that reach the
judiciary via the legislative route are those that have successfully passed
through an extensive filtering system. This is majoritarianism plus. It is
the plus that reflects the Framers' unique version of democracy, and it is
the plus that warrants judicial caution in substituting its own judgment.
Refined, or filtered majoritarianism, captures the virtues of popular sover-
eignty without being tainted by its vices. Judicial review must be inte-
grated into this design.
I am not bent on persuading the reader of any particular vision con-
121. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutoly Interpretation: An hi-
terest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 225-26 (1986). See infra Part II.D for a necessarily
altered expression of the tension when state laws rather than Federal laws are being reviewed,
122. See J. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLITICAL PROCESS 26 (1980)
(most anti-majoritarian elements of legislative process are negative ones that prevent the translation of
popular wishes into governing rules rather than produce laws that are contrary to majority senti-
ments). But see Amar, supra note 2, at 1084 (minority's power to veto can be leveraged into power to
force adoption of unrelated bill-clever politicians can thus "beat their 'shields' into 'swords,' trans-
forming 'checks' into 'spurs' ").
123. J. ELY, supra note 86, at 67.
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cerning the proper scope of judicial review of legislative action-although
my biases undeniably shape the contours of my thesis. This venture is
more a comparative one. Wherever one's starting point, the case for-or
against-judicial deference looks different when applied to electoral deci-
sion-making. Once it is recognized that the restraints placed on judicial
review by the constitutional scheme are not grounded in a deification of
unfiltered majority preferences, the nature of these differences becomes
clearer.
2. Contextualizing the "Difficulty" With Judicial Review
The judicial role must be contextualized. By this I mean that any eval-
uation of the appropriate scope of judicial review under the United States
Constitution is highly dependent on the nature of the particular body and
process that produces the governmental act under attack. On occasion we
are sensitive to this need to contextualize. For example, in a system rest-
ing upon the principle of national supremacy, Federal judicial review of
state legislation is generally seen as raising different questions than the
oversight of congressional action. Judicial review of the plebiscite has not
profited from such a sensitivity. Yet, as I shall urge below, a constitutional
framework with a normative preference for representative government de-
mands that we conceptualize a different judicial role when the law under
review emanates from the electorate rather than a legislative body.124
Most of the arguments generally offered on behalf of judicial re-
straint-separation of powers, the non-exclusivity of judicial interpreta-
tions of the Constitution, and the superior capacity of legislatures for fact-
124. Judicial review is not limited, of course, to scrutinizing legislation, whether emanating from
legislatures or the electorate. Federal courts often rule on the constitutionality of action taken by
members of the executive branch, administrative agencies, or state courts. Surprisingly little of the
literature on judicial review addresses the reconciliation of these other forms of judicial oversight with
democratic principles. It is almost as if the issues are assumed to be identical to those encountered
when Federal courts review a legislative act. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 20 ("so long as
there has been a meaningful delegation by the legislature to administrators, . . . the essential majority
power is there" in way that it is not with judiciary); Maltz, Individual Rights and State Autonomy,
12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 163, 171 (1989) (no court or commentator has ever suggested that
judicially created rules should be scrutinized more closely than legislative decision-making). I believe
this assumption to be dead wrong, because a theory of judicial review must be contextualized. See
Eule, supra note 7, at 449-52 (different standard ought to govern our assessment of retroactive legis-
lation when the displaced status quo is judge-made rather than statutory since statutes are politically
superior to common law decisions); see also Brief for Petitioner at 56 n.31, Ferri v. Ackerman, 444
U.S. 355 (1979) (No.78-5981) (traditional reluctance to interfere with choices made by people's rep-
resentatives dissipates when reviewing common-law doctrines). My immediate goal is to apply this
premise to judicial review of direct democracy-comparing it to judicial review of legislative ac-
tion-and little attention will be devoted here to what I see as its application in other settings. The
broader message particularly resonant to a process-oriented scholar is that theories of judicial review
can no more ignore the "who" than the "how" and the "what" of the governmental action subjected
to a court's scrutiny. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
69-70 (1969) (assessment of political meaning of judicial review very much depends on answers to
questions like: "Whose action is the Court annulling? Whom is the Court second-guessing? Who,
before the Court acts, has made the critical determination which the Court is asked to reverse?").
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finding-appear to have little application to the scrutiny of citizen law-
making. This is hardly surprising. Advocates of judicial deference gener-
ally assume, as did Bickel, the existence of a representative government.
The judiciary is a part of the Constitution's mutual checking design,
but it is only one actor in a play with many characters. Judges, it is ar-
gued, must be sensitive to the usurpation of the role assigned the others.
In part, this is because the others perform certain tasks better. In part, it
is because a concentration of power in any single body-be it the execu-
tive, the legislature, or the judiciary-offends the constitutional vision.
Separation of powers is thus a large part of the case for judicial restraint.
Nowhere is the centrality of separation of powers concerns to the defini-
tion of the judicial role more evident than in the disparate treatment that
advocates of judicial restraint sometimes accord Marbury v. Madison1 25
and Martin v. Hunter's Lessee. 26 Bickel himself noted that "[m]any
judges and commentators who have questioned the power of judicial re-
view of federal legislation have freely conceded the same power when ex-
ercised with respect to state actions."1 27 When a Federal court declares an
act of the Congress unconstitutional, it encroaches on the authority of a
coordinate and equal branch of government to make law, a power that
Article I explicitly confers upon the legislative branch. This disturbs the
constitutional division of powers, and courts are urged to do so sparingly.
When it is state legislation that is being reviewed for its compatability
with the Federal Constitution, the picture is a different one. Here, the
supremacy clause of Article VI demands a larger role from the judiciary.
However debatable the advocates of judicial restraint find Marbury's con-
clusion that Federal judges may pass on the efforts of coordinate branches,
the judicial power articulated in Hunter's Lessee'28 to review state legisla-
tive efforts is generally perceived as beyond reproach. Even James Brad-
ley Thayer, as persistent and as ardent an opponent of an active judiciary
as one is likely to find, experiences a conversion when the restraints of
separation of powers give way to the hierarchy of the supremacy clause:
"The judiciary now speaks as representing a paramount constitution and
government, whose duty it is, in all its departments, to allow to that con-
125. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
126. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
127. See A. BICKEL, supra note 2, at 33. Bickel tries to distance himself somewhat from this
position. Although acknowledging that it is vital that the Federal judiciary have power to declare and
apply Federal law-including constitutional law-to the member states, he reminds us that "it re-
mains true that [the Court] . . . is acting against the majority will within the given jurisdiction." Id.
Thus, as we have already seen, the root difficulty of judicial review for Bickel is its counter-
majoritarian nature and not the separation of powers issue.
128. Although Martin v. Hunter's Lessee itself involved review of state court decisions, not state
laws, the Court's reasoning was obviously meant to apply to the latter problem as well. See, e.g.,
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810) (striking down state legislation as violation of con-
tracts clause).
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stitution nothing less than its just and true interpretation; and having
fixed this, to guard it against any inroads from without." 2'
This does not mean that an alternative case for restraint is not available
when state laws are under review. Legislatures on the state level, no less
than Congress, can claim an edge in expertise and accountability that
warrants judicial deference. And federalism may fill part of the gap left
by the departure of the separation of powers constraint. 13' But, because
the Constitution itself confers supremacy on the Federal Government, the
argument for judicial restraint is altered in this context and, in the view of
many commentators, is left substantially weaker. 3
There is an important lesson here. Federal courts are creatures of the
Constitution. Their role must be defined both by the story line and their
relation to the other characters in the script. 1 2 The judicial role is thus a
relative one. One cannot talk of judicial deference in a vacuum. One first
has to know who or what demands the deference. The Constitution does
not establish equality among all actors in the political picture. Residing in
its explicit language and its tacit assumptions is a hierarchy. In seeking
the proper role for courts under our constitutional system we ought to
respect that hierarchy.
The constitutional hierarchy is constructed on the Framers' relative as-
sessments of trust. Different decision-makers and different methods of ar-
riving at decisions pose different threats of faction. The extended republic
is less to be feared than are local governments;13 dissipated command is
129. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 HARV.
L. REV. 129, 154-55 (1893). See also Eakin v. Raub, 12 Serg. & Rawle 330 (Pa. 1825), where
Justice Gibson ends his celebrated attack on Marbury by conceding the legitimacy of judicial review
of state action for conformity with "supreme" Federal obligations.
130. One recent commentator argues, in fact, that the pull of federalism is oftentimes so strong as
to justify greater judicial deference in the review of state actions than in the review of Federal action.
See Maltz, supra note 124. If one were to embrace such a view it might be as applicable to state
plebiscites as to actions of the state legislature. But see infra Part II.D. Despite an admirable effort by
Professor Maltz, I remain unconvinced. His historical argument underplays the extent of the Fram-
ers' fears of faction at the local level, see infra note 133 and accompanying text, and his policy
arguments undervalue their validity.
131. E.g., C. BLACK, supra note 124, at 71-76; L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 13 n.7; Amar, supra
note 2, at 1079 n.128; see also O.W. HOLmES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 295-96 (1920) (finding
judicial review of state acts far more critical to survival of constitutional enterprise). Surprisingly, the
subordinate position of the states under the supremacy clause-and the consequent ease with which
Federal judicial oversight may be legitimated-seldom translates into an articulated willingness on the
part of the Supreme Court to apply a different standard to review of state and Federal laws. But see
Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (opinion of Holmes, J.) (judicial review of an Act of
Congress is "the gravest and most delicate duty that this Court is called upon to perform"). Compare
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 472 (1980) (upholding Federal minority set-aside program in
part because of "appropriate deference to the Congress, a co-equal branch") with City of Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706, 719-20 (1989) (striking down municipal set-aside program under
equal protection clause in part because states and their political subdivisions lack broad remedial
powers granted to Congress by § 5 of Fourteenth Amendment and thus deserve less deference in
adoption of racially-conscious remedies).
132. See generally C. BLACK, supra note 124, at 67-98 (exploring implications of constitutional
structure on practice of judicial review).
133. For Madison especially, small societies embracing fewer distinct parties and interests maxi-
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less to be feared than concentrated power;"" and indirect democracy is
less to be feared than plebiscites. The Constitution's exaltation of repre-
sentative over direct democracy may be less forthrightly expressed than its
other preferences, but it is no less central. Just as Article VI reveals a
distinctive vision of the relative status of Federal and state governments, it
sheds light on the place of electoral lawmaking in a way that has previ-
ously gone unnoticed.
Article VI demands an oath of all public officers-whether Federal or
state-to support the Constitution. Legislators are thus obligated to deter-
mine the constitutionality of proposed legislation. 3 5 Judicial interpreta-
tions of the Constitution may be supreme,"3 6 but they are not exclusive.
The architects of the doctrine of judicial restraint drew great significance
from this sharing of interpretive power. To them the law that reached a
court had already been reviewed for its constitutionality and deserved def-
erence as a consequence. Thus, Thayer questioned not the supremacy of
the constitutional command over the majority preference, but the judicial
role as exclusive expositor of those commands. He saw courts and legisla-
tures as co-equal branches and demanded that judges afford a presump-
tion of correctness to legislative judgments regarding constitutional
questions.13
7
This argument for judicial deference is not extraordinarily persuasive to
mized the opportunities for oppression of minorities. "Extend the sphere," he exhorted, "and you take
in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will
have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will
be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each
other." THE FEDERALiST No. 10, at 64 (J. Madison). For a contemporary invocation of the Framers'
hierarchy as justification for distinguishing between the review of Federal and state (or local) action
based on race, see Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 736-37 (Scalia, J. concurring) ("to the children of the
Founding Fathers"-who prophesied the heightened danger of oppression from political factions in
small rather than large political units-"it should come as no surprise" that racial discrimination
against any group finds more ready expression at state and local than at Federal level).
134. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946-51 (1983) (President's veto and bicameral require-
ment of Article I both guard against effects of faction by dividing and dispersing power).
135. See L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 10, 16 (oath requires legislator to heed Constitution over
constituents); Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 585, 587 (1975) (most obvious way for legislator to support Constitution is to enact only
constitutional legislation).
136. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (Federal judiciary supreme in exposition of
constitutional law). But see Meese, The Law of the Constitution, 61 TUL. L. REV. 979, 983 (1987)
(Supreme Court decision does not establish "supreme law of the land" that is binding on all persons
and parts of government). Jefferson, Jackson, Lincoln, and Roosevelt all made statements similar to
Meese's. See Tushnet, The Supreme Court, The Supreme Law of the Land, and Attorney General
Meese: A Comment, 61 TUL. L. REv. 1017, 1018 (1987).
137. Thayer, supra note 129, at 135 (preliminary determination of constitutionality by legislature
is "a fact of very great importance"). Similarly, Henry Steele Commager portrayed judicial review as
a second-guessing of a constitutional determination. "In support of every act," he argued, "is not only
a majority vote for its wisdom but a majority vote for its constitutionality." A court voiding an act
"opposes its own opinion on constitutionality to the opinions of the other two branches of the govern-
ment." Commager, Judicial Review and Democracy in JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE SUPREME
COURT 65 (L. Levy ed. 1967). See also Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court in Missouri, K. & T.
Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904) ("[It must be remembered that legislatures are ultimate
guardians of the liberties . . . of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts.").
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our realist way of thinking. Perhaps we believe that legislators will fail to
take their constitutional obligation seriously because of the press of time.
Perhaps we are troubled that many legislators are not lawyers and lack
the knowledge or skill necessary to adjudicate constitutional issues. Or,
perhaps we think it naive to assume that the Constitution will prevail
when political interests are threatened.' 3 At the very least it is clear that
most legislatures lack strong traditions of constitutional decision-
making.'39
But it is not necessary to embrace fully the factual premise of this claim
for deference. Perhaps it is unworthy. A number of conclusions can none-
theless be drawn from the debate itself. First is the obvious inapplicability
of a claim such as this to the plebiscitary process. There is no reason to
believe that plebiscite campaigns will address the measure's constitutional-
ity. Even if voters were made aware of such issues, the knowledge or in-
formation necessary to such a decision would be missing. The legislative
tool of inviting legal experts to testify is unavailable.
More important, the Constitution does not ask the voters to assess a
measure's constitutionality. Article VI imposes the obligations of constitu-
tional compliance on public officers, not the electorate. This reinforces the
observation that the Framers never expected the electorate to be placed in
a position where it would have to square public need with constitutional
command. Several alternative explanations for Article VI's omission are
feasible, but they all are wanting. One could argue that the Framers never
mentioned the populace in Article VI because the idea of government by
plebiscite never occurred to them. Even if this were true1 40 it scarcely con-
tradicts my thesis that the constitutional structure places direct democracy
on a less revered plane than representative government. Alternatively, one
might suggest that the failure to mention the people in Article VI simply
recognizes their place as the sovereign. Constitutional limits do not bind
the sovereign, the argument might go, because it is their source. 4 ' This
explanation is similarly unsatisfying. It is true, of course, that the Consti-
tution's prohibitions are directed at government and not the populace, and
Article VI's failure to mention the "people" merely reflects that vision.
But that is precisely the point. When the electorate enacts laws it acts not
138. See NI. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 30
(1966) (by final debate and voting on bill, so many commitments already made that injection of
constitutional issue would not only be futile but in many instances appear to be "traitorous repudia-
tion of pre-established agreements"). But see Brest, supra note 135, at 601 (suggesting that it may be
premature to assume that legislators will neglect their obligation to interpret Constitution, at least
until it is clear that they recognize this duty).
139. See Brest, Constitutional Citizenship, 34 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 175, 183 (1986).
140. But see supra text accompanying notes 82-84.
141. It is inaccurate, of course, to confuse the people of an individual state with the sovereign.
Sovereign they may be for purposes of the state constitution, but sovereignty under the United States
Constitution resides in a much larger entity of which the people of a single state are just a small part.
See supra note 7.
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as a sovereign people but as a governmental body and the Framers of the
Constitution never anticipated such a possibility. 4"
Just as arguments for judicial restraint based on separation of powers
or the sharing of interpretive power fail to carry over to review of ballot
measures, those premised on comparative competence make little sense
when removed from the legislative context. The superior legislative ability
to collect information and to sort it out is routinely invoked by courts
deferring to legislative judgment. 4 Whether or not legislators actually do
outperform judges at fact-finding, both groups perform with a lot more
proficiency than the electorate.' 44 If the accuracy of decision-making is to
be our criterion, the electorate stands at an obvious disadvantage. It lacks
the staff, resources, time, and understanding to .compete favorably with
either judges or legislators on this count.
Of course, arguments about comparative competence are about more
than the accuracy of empirical assessments. Those who trumpet the legis-
lature's edge over the judiciary rely in large part on the lawmakers' close-
ness to the populace. 4" Accountability to the electorate is the touchstone
of legitimacy. But we must not confuse electoral accountability with popu-
lar legislation. However we may appraise political theory arguments for
direct democracy, the Constitution's choice is clear: It opts for the virtues
of agency.' 4" Those who framed and ratified the Constitution thought that
distance was necessary if wisdom and fairness were to prevail. They val-
ued a removed deliberation over impassioned-and often impru-
dent-decision-making. The Framers did not deny the electorate a role.
The people were to speak through periodic elections. "Frequent elec-
tions," warned Madison, "are . . . the only policy" for effectively secur-
ing the government's dependence on and sympathy with the people.4 7 But
when it came to ordinary lawmaking, popular participation was denied at
the Federal level and, as I shall argue in Part II.D.1, disfavored at the
142. The American government, said Madison, will be characterized by "the total exclusion of
the people in their collective capacity" from any part in it. THE FEDERALIST No. 63, at 428 UJ.
Madison) (emphasis in original). In this particular quote Madison was referring only to the Federal
government. The Framers' assumption, reflected in Article VI, is not so limited. See infra Part
II.D.l.
143. This is done even where it appears that the legislature is factually mistaken. See, e.g., Min-
nesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 463-64 (1981).
144. See Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197, 228 (1976) (once initiative
measure is drafted it is past systematic factfinding). While Hans Linde uses this observation to argue
that there can be no expectation of rationality in legislative action, see id. at 227, Lawrence Sager
invokes it as part of an argument that plebiscites in some circumstances violate the due process clause.
See Sager, Insular Majorities Unabated: Warth v. Seldin and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter-
prises, Inc., 91 HARV. L. REv. 1373, 1415 n.171 (1978).
145. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (courts
are "not designed to be a good reflex of a democratic society"); Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325
U.S. 761, 794 (1945) (Black, J., dissenting) ("Representatives elected by the people to make their
laws, rather than judges appointed to interpret those laws, can best determine the policies which
govern the people.").
146. The origins of the agency concept are explored in Eule, supra note 7, at 394-96.
147. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 355 (J. Madison).
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state and local level. A theory of judicial review must take account of this
constitutional preference. Just as deference to accountability preserves our
democratic spirit, a wariness of unfiltered electoral expressions protects
our republican form.
D. Are States Laboratories for Unfiltered Experimentation?
1. The Federal Curb on State Experiments With Unfiltered
Majorities
A state may experiment with unfiltered majoritarianism only because
the Federal Constitution provides a secure safety net. Individual rights
trampled by voter excesses may be restored by congressional or judicial
action. The question is not whether the protections afforded by the Four-
teenth Amendment are applicable to voter enactments. That matter has
long since been settled.148 The issue instead is whether the preference for
representative government which I identify in Part II.B and use in II.C as
a context for conceptualizing the judicial role can be extended to the struc-
ture of state government. I conclude that it can and that it should. My
argument is thus both historical and normative.
The Constitution is not silent on the structure of state government. Ar-
ticle IV explicitly imposes an obligation on the United States-a term that
ordinarily includes the judiciary-to "guarantee to every State in this
Union a Republican Form of Government."' 49 The message appears
clear. The clause says "Republican," not "Democratic." If we harbor any
doubt about the difference, Madison is there to help out. "Democracy," he
informs us, consists "of a small number of citizens, who assemble and
administer the government in person." "A Republic," in contrast, is "a
Government in which the scheme of representation takes place."' 50 The
distinction is precisely what Madison hoped would bring the success that
eluded earlier free societies. It is unlikely that the word "Republican" was
loosely used. It came with a history and symbolized a vision. Its inclusion
in Article IV is best understood as transporting that vision to the states. 5 '
148. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down Oregon voter initia-
tive imposing criminal liability on parents who failed to send their children to public school).
149. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
150. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 61-62; see also Rice v. Foster, 4 Del. (4 Harr.) 479, 487
(1847) (characteristic that distinguishes republican government-as term is used in Article IV-is that
"none of the powers of sovereignty are exercised by the people; but all of them by separate, co-
ordinate branches of government in whom those powers are vested"). Madison's view was not shared
by all his contemporaries. John Adams, for example, thought Madison's distinction unjustifiable, de-
claring that "a democracy is as really a republic as an oak is a tree, or a temple a building." See
DOCUMENTS, supra note 79, at 27. On the other hand, Adams later complained that he "never un-
derstood" what the guarantee of republican government meant. See W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE
CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 13 (1972).
151. Accord J. ELY, supra note 86, at 5 (constitutional document, "prescribing a republican form
of government for the states, expresses its clear commitment to a system of representative democracy at
both the federal and state levels").
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This interpretation is substantially bolstered by the consistent use of the
term "Legislature" whenever the Constitution confers power on state
government.
1 52
Now if this seems too easy, fear not. No matter how clear language
appears we can always count on someone to muck it up. First there is the
assertion that, notwithstanding the apparent implications of the Framers'
choice of words, the debates reveal that the clause was actually placed in
the Constitution to ensure that a state did not establish a monarchy or an
aristocracy. 5 ' It is undoubtedly true that for a few of the Framers that is
all it meant.154 But scholars who have studied the historical record con-
vincingly demonstrate a dual purpose behind the guarantee of a republi-
can form. On one hand the delegates did worry about monarchy, con-
cerned lest responses to excesses of populism at the state level tip too far
in the opposite direction.155 On the other hand, it was in fact the threats
to property, credit, and liberty posed by these popular excesses that drew
many of the delegates to Philadelphia.""6 Madison captured this duality
when, near the close of his life, he described the ominous prospects that
precipitated the Convention. The "unstable and unjust career of the
States" had caused "a general decay of confidence & credit." Those "most
devoted to the principles and forms of Republics were alarmed for the
cause of liberty." Those "least partial to popular Govt."-presumably the
monarchists-"were yielding to anticipations that from an increase of the
confusion a Govt. might result more congenial with their taste.' 15 7 Just as
the Framers' effort to structure the national regime was fueled by the
twin fears of underresponsive and overresponsive government, so too was
152. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1, (power to select Senators); id., art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (power to
prescribe time, manner, and place for elections of members of Congress); id., art. I, § 8, ci. 17 (con-
sent of state legislature needed for Federal purchase of land therein); id., art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (power to
establish manner for choosing presidential electors); id., art. IV, § 3, cl. 1 (consent of state legislature
needed for combining or dividing of states); id., art. IV, § 4 (power to apply to Federal Government
for protection against domestic violence); id., art. V (power to apply for Constitutional Convention
and ratify amendments). Note that when the states are prohibited from doing something the legisla-
ture is not specifically mentioned-although this is of uncertain significance since the drafters could
have merely intended to bring the state executive branch within the prohibition. See id., art. I, § 10.
153. See, e.g., In re Interrogatories, 189 Colo. 1, 11-12, 536 P.2d 308, 317 (1975) (main concern
of Framers in adopting Article IV, § 4 was to prevent state from changing government into
monarchy).
154. John Randolph, for example, appeared to consider monarchy as the system with which re-
publican government should be contrasted. See 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 202-06 (M. Farrand ed. 1966).
155. The disorder of absolute power in the hands of the people, they believed, inevitably led to the
tyranny of the dictator. See G. WOOD, supra note 89, at 19 (politics was viewed along "spectrum that
ranged from absolute power in the hands of one person on one end, to absolute power . . . in the
hands of the people at the other end" and met in full circle where absolute popular power inevitably
led to dictatorship).
156. See Wood, supra note 80, at 1-17; see also Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article 17,
Section 4: A Study in Constitutional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REV. 513, 517 (1962) (delegates feared
that unfettered majority rule "could endanger property rights and destroy wise and enlightened
leadership").
157. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 154, at 548.
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their treatment of the states. Monarchy was unaccountable. It would not
do. Neither, however, would the self-interested factionalism of the masses
that prompted the appeal of monarchy. The republican form clause"'8 was
an effort to fix the balance.159
Reliance on the Framers' intent has its problems. Two in particular:
"How can we know?" and "Why should we care?" Both have some rele-
vance here.
The use of the word "Republican" in Article IV clearly did not have a
single connotation for those who drafted the Constitution, let alone for the
far greater number who ratified it. John Adams confessed that he never
understood what the word meant and defended his confusion by asserting
his belief that "no man ever did or ever will."1 0 Nonetheless, most of
Adams' contemporaries seemed to share a sense of the clause's negative
meaning-what it was trying to prevent-however incapable they may
have been of answering the much more difficult question of what it was
affirmatively seeking to achieve. But even if the clause's legislative history
is inconclusive, the general themes of the entire constitutional document
inform our interpretation. If ever a concept drew meaning from a look
around the clauses of the Constitution, this is it. True, the structure the
Constitution erects is meant for the federal government, and greater lee-
way is afforded the individual states. But the document does establish a
republican form, and a republican form is what was guaranteed to the
states. If we cannot ascertain exactly what the form ought to be, we can at
least come up with an educated guess regarding its goals-accountability
to the majority with filters to protect minorities.
The more difficult issue regarding Framers' intent is why we ought to
care. Frequently our answer to this question depends on whether we
agree with what the record shows-or at least on whether there is enough
there to support our position. My own view is that intent is relevant but
not dispositive. It is a starting point. Like every other clause in the Con-
stitution the republican form clause deserves to grow and develop. 61 As
Senator Charles Sumner noted on the eve of launching his 1865 argument
that the clause demanded suffrage for all races: "Words receive expansion
158. Although most scholars refer to Article IV, § 4 as the guaranty clause, I prefer to emphasize
what is guaranteed. See also J. ELY, supra note 86, at 118-19 & n.* (calling it Republican Form of
Government Clause).
159. See W. WIECEK, supra note 150, at 11, 18, 20, 67, 75 (republican form clause was alterna-
tive to extremes of monarchy and-as exemplified by Shays' Rebellion-unchecked democracy); Bon-
field, supra note 156, at 517 (delegates feared both popular tyranny and authoritarian power and
sought "compromise between majority rule and minority rights"); Comment, The Guarantee of Re-
pubhlican Government: Proposals for Judicial Review, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 208, 231-32 (1987) (re-
publican form clause charged Federal government with "preservation of the structure of state govern-
ment necessary to maintain the dynamic between" accountability to people and "shortsighted,
unrestrained rule by whim of masses").
160. See W. WIECEK, supra note 150, at 13.
161. See J. ELY, supra note 86, at 123.
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and elevation with time. Our fathers builded wiser than they knew. Did
they simply mean a guarantee against a king? Something more, I be-
lieve,-all of which was not fully revealed to themselves, but which we
must now declare in the light of our institutions." '162
The minorities the Framers worried so much about-creditors, prop-
erty owners, and the wealthy-are no longer those that call for special
protection from society. They have learned to take care of themselves.
When majorities tyrannize, the rich are seldom their victims. 6 ' But
Madison's admonition that "[i]t is of great importance in a republic...
to guard one part of a society against the injustice of the other part"'6
has lost nothing with time.
The judiciary is one of the prominent guardians of minority rights. But
as we have seen, it ordinarily does not stand alone. A republic has other
checks, other ways for ensuring that many voices have their say and no
single faction dominates. If courts are needed to safeguard minority rights
in a republic, the judicial task is that much more essential in an unfiltered
democracy.
We now come to our second obstacle-a long list of cases that tell us
that the judiciary has no role in the enforcement of the republican form
clause. 6 Yet the clause extends a guarantee with the "United States" as
162. See 4 MEMOIR AND LE-rERs OF CHARLES SUMNER, 1860-1874, at 258-59 (E. Pierce ed.
1893) (letter to Francis Lieber, Oct. 12, 1865). A theory of the clause's development would be incom-
plete without an understanding of the post-Civil War metamorphosis in the constitutional attitude
toward state autonomy. Although the Framers may have feared majority tyranny less at the local level
than at the national level-inducing a willingness to immunize state government from constitutional
restraint-the events leading to the Civil War demonstrated that their trust had been misplaced. The
Reconstruction Amendments reflect a recognition that citizen control over state governments did not
adequately safeguard individual liberty. They manifest an intent to confine majoritarian preferences
at the state level. An enhanced suspicion of state departures from the republican model serves this end
no less than the installation of an entrenched-rights safety net under the state lawmaking process. Of
course, the Reconstruction Amendments do not say this, but the Constitution did not need alteration to
reach this result. It already contained the republican form clause. The nation's first 80 years had
simply revealed its importance.
163. An updated version of the golden rule acknowledges that he who owns the gold, rules. See
Carter, Technology, Democracy, and the Manipulation of Consent, 93 YALE L.J. 581, 581 (1984)
("The critical problem for contemporary First Amendment theory is the unequal access that wealth
can buy."); Nicholson, Campaign Financing and Equal Protection, 26 STAN. L. REV. 815, 816
(1974) (large campaign contributions accord the wealthy "multiple representation"); Wright, Mont
and the Pollution of Politics: Is the First Amendment an Obstacle to Political Equality?, 82 COLuM.
L. REV. 609 (1982); see also First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 809 (1978) (White,
J., dissenting) (vast economic power of corporations threatens to dominate "the very heart of our
democracy, the electoral process"); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 288 (1976) (Marshall, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("One of the points on which all Members of the Court agree is
that money is essential for effective communication in a political campaign.").
It may be that "sticking it to the rich" is likelier to occur in the plebiscitary process than in the
legislative process. Indeed, that possibility in large part is what prompted the Progressives to cham-
pion direct democracy. Professor Lowenstein's study, however, convincingly demonstrates the efficacy
of large sums of money in blocking unfavorable initiatives. Lowenstein, supra note 27.
164. THE FEDERALiST No. 51, at 351 (J. Madison).
165. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218-26 (1962); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241
U.S. 565 (1916); Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1913); Kiernan v. Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912);
Pacific States Tel. & Tel. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 582
(1964) ("some questions raised under the Guaranty Clause are nonjusticiable, where 'political' in
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promised enforcer. If the Framers were unclear about the precise contours
of a "Republic" they certainly harbored no doubt about what the term
"United States" meant.16 The drafters could have designated "Congress"
or "the President" as the enforcement agent. They did not, and the words
chosen ought to be given their ordinary meaning. To the extent that judi-
cial refusal to act is premised on the existence of a "textually demonstra-
ble constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment," the claim rests on weak ground.167 Perhaps for this reason, more
recent cases have relied instead on the Baker v. Carr argument that the
clause provides no "judicially manageable standards."16 This is an unfor-
tunate doctrine. Judge Wisdom was never truer to his name than when he
expressed the view that "[f]ederal courts should be loath to read out of the
Constitution as judicially nonenforceable a provision that the Founding
Fathers considered essential to formulation of a workable federalism." ' 9
In Pacific States Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Oregon,"" the United
States Supreme Court was asked to rule whether Oregon's use of the initi-
ative to enact a gross-receipts tax was consistent with a republican form of
government. The taxpayer argued that the representative nature of repub-
lican government prevented the people from taking legislative functions
into their own hands. The Court never reached the merits of this claim.
Speaking through Chief Justice White, it concluded that the question of
whether a state government is "republican" was not one that courts are
competent to answer.
In arriving at this result, White overstated the nature of the taxpayer's
claim. As White saw it, the taxpayer was asking the Court to treat the
entire state government as a nullity-an illegal government. In fact, only
nature and where there is a clear absence of judicially manageable standards"). Professor Tribe has
suggested that these cases stand only for the proposition that the clause confers no judicially enforcea-
ble rights upon individuals, without precluding the possibility that it may confer such rights on the
states to whom the guarantee is explicitly extended. L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 398. This seems an
unduly narrow view of the cases-which draw no such distinction-and, more unfortunately, an un-
duly narrow view of the clause. See Comment, supra note 159, at 224-25 (Tribe's theory both un-
sound and inapplicable to this particular clause).
A very small number of courts have reached the merits of challenges raised under the republican
form clause. See, e.g., VanSickle v. Shanahan, 212 Kan. 426, 439, 511 P.2d 223, 234 (1973) (case
arising under guaranty clause justiciable if it involves "none of the traditional elements of a 'political'
controversy").
166. See W. WIECEK, supra note 150, at 76-77.
167. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 242 n.2 (Douglas, J., concurring) (notion that "guaranty is
enforceable only by Congress or the Chief Executive is not maintainable"); Note, Lousy Laumnaking:
Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV.
733, 766-68 (1988) (Court's designation of clause as nonjusticiable cannot be maintained on basis of
commitment to another branch of government); Comment, supra note 159, at 217-19 (case for "tex-
tual commitment" is weak and has been abandoned by Court). But see Henkin, Is There a "Political
Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597, 609 (1976) (" 'The United States shall guarantee' plausibly
refers to the political branches" exclusively).
168. 369 U.S. 186, 223 (1962).
169. Kohler v. Tugwell, 292 F. Supp. 978, 985 (E.D. La. 1968) (emphasis in original), affd, 393
U.S. 531 (1969).
170. 223 U.S. 118 (1912).
1990] 1543
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 99: 1503
the state constitutional amendment authorizing the initiative was chal-
lenged. Oregon still had an elected legislature."7' It still had a Governor.
The initiative constituted but a small part of Oregon's governmental oper-
ation. The notion that a single unconstitutional feature would taint the
entire structure is unsound. But it was this assumption that led White to
find the precedent of Luther v. Borden "absolutely controlling."' 72 Here
White made his second error. The holding in Luther-that Congress
rather than the Court should be charged with determining which of two
competing governments was the "true" government of Rhode Is-
land-does not begin to answer even the distorted question that White
had posed for the Court."73
White's invocation of the justiciability bar leayes us with no Supreme
Court precedent on the constitutionality of direct democracy devices under
the republican form clause. 74 Several state court decisions prior to Pacific
States had reached the merits of similar claims. Each rejected the claim.' 75
I am inclined to think that they reached the correct result. No state-then
or now-has abandoned representative government. The plebiscite thus
serves an ancillary role only."76 A per se rule of invalidity in such a set-
ting177 goes too far toward imposing a uniform model of republicanism on
the states. This does not mean, however, that when the substance of a
voter decision is judicially tested, the standard of review should be the
same as that applied to legislation.
171. While it is true that the taxpayer's assignment of errors did assert that "the legislature...
is destroyed by the initiative," id. at 139, there was no reason for the Court to take this statement to
mean that the adoption of the initiative destroys "all government republican in form in Oregon," id.
at 141 (emphasis added). See Bonfield, supra note 156, at 554-55.
172. Pacific States, 223 U.S. at 143; see L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 99 (describing White's
assumption that invalidating initiative mechanism required nullifying Oregon government as "color-
ful" but "dubious"); Sager, supra note 144, at 1404-05 (describing White's analysis as shaky and as
badly distorting issue before Court). Chief Justice White repeated his overstatement of the legal chal-
lenge to the plebiscite in Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916) (challenge to
referendum "rest[s] upon the assumption that to include the referendum in the scope of the legislative
power is to introduce a virus which in effect annihilates representative government.").
173. Luther involved a political tangle probably best left to Congress. See J. ELY, supra note 86,
at 118 n*. Since the President had already acted to recognize one of the competing Rhode Island
governments, the possibility that co-ordinate branches might give conflicting answers was real and
warranted judicial abdication. See W. WIECEK, supra note 150, at 123-26.
174. Cf City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 679 (1976) ("referendum process
does not, in itself, violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when applied to a
rezoning ordinance"). For a different vision, see Sager, supra note 144, at 1418 (use of plebiscite may
violate due process "where substantial constitutional values are placed in jeopardy . . . [and] where
substantive review of the enactment by the judiciary is largely unavailable").
175. See In re Pfahler, 150 Cal. 71, 88 P. 270 (1906); Hopkins v. Duluth, 81 Minn. 189, 83
N.W. 536 (1900); Ex parte Wagner, 21 Okla. 33, 95 P. 435 (1908); Kiernan v. Portland, 57 Or. 454,
111 P. 379 (1910); Oregon v. Pacific States Tel. & Tel., 53 Or. 162, 99 P. 427 (1909); Kadderly v.
Oregon, 44 Or. 118, 74 P. 710 (1903); Bonner v. Belsterling, 104 Tex. 432, 138 S.W. 571 (1911).
176. One thoughtful commentator argues with some force that the plebiscite runs afoul of the
Constitution when it exceeds its checking function. See Sirico, supra note 22, at 654; cf Comment,
supra note 159, at 238-40 (plebiscitary forms constitutional for setting broad policy objectives but
implementation decisions reserved for representative decision-making).
177. Occasional student notes propose such a rule. E.g., Note, supra note 167, at 772-76 (direct
democracy unconstitutional means of adopting laws and of amending state constitutions).
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In the end, my claim is that direct democracy is constitutionally suspect,
not impermissible. It triggers a harder judicial look. This argument is not
hampered by the justiciability problems that surround the republican form
clause, for I do not contend that this clause should be the lens under
which direct democracy will be scrutinized. My argument instead is that
when laws enacted by plebiscite are challenged under other provisions of
the Federal constitution, the republican form clause informs the nature of
the judicial role.
Hugo Black neglected to read the words of the republican form clause
with the care and respect for which he was renowned. He may have been
right when he remarked that letting the voters of the state directly legis-
late was "as near to democracy as you can get."M7 8 What he failed to note
was that the United States Constitution is not.
2. Judicial Review Under State Constitutions
Until this point I have assumed that judicial review entails a challenge
under a provision of the United States Constitution. Products of direct
democracy-at least in their statutory form 17-9 can also be challenged
under state constitutional provisions.
The preference for representative government revealed in the history
and structure of the Federal constitution has no equal in the constitutions
of the states where voters enjoy lawmaking power. More often than not
these documents expressly proclaim something to the effect that "the peo-
ple reserve to themselves the powers of initiative and referendum." 8 °
Such state constitutions must fairly be read at least to give parity to direct
democracy. Indeed, to the extent that voter initiatives and referenda are
free to undo legislative decisions, while state legislatures often are consti-
tutionally limited in the amendment or repeal of voter action,"" a strong
case may be made for the preferred position of citizen lawmaking. 2
178. 64 LANDMARK BRIEFS, supra note 11, at 668 (emphasis added).
179. Obviously it will be rare that a constitutional initiative or referendum will itself be chal-
lenged as unconstitutional under the state constitution. See supra note 28.
180. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 1; see also, e.g., ARIz. CONsr. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1. The California
Constitution also proclaims that "[a]ll political power is inherent in the people" who enjoy the power
to "alter or reform" government "when the public good may require." CAL. CONST. art. II, § 1.
181. The degree of entrenchment varies. Some states entrench for a specified period of time only.
See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. XI, § 6 (legislature may not repeal initiatives within 2 years of effec-
tive date); Wyo. CONST. art. III, §52(f) (same). Some require legislative supermajorities. See, e.g.,
ARK. CONST. amend. VII § I (two-thirds vote of each House needed to repeal or amend initiatives);
MICH. CONST., art. II, § 9 (1963) (three-fourths of each House needed to repeal or amend initiative);
N.D. CONST. art. III, § 8 (two-thirds vote of each House needed to repeal or amend initiative or
referendum); WASH. CONsT. art. II, § 41 (two-thirds of each House needed to amend or repeal
initiative or referendum within 2 years of passage). Finally, one state prohibits any legislative modifi-
cations without voter approval regardless of how long has transpired since passage or how great a
percentage of the legislators favor such a change. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c) (legislature may not
amend or repeal voter initiative without approval of electorate unless initiative provides otherwise).
182. In fact the conventional history holds that the very purpose behind the adoption of the initia-
tive and referendum was to enable the voters to establish their supremacy over a corrupt and captured
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Naturally, state constitutions place some limits on citizen lawmaking.
They mandate procedures and place certain rights beyond voter abroga-
tion. But state judicial enforcement of these limitations has not always
been vigorous. There are several legitimate justifications for judicial reluc-
tance to invalidate voter action under the state constitution.
The Progressive movement that injected the initiative and the referen-
dum into so many state constitutions feared special interest control of
courts... as well as of legislatures. In several states, such as Colorado and
Nevada, the state constitutions were amended to prohibit judicial invalida-
tion of direct legislation.'84 Other more restrained efforts to control the
judiciary included subjecting judges to constitutional recall provisions.' 85
Without a recall power over judges, reformers argued, the referendum
and initiative would be "rendered valueless" by conservative judges seek-
ing to reinstate the status quo.18 6 It is true that the recall device has al-
most never been used against judges, but its prevalence in state constitu-
tions, and the reasons behind its adoption, confirm these documents'
empowerment of unfiltered popular majorities. 8
In fact, in the sixteen states whose constitutions permit amendment by a
majority of the voters-neither requiring legislative review nor permitting
legislative veto' 88-sovereignty truly vests in an electoral majority. Judi-
representative process. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. For an interesting analysis of one
facet of the conflict between representative government and popular sovereignty under the California
Constitution, see Note, The Limits of Popular Sovereignty: Using the Initiative Power to Control
Legislative Procedure, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 491 (1986).
183. See, e.g., G. MOWRY, supra note 38, at 140-42, 148 (as result of several rulings, California
Supreme Court had become identified with corporate interests controlling state).
184. See COLO. CONST. art. 6, § 1 (1913) (restriction applicable to lower state courts only); NEV.
CONST. art. XIX, § 2 (1904). The texts of both these provisions are set forth in J. BARNETT, THE
OPERATION OF THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL IN OREGON 174 n.1, 175 n.1 (1915)
(citing COLO. CONST. art. VI, § 1 (1914), and NEV. CONST. art. XIX, § 2 (1904)). Although the
Colorado provision is no longer in force, the Nevada provision can now be found at NEV. CONsT. art.
XIX, § 1, cl. 2. It is not likely, however, that any Nevada court would presently read this provision to
bar its review of voter legislation under the state constitution. See Caine v. Robbins, 61 Nev. 416, 131
P.2d 516 (1942) (intent to permit use of initiative process to enact unconstitutional measure should
not be presumed).
185. There seems to have been a split among the Progressives over whether state judges should be
subject to recall. Critics warned that judges would be too hasty "to serve the mob." T. CRONIN, supra
note 16, at 131. While such arguments no doubt contributed to the decision of six states specifically to
exclude judges from recall, the majority of the fifteen state constitutions providing for recall include
the judiciary. Id. at 126-27 (Table 6.1).
186. See Reasons Why Senate Constitutional Amendment No. 23 Should Be Adopted, in CAL.
SECRETARY OF STATE, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALI-
FORNIA WITH LEGISLATIVE REASONS FOR AND AGAINST ADOPTION THEREOF (1911).
187. That the recall is seldom used against judges, see T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 143, does
not mean that the state judiciary is not held electorally accountable. See infra Part III.C.
188. See BOOK OF THE STATES, supra note 27, at 18 (Table 1.3). Nevada, however, requires that
the electorate approve the amendment in two consecutive general elections. Id. at 18. A seventeenth
state, Massachusetts, permits a constitutional initiative to be placed on the ballot only after it is ap-
proved by one-fourth of the members of two successively elected legislatures. Id. at 18 n.b.
Several of these states limit the amendatory power of the electorate by distinguishing between "con-
stitutional amendments" which may be done by voter initiative and "constitutional revisions" which
require the calling of a constitutional convention. See Fischer, supra note 28, at 50-51; Comment,
Judicial Review of Initiative Constitutional Amendments supra note 4, at 476-77. The line between
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cial review of legislative initiatives or referenda under state constitutions
has a sense of futility in such settings. Constitutional initiatives are often
responses to state judicial rulings.18 If a court strikes down voter legisla-
tion as incompatible with the state constitution the same electoral majority
may join together to amend. Voters show no inclination to act with greater
circumspection or self-restraint when confronted with constitutional
amendments. The success rate for constitutional initiatives does not differ
significantly from the passage rate for legislative initiatives.' 90 Using the
state constitution as a judicial shield against the "sovereign's" legislative
effort places an awful lot of weight on the form initially selected by the
plebiscite's promoters. Considering the scant attention voters appear to
pay to this form, 9 ' and state constitutions' lack of additional filters for the
amendatory process-save the additional signatures needed to secure
placement on the ballot"'9 -a court's invalidation of voter legislation
under the state constitution is a questionable preference for the voice of
past electoral majorities over current ones.
The thesis I espouse here-that judicial scrutiny of plebiscites should be
less restrained than judicial review of legislative efforts-therefore makes
sense only when an attack is mounted under a provision of the Federal
the two is sometimes elusive. For an attempt at definition, see Amador Valley Joint Union High
School District v. State Board of Equalization, 22 Cal. 3d 208, 223, 583 P.2d 1281, 1286 (1978)
(enactment so extensive as to change the "substantial entirety" or which accomplishes "far reaching
changes in the nature of [the] basic governmental plan" may constitute revision).
189. See Thompson, Judicial Retention Elections and Judicial Method: A Retrospective on the
California Retention Election of 1986, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2007, 2017-18 (1988).
190. From 1898 to 1979 the passage rate was 38% for statutory initiatives and 34% for constitu-
tional initiatives. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 71 (Table 4.3); see also LEAGUE OF WOMEN
VOTERS, supra note 18, at 26 (from 1912 to 1976 in California, pass rate was 28% for statutory
initiatives and 27% for constitutional initiatives). There may, however, be a trend toward greater
caution with constitutional initiatives. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 72 (since 1950 passage
rate for constitutional initiatives has been 30% as against 42% for statutory initiatives).
191. Voters do, however, seem to distinguish between referenda-whether statutory or constitu-
tional-and initiatives. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 73 (Table 4.4) (passage rate for referenda
from 1898 to 1978 was 60% as opposed to 34% for initiatives). It seems to matter less to the voters
whether they are acting in a constitutive or legislative mode than whether legislative approval has
preceded placement of a measure on the ballot. Perhaps the voters themselves are skeptical about
unfiltered exercises of popular will.
This supposition provides a degree of support for those who contend that electoral self-restraint
renders initiatives less problematic than its critics suggest. See, e.g., Allen, supra note 18, at 1036-38.
I address this possibility in Part III.A. On the other hand, there are alternative explanations for the
higher passage rate of referenda. Initiatives tend to be more controversial and to depart further from
the status quo. Cf. Romer & Rosenthal, Modern Political Economy and the Study of Regulation, in
PUBLIC REGULATION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON INSTITUTIONS AND POLICIES 92 (E. Bailey ed. 1987)
(high cost of changing status quo implies that pivotal voter's preferences must be far from status quo
for initiative to gain support; this enables organizer to pass extreme proposal rather than proposal
matching pivotal voter's ideal). In contrast, many referenda have been approved unanimously by the
legislature. D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 72. Especially in the cases of mandatory referenda like
debt authorization, the proposal may be routine and the opposition minimal. In such situations a
higher pass rate is hardly surprising.
192. See supra note 28. Higher signature requirements do not appear to serve as much of a filter.
In those states permitting both statutory and constitutional initiatives there have been nearly as many
of the latter as the former. Indeed, in eight states there have been more constitutional initiatives than
statutory ones. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 72.
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Constitution. Where the state constitution is the source of a judicial chal-
lenge, the absence of a representational bias and a different conceptualiza-
tion of sovereignty' 93 render the argument inappropriate. State constitu-
tions (in those states that permit direct democracy) embrace a vision of
governance different from the one outlined in the earlier sections of this
Article.
I take no firm position here on whether state constitutional review of
citizen lawmaking warrants greater judicial deference than is ordinarily
afforded to legislative action. It all depends on the state. It is risky to
generalize without first undertaking an in-depth examination of the state's
constitutive instrument. Nonetheless, let me offer three observations. First,
the strongest case for enhanced deference will occur in the states whose
constitutions afford the voters the same direct and unimpeded access to the
amendatory process that they allow for legislation.19 In states which per-
mit direct voter legislation but require legislative concurrence for constitu-
tional amendment, 195 the case will be a weaker one-for the vesting of
sovereign power in an electoral majority has been hedged. Second, judicial
review of local rather than statewide initiatives or referenda under the
state constitution is another kettle of fish altogether. Finally, whatever
may be the actual practice, state courts generally articulate the view that
state constitutional challenges to voter legislation are subject to the same
standard of review applied to laws passed in the ordinary manner.' 96
III. CHECKING THE PLEBISCITE
A. Judicial Review of Substitutive Plebiscites
The thesis to this point may be roughly summarized as follows: The
Constitution seeks to balance majority rule and minority rights. It enforces
the government's obligation to the majority by requiring frequent elec-
tions. Legislative agents periodically return to the people for a renewal of
their transitory mandates. They are held accountable for past actions and
are exposed to shifting waves of public sentiment. Yet, government has an
193. See Amar, supra note 2, at 1063 n.73 ("People of a state may still be treated as 'sovereign'
over its state legislature and state constitution, but not over federal laws or the federal Constitution.").
194. After comparing state provisions for constitutional amendment with provisions for statutory
initiatives, I place thirteen states in this category (Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Michigan,
Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon and South Dakota). Because
Nevada requires voters to approve amendments in two consecutive general elections, see BOOK OF THE
STATES, supra note 25, at 18, I have not included it in this group. The Nevada filter's impact is
demonstrated by the failure in 1980 of a property tax cut amendment after the same measure passed
in 1978. See LEAGUE OF WOMEN VOTERS, supra note 18, at 87.
195. I place seven states in this category (Alaska, Idaho, Maine, Massachusetts, Utah, Washing-
ton and Wyoming).
196. See, e.g., Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d 658, 674, 669 P.2d 17, 26 (1983) ("statu-
tory initiative is subject to the same state . . . constitutional limitations as are the Legislature and the
statutes which it enacts"). But see id., 34 Cal. 3d at 683, 669 P.2d at 35 (Richardson, J., dissenting)
(initiatives entitled to "very special and very favored treatment" (emphasis in original)).
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obligation to all of its citizens; the rights of individuals and minority
groups must be protected against the actions of the majority. The Consti-
tution seeks to enforce this obligation by (i) investing primary lawmaking
authority in representatives rather than the people themselves; (ii) divid-
ing the power of the lawmakers so that each unit may check the others;
and (iii) placing certain principles beyond the reach of ordinary majori-
ties. These protections are enforced by the mechanism of judicial re-
view.' 97 Much sentiment exists for the proposition that the judiciary
should exercise substantial self-restraint in performing its role. The argu-
ment for judicial deference, however, rests on the assumption that the
structure itself-(i) and (ii)-guards against neglect of minority interests.
In its substitutive form direct democracy bypasses internal safeguards
designed to filter out or negate factionalism, prejudice, tyranny, and self-
interest. The judiciary must compensate for these process defects. It must
serve as the first line of defense for minority interests; a back-up role is no
longer adequate. The absence of structural safeguards demands that the
judge take a harder look. A rough sketch for such a "hard look" approach
is set forth in Part III.A.2.
I anticipate two major responses to this argument. First, one may attack
the legislative process as something short of the Framers' vision.' Sec-
ond, one may defend substitutive plebiscites as more deliberative, more
constrained, and less tyrannical than my model suggests. To the extent
that my venture is a comparative one, both claims are relevant.
Initiatives, said then Governor Woodrow Wilson, must be contrasted
"not with the representative government which we possess in theory...
but with the actual state of affairs."' 99 It is undoubtedly true that many
critics of the plebiscite overstate the deliberative capacity of the legislative
process. The gap between theory and reality is probably most pronounced
at the state and local levels where many legislators serve part-time and
laws are often railroaded through en masse.200 A raft of public choice
scholarship seeks to move us from a naive faith in the public-interest char-
197. It is plausible to conceive of courts as having the additional role of protecting majority rights
by ensuring that legislation truly reflects popular values. This vision is more than a little problematic
when applied to review of legislative efforts, for it assumes that courts can better gauge what the
people want than can the legislature. See J. ELY, supra note 86, at 68-69. Applying it to electoral
judgments would completely undermine a court's credibility. Substituting judicial will for voter prefer-
ences in the name of minority rights is one thing. Voiding electoral preferences in the name of major-
ity will, while theoretically supportable, see supra Part II.A, borders on judicial suicide.
198. Cass Sunstein suggests that we are a far cry from Madison's vision of a deliberative democ-
racy. Sunstein, supra note 89, at 48-49. That the scenario Madison promised has not come to frui-
tion, however, does not lead Sunstein to reject it as a normative vision-even if a somewhat romantic
and utopian one. See id. at 81-85, 87.
199. Wilson, The Issues of Reform, in THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL 87 (W.
Munro ed. 1912); see also DOCUMENTS, supra note 79, at 33 (practice of representative government
rather than theory should be basis of comparison with initiative); Briffault, supra note 19, at 1350
(direct legislation "in the field" bound to compare unfavorably with idealized construct of legislative
process).
200. See Gillette, supra note 19, at 942 n.49; Briffault, supra note 19, at 1362.
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acter of most legislation to what Richard Posner calls "a more realistic
understanding of the importance of interest groups in the legislative
process."20o
An in-depth evaluation of the competing pictures of legislative reality is
beyond the scope of this Article. Choosing between the deliberative and
interest group description of the legislative process is unnecessary be-
cause-as 1 suggest below-either affords minorities a greater role than
they are likely to enjoy under the mere aggregative process of the substitu-
tive plebiscite. Further, a good deal of the criticism leveled at the legisla-
ture has no bearing on my limited claim. The contention, for example,
that legislators are inadequately accountable to or insufficiently responsive
to majority preferences admittedly may argue for adopting or maintaining
the initiative.20 2 Initiatives may be better gauges of popular will20. and
elections may be an inadequate means of reminding representatives of
their constituents' views on the issues of the day. But my thesis is several
shades more modest than the claim that direct democracy is an unwise or
unnecessary institution. Instead, my principal concern is with laws that
are unduly insensitive to minority rights, not with those that fail to carry
out popular will. The bridling of lawmakers who fail to heed the major-
ity's voice must in large part occur through the political process20 4 and
may warrant some structural revision. The monitoring of lawmakers who
hear little else is a task that must ultimately rest with the courts.
In exploring the judicial role in protecting minority and individual
rights, the relevant question is whether a system of deliberative, checked-
and-balanced representative government lessens the probability that mi-
nority interests will be neglected, undervalued, or invaded.205 No one
would be so naive as to deny that the deliberative ideal breaks down with
disturbing frequency. The legislature often has trouble hearing voices
from the margin. The Framers' vision, however, combined a deliberative
idealism-which inspired representative government-with a pluralistic
201. R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 271 (1985); see also Macey,
supra note 121, at 223 (special interest groups dominate political process); Wiley, A Capture Theory
of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REV. 713, 723 (1986) (regulation has come to be conceived of
as "a method of subsidizing private interests at the expense of public good.").
At times this literature swings too far in the opposite direction, manifesting a deep distrust of
legislators that may be unwarranted. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 65, at 874 (social science
literature does not support deep distrust of legislatures implicit in public choice legal scholarship); K.
SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, ORGANIZED INTERESTS AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 402 (1986) (pub-
lic officials exercise independent leadership and influence and at times act in behalf of disadvantaged).
202. See Allen, supra note 18, at 978-1001; see also Wilson, supra note 199, at 88 (initiative
provokes genuine representative action by legislative bodies).
203. But see supra Part II.A.
204. See supra note 197.
205. Professor Briffault poses the question somewhat differently: "The appropriate question is
whether the initiative is more likely than the legislature to be a source of measures that discriminate
against minorities or infringe upon the rights of the politically powerless." Briffault, supra note 19, at
1364. Interestingly enough, while Professor Briffault offers no "firm answer," he consoles himself by
pointing to the judiciary as "mitigat[ing] the antiminority potential of direct legislation." Id.
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realism-which prompted cautionary checks. In other words, the process
anticipates its own frailties by subdividing lawmaking authority. Of
course, even this checking structure is far from foolproof."' 8 Recognizing
the consequent need for enhanced judicial attention where the checking
mechanisms themselves break down is what the Carolene Products foot-
note is all about.
20 7
The problem with substitutive democracy is different. When naked
preferences °s emerge from a plebiscite, it is not a consequence of system
breakdown. Naked preferences are precisely what the system seeks to
measure. Aggregation is all that it cares about.20 9 The threat to minority
rights and interests here is structural. This is how the system is supposed
to work.210
1. Equality and Individual Rights at Risk
America's "outsiders" cannot have felt sanguine over the results of sub-
stitutive plebiscites in November 1988. Initiatives declared English the of-
ficial language in Arizona, Colorado, and Florida. Voters in Arkansas,
Colorado, and Michigan banned funding for poor women seeking abor-
tions. California voters authorized involuntary AIDS testing for sex crime
suspects and for assailants of police and emergency workers. And, in Ore-
gon, an initiative repealed the Governor's executive order banning dis-
crimination against lesbians and gay men in the executive branch.211
A number of commentators argue that, notwithstanding the absence of
checks and filters, direct democracy has a good track record and "can only
rarely be faulted for impairing the rights of the powerless. ' 212 There are
206. See Kahn, Reason and Will in the Origins of American Constitutionalism, 98 YALE L.J.
449, 471 (1989) ("Political order . . . cannot always cure the disease of the soul. A properly struc-
tured system of representation and participation cannot guarantee political success."); see also Elliot,
Ackerman & Millian, Toward a Theory of Statutory Evolution: The Federalization of Environmen-
al Law, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 313, 328 (1985) (sometimes our polycentric lawmaking system has
very different structural implications than intended; it "may sometimes encourage or reward rapid
and extreme lawmaking").
207. United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). See generally J. ELY,
supra note 86.
208. The phrase is Cass Sunstein's. See Sunstein, Naked Preferences and the Constitution, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1689 (1984) (defining naked preference as "the distribution of resources or
opportunities to one group rather than another solely on the ground that those favored have exercised
the raw political power to obtain what they want").
209. See Kateb, The Moral Distinctiveness of Representative Democracy, 91 ETHICS 357, 371
(1981) ("[T]he politics of direct democracy is pure numbers.").
210. Cf. Briffault, supra note 19, at 1364 ("[Tlhe challenge to the initiative for lack of sensitivity
to minority interests is misguided; the initiative . . . was designed as a majoritarian tool, to be used
when the legislature failed to act on a program the majority desires." (emphasis in original)).
211. The results of the 1988 statewide ballot measures are compiled in 9 INITIATIVE AND REFER-
ENDUM REPORT No. 10 (Dec. 1988), and INITIATIVE & REFERENDUM: THE POWER OF THE PEOPLE
(Winter 1989).
212. See T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 92; see also Allen, supra note 18, at 1023 ("[Ilt is difficult
to find abusive legislation enacted by initiative."). Allen admits, however, that initiatives may be more
problematic at the local level than at the statewide level. Id. at 1007 n.215, 1026 n.304; cf. Amar,
supra note 2, at 1097 (tyrannical majorities greater problem at state than at national level).
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some stains, they concede, but no more than can be found on the legisla-
tive ledger.213 This is an extremely difficult claim to evaluate.214 Reliable
empirical studies do not exist.2 15 Those who commend direct democracy's
track record rely on anecdotes and erratic case counting. They fail to dis-
tinguish substitutive from complementary exercises of democracy, focus al-
most exclusively on statewide rather than the more prevalent local plebi-
scites,216 and take no account of the comparative frequency with which
voters and legislators act.
But the deficiencies of bottom line comparisons are more serious. As
Professor Ronald Allen, a strong defender of the initiative's track record,
himself concedes, evaluating the states' experience with the initiative
"rests, in part, upon whether the outcomes of ballot measures meet with
our approval. '2 17 Assessing the extent to which plebiscites disregard the
rights of minorities necessarily depends on judgments about whom we rec-
ognize as "minorities," what we view as their "rights," and how we mea-
sure voter "disregard." In offering my judgment that substitutive democ-
racy in fact threatens minority interests to a degree beyond what might be
expected from the representative process, I acknowledge the inevitable
subjectivity of such a claim.
213. See T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 92 ("[A]lthough both direct and representative lawmaking
have occasionally diminished the liberties of the politically powerless, neither can be singled out as
more prone to this tendency."); Allen, supra note 18, at 1010-11 (there is "no evidence from any
extensive study that legislation enacted by initiative is. . .more 'biased' . . . than the workproduct of
the legislative branch"); see also Briffault, supra note 19, at 1364 ("greater [legislative] potential for
attentiveness to minority groups has not always been matched in practice" (emphasis in original)).
But see Bell, supra note 4, at I ("experience of blacks ...has proved ... that the more direct
democracy becomes, the more threatening it is" to unpopular minorities).
214. Indeed, the task of comparison seems Herculean. Plebiscites number in the thousands annu-
ally. Legislative product no doubt can be counted in the millions. Moreover, there are substantial
variations in experience from state to state, and from locality to locality even within a single state.
Finally, the passage of every ballot measure is influenced by a myriad of factors, and broad-based
comparisons run the risk of papering over these complexities. As one of the earliest students of the
initiative process observed: "How superficial at best must be our insight into that complex of social,
political, economic and human forces which lay back of the presentation of [the measures voted on in
19141 and the popular decision upon them." Cushman, Recent Experience with the Initiative and the
Referendum, 10 AM. POL. Sci. REv. 532 (1916).
215. See Allen, supra note 18, at 1014 (studies of performance of initiative process tend to be
dated and methodologically suspect); see also Sirico, supra note 22, at 641 (social science literature
does not indicate whether minorities have done better with legislatures than with voters). Professors
Thomas Cronin and David Magleby have each recently completed extensive studies of direct democ-
racy. Cronin finds voters no more prone to impair equality, T. CRoNIN, supra note 16, at 92, 98,
while Magleby concludes that legislatures are more sensitive to the interests of minorities, D.
MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 184-85. In books otherwise loaded with empirical data these particular
conclusions rely only on general observations. Perhaps Clayton Gillette is correct when he states that
claims about comparative performances of direct and representative democracy are not capable of
empirical demonstration. Gillette, supra note 19, at 938.
216. This focus leaves much majority tyranny unseen. In November 1989, for example, an elec-
tion with almost no controversial statewide measures, the voters of Seattle voted to make additional tax
revenues available to the school district only if the School Board reversed its decision to bus students
for racial balance, see N.Y. Times, Nov. 15, 1989, at A18, col. 6 (West Coast edition), and the voters
of three California cities repealed local legislative measures enacted for the protection of the gay and
lesbian community, see L.A. Times, Nov. 9, 1989, at Al, col. 1.
217. Allen, supra note 18, at 1008.
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There are two distinctive components to assessing substitutive democ-
racy's relative capacity for majority tyranny. The first concerns the need
for filters. The second deals with their efficacy.
a. The Need For Filters
Advocates of direct democracy frequently invoke a trust in the inherent
goodness and fairness of the citizenry. All criticisms, Benjamin Barber in-
formed the Senate, "are so many different ways of saying 'the people are
not to be trusted.' "218 Representative Walter Fauntroy prefers "to put my
faith in the good judgment of the American people and in their basic
good. ' 219 White voters will respond to the plight of blacks,2 2  the middle
class will not cut off the poor,22' and the Bill of Rights will remain
intact. 222
Many of us, however, are not prepared so confidently to shed the skep-
ticism of the Founders. It may be politic to invoke an abiding trust in
public judgment, but racism, sexism, nativism, and self-interest are too
much a part of American history to be ignored. In a multitude of ways we
continue to demonstrate our fear of the other and our distrust of differ-
ence. While public proclamations of racist attitudes have lost their respect-
ability, prejudice continues to receive an airing in the privacy of the voting
booth. 223 As Charles Black once reminded us, the very definition of un-
popularity is that unpopular groups normally will fare poorly at the bal-
lot box. 224
A recent Gallup Poll asked those surveyed whether they believed the
opinions of minority groups would "get a fair say" among citizens asked
to vote directly on legislation. Fifty-eight percent thought so. Thirty-two
percent thought not. Among non-whites the figures were quite different.
The respondents split evenly, with forty-six percent believing that minori-
218. See Hearings, supra note 14, at 195.
219. Id. at 34.
220. Walter Fauntroy has expressed the belief that matters involving civil rights, voting rights,
and affirmative action "would be faced and responded to at least as courageously by the majority of
the American voting public as the Congress has faced and responded to issues surrounding the plight
of various minority segments of our population." Id. at 35. Had a national initiative process been in
place at the time of the Civil Rights Bill of 1964, says Fauntroy, "the result would have been the
same, perhaps even stronger." Id. at 38.
221. Id. at 72 (Testimony of Professor Larry Berg). Shortly after Professor Berg testified, Cali-
fornia adopted Proposition 13.
222. See Amar, supra note 2, at 1096-97. Amar, however, does suffer a partial loss of faith when
it is trust in the people of a state rather than the nation as a whole that is being debated. Id. at 1097.
223. See K. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA 274 n.32 (1989); Pettigrew, Neu, Patterns of Ra-
cism: The Different Worlds of 1984 and 1964, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 673, 691 (1985); see also
Crenshaw, Race, Refon, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimina-
tion Law, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1331, 1347 n.62 (1988) ("Polls show that most Americans have
adopted the rhetoric of formal racial equality" while expressing anti-Black opinions on issues such as
miscegenation and housing integration). On occasion the Court has demonstrated sensitivity to the
prejudice which permeates the voting booth. See Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964) (law re-
quiring designation of candidate's race on ballots held unconstitutional).
224. Black, supra note 19, at 31.
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ties would not get fair treatment at the hands of the voters and the same
percentage registering faith in electoral fairness. 2 5 Even if the public
judgment often turns out to be "fair" to minorities-whatever that
means-at least a perception exists among a substantial percentage of
Americans, especially minorities, that it is not.
Perhaps most telling is the ultimate lack of faith in the unfiltered judg-
ment of a simple majority shown by the very people who praise the electo-
rate's track record and chide us for our distrust. Benjamin Barber con-
cludes his primer for participation by worrying about "whimsical
majorities" and suggesting multiple votes and legislative or executive ve-
toes-subject to subsequent override-as checks against majorities work-
ing their will without prolonged debate and deliberation. The aim "is not
to make it easy for the public to self-legislate but to make it possible. '226
His particular brand of strong democracy calls for adding participatory
ingredients to the constitutional formula, not removing representative in-
gredients. Checks and balances must, according to Barber, be kept in
place to prevent majorities from running roughshod over minority expres-
sions of dissent and indignation.2 Ron Allen ends his brief for a national
initiative by endorsing a super-majority requirement "as an awkward at-
tempt to provide institutional protection for minority interests. '228 Both
Richard Briffault and Clayton Gillette defend direct democracy while not-
ing the comforting presence of a sturdy judicial safety net.229 And Thomas
Cronin hedges his tribute to the plebiscite's track record by acknowledging
that "[iff we are to give occasional free rein to majority rule at the ballot
box, we shall have to give additional consideration to protecting the rights
of minorities."23 The message these commentators leave us is this: Those
who oppose electoral lawmaking lack the trust in the people that a democ-
racy demands. But trust only goes so far. In the end simple majorities
cannot be expected consistently to honor the interests of minorities and
guarantee individual liberties. Something more is needed.
I must admit to a degree of confusion. If indeed the electorate-without
a checking structure-has done as well by minorities and individual rights
as the legislature has, does it not suggest that checks are unnecessary? Yet
no one seems to endorse this conclusion. No one is willing to leave all
decision-making to mere aggregation of electoral preferences. This of
225. See T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 98-99. The specific breakdown between whites and non-
whites is on file with the author.
226. B. BARBER, supra note 19, at 288 (emphasis in original).
227. Id. at 308-11.
228. Allen, supra note 18, at 1043. Allen proposed that passage require a majority in a majority
of states. I refer to this as a super-majority requirement to distinguish it from a simple-majority vote.
Allen apparently rejects such a label. Id. at 1045.
229. See Briffault, supra note 19, at 1364-65 (judicial review ensures that direct legislation no
more threatens minorities than does legislature); Gillette, supra note 19, at 984 (courts can check
plebiscites as they do legislature).
230. T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 98.
[Vol. 99: 15031554
Judicial Review of Direct Democracy
course is consistent with the premise of our Constitution. If it does not
mean that the champions of substitutive democracy lack trust in electoral
majorities, it at least means that they demand certain conditions to ensure
that trust is warranted. In the end, their distrust, like mine, is of the
process not the people. Considered judgments, sensitive to the interests of
all, require time, debate, deliberation, information, and shared power.
Substitutive plebiscites shortchange the decision-maker on all these
accounts.
b. The Efficacy of Filters
The legislative process, whether described as deliberative or pluralist,
affords minority groups a role that they lack in the substitutive plebiscite.
Our worst tendencies toward prejudice, suggests Derrick Bell, are chas-
tened in legislative debate.213' Knowledge and exposure are effective weap-
ons against prejudice. Debate and deliberation inevitably lead to better
informed judgment. Enlarging one's exposure to competing ideas and per-
spectives induces greater sensitivity and checks partiality.2 32 Legislative
hearings and the testimony of various interest groups widen the legisla-
tor's horizon. But hearings are only a part of legislative education. Per-
haps a more important factor in generating empathy is the diversity of the
legislature's membership itself. Racism is not always conscious. More
often than not it occurs because of ignorance, oversight, or insensitivity.
When minorities are part of the legislative "we," subordination of the
"other" becomes both more visible and less comfortable. Group represen-
tation ensures that diverse views are continually expressed, increasing
"the likelihood that political outcomes will incorporate some understand-
ing of the perspectives of all those affected. '233
The substitutive plebiscite, on the other hand, has little capacity for
deliberation."" Public debate is infrequent. Exposure to minority perspec-
231. Bell, supra note 4, at 29. Professor Bell believes only that prejudice is subdued in the delib-
erative environment. He holds out little hope for its elimination. See Bell & Bansal, The Republican
Retival and Racial Politics, 97 YALE L.J. 1609, 1612 (1988) (Blacks properly feel "skepticism and
cynicism" when asked "to rely on a theory that extols the shared values of a deliberative model").
232. See J. RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTiCE 358-59 (1971) (exchange of opinion checks partiality
and widens perspectives; "[W]e are made to see things from the standpoint of others and the limits of
our vision are brought home to us.").
233. Sunstein, supra note 84, at 1588. This of course assumes a diverse legislative body. In a
system of at-large rather than proportional representation this benefit will be lost. See City of Mobile
v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 123 (1980) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (at-large voting effectively locks discrete
political minorities out of governmental decisionmaking processes).
234. See D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 187 (voters appear to decide with little deliberation or
discussion); Black, supra note 19, at 30-31 (initiative process does not permit informed deliberation
such as normally engaged in by legislature); Sager, supra note 144, at 1414 ("Legislation by plebi-
scite is not and cannot be a deliberative process."); see also Michelman, supra note 99, at 185 (direct-
democratic procedures used sporadically in large and politically apathetic electorates do not fulfill
Rousseau's vision of deliberative community expressions of the general will). One commentator dis-
agrees, claiming that "the deliberative process that informs legislators has an equivalent in the plebis-
citary process." Gillette, supra note 19, at 958. Gillette's claim is a bit unusual. He argues that most
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tives occurs accidentally if at all. Voters may be confused and over-
whelmed by the issues placed before them.2 35 Any efforts at self-education
are thwarted by manipulative campaigns designed to oversimplify the is-
sues and appeal to the electorate's worst instincts.236 Most important, vot-
ers register their decisions in the privacy of the voting booth. They are
unaccountable to others for their preferences and their biases. Their indi-
vidual commitment to a consistent and fair course of conduct can be
neither measured nor questioned.
If the deliberative version of the legislative process sounds a little too
much pie-in-the-sky to the reader, I share the sentiments. Whatever its
normative force, it falls considerably short as description. The deviations
from an ideal model of deliberation are particularly marked at the state
and local level. And it is to combat this failing that many commentators
have urged judicial emphasis on due process of lawmaking.237 But it
seems inconceivable that on balance the legislature does not come a whole
lot closer to the ideal than the substitutive plebiscite.23 A pluralistic snap-
shot of the legislative process shows an ongoing system of compromise,
negotiation, vote-trading and tactical deals. This arrangement forces legis-
lators to reckon with minority groups. Legislative logrolling over a broad
agenda brings minorities into the process and allows resulting com-
promises to accommodate their interests. 2 9
Substitutive plebiscites, on the other hand, are one-shot, winner-take-
all. The coalition process does not work in the sporadic and unwieldy
world of citizen lawmaking. As Frank Michelman notes, you can't dicker
with an electorate for support now in exchange for your support on some-
thing else later.240 Majoritarian preferences cannot be softened or diluted
by political compromise.
persons will not vote, id. at 946, that the process of voting serves as a filter for those who have
thought about the underlying issues, id. at 958, and that those who opt for participation thus do so
deliberatively, id. at 960. Gillette's claim, while imaginative, has two shortcomings. On a general
level, his notion of an informed electorate appears to be flatly contradicted by a number of surveys.
See supra text accompanying note 46. More damaging in the particular context I address here, how-
ever, is his failure to take account of the racial, class, and financial skew of those who vote on ballot
propositions. See supra notes 43-44. If Gillette's sighting of deliberation is accurate, it is not likely to
be the sort of deliberation that will result in attention to the voices at the margin.
235. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text. A 1989 Pennsylvania ballot measure on tax
reform ran 125 pages. See FAMILY, LAW & DEMOCRACY REPORT, June 1989, at 1. Small wonder
that voters are confused.
236. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
237. E.g., Sunstein, supra note 89; J. ELY, supra note 86, at 125-34; L. TRIBE, supra note 28,
at 1673-87.
238. Thus, although commentators like Richard Briffault criticize critics of direct democracy for
"overstating" the deliberative nature of the legislative process, see Briffault, supra note 19, at 1362,
they usually end up conceding that it is "likely" that the legislative process has "a greater potential
for deliberative decision making than does initiative voting." Id. at 1363.
239. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT 133 (1962) (if minorities
are represented in legislature, log-rolling will block laws discriminating against them). But see R.
SUGDEN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC CHOICE 184 (1981) (log-rolling no defense against
injustices of majority rule).
240. Michelman, supra note 99, at 182; see also D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at 184 (direct
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It is not the continuing and open nature of the legislators' relationship
alone that blunts majoritarian excess. Three features of the legislative
structure magnify the minority voice. First, the committee system dispro-
portionately empowers minorities and necessitates bargaining in order to
"move" legislation. Second, political parties assert a strong anti-
majoritarian influence in the legislative process by enabling the individu-
ally powerless to aggregate their voting power.241 Political parties play a
minimal role in the substitutive plebiscite.242 They rarely take a stand on
ballot measures, leaving confused voters to rely on individual politicians
for external cues. Third, and perhaps most resonant of the Framers' plan
is the part played by bicameralism and executive veto. Bicameralism
forces majorities to seek broader coalitions. It imposes something like a
supermajority voting rule.2" 3 The executive veto not only affords minority
groups an additional ear on legislation that affects them, but because leg-
islative override demands supermajority votes, the veto also enhances mi-
nority currency.
Pluralism in the legislative process is a two-edged sword. Minoritarian
counterweights have undesirable costs to accompany their benefits. The
same mechanisms that allow less advantaged minorities to check the legis-
lative product permit plutocratic interests to exert disproportionate influ-
ence. Indeed, because these groups are better organized and better fi-
nanced, interest group politics tends to skew dramatically in their
legislation excludes compromise and accommodation); Black, supra note 19, at 31 (initiative compels
total polarization); Note, supra note 98, at 1304 n.1 11 (transaction costs of coalition-building and log-
rolling for minority groups are much lower in legislature than in polity at large). Derrick Bell makes
the apt analogy to at-large voting. See Bell, supra note 4, at 25-26 (plebiscites, like multi-member
districts, tend to minimize or cancel out voting strength of racial and political minorities). Clayton
Gillette argues that compromise does play a role in the plebiscitary process. The drafters of initiatives,
he contends, understand the yes-no choice open to the voters, and in order to attain sufficient support
they may construct a form more moderate than the one favored by the most zealous advocates. Thus
compromise, absent from the voting stage, is built in at the drafting stage. Gillette, supra note 19, at
96 9-7 0 . All this proves, however, is that initiatives with only minority support have to be softened.
Those with solid majority backing need make no accommodations for minorities. Indeed, to do so may
erode support among the majority.
241. See W. BURNHAM, supra note 41, at 294 (Democratic party often embraces public policies
with little general mass support); W. CROTTY, AMERICAN PARTIES IN DECLINE 281 (2d ed. 1984)
(political parties "most effective vehicle" for representing "out-groups"); K. KARST, supra note 223,
at 93 (political parties "connect different groups," and "party activity makes cultural subgroups feel
like insiders"); V. KEY, JR., SOUTHERN POLITICS IN STATE AND NATION 298-311 (1949) (Demo-
cratic party functions as bargaining agent among conflicting minority interests); R. LANE, POLITICAL
LIFE: WHY PEOPLE GEr INVOLVED IN POLITICS 270 (1959) (disorganized and resourceless groups
need political ties to mobilize). Some historians contend that a major purpose behind the adoption of
initiative procedures was to reduce the power of party machines and of the lower and middle class
groups to which they catered. See, e.g., S. HAYS, supra note 38, at 217-29.
242. As David Magleby points out, the parties usually play no role in the drafting of initiatives
and are thus. robbed of their traditional role of "weighing competing interests, achieving compromise,
and moderating demands in order to appeal to the maximum number of voters." D. MAGLEBY, supra
note 16, at 189.
243. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCK, supra note 239, at 233-48. Bicameralism, however,
plays a lesser role on the state and local level than on the national level. Although every state but
Nebraska has retained the bicameral form, nearly all major local governments today have unicameral
legislatures. See T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 33.
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direction. 244  But for both groups, the enhanced voice produces mi-
noritarian vetoes far more than minoritarian legislation.245 The added ad-
vantage tends to be a negative power rather than an affirmative one. This
after all is how the Framers intended the filtering system to work. The
upside would be a limit on simple majoritarianism. The downside would
be impasse.
It was precisely the ability of narrow political and economic interests to
block popular legislation that led to the adoption of the substitutive plebi-
scite."" A good deal of what this reform produced has been positive.
When powerful private interest lobbies cause legislative inattention to the
public interest, initiatives serve a valuable corrective function. The prob-
lem is that circumventing counter-majoritarian influences indiscriminately
breaks the stranglehold of special economic interests247 and stifles the
voices of unpopular racial and political minorities. If we are to reap the
rewards of the former, we must provide compensation for the latter.
2. The Outlines of a Hard Judicial Look
The purpose of this article is to suggest that courts take a harder look
when constitutional challenges are mounted against laws enacted by sub-
stitutive plebiscite. In a sense I am proposing a new paragraph for the
Carolene Products footnote: a fourth situation where the presumption of
244. See K. SCHLOZMAN & J. TIERNEY, supra note 201, at 66-87, 107-19. The authors none-
theless acknowledge that less advantaged groups are "heeded in the making of policy." Id. at 403.
245. See supra note 122; see also Farber & Frickey, supra note 65, at 906 (social science litera-
ture indicates that interest groups exercise more power when they oppose legislation than when they
support it).
246. See T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 45 (direct democracy became appealing as populists saw
legislatures defeat proposals majority favored); Briffault, supra note 19, at 1364 (initiative designed tt,
offset minority influence when legislature failed to act on program desired by majority); Lowenstein,
California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule, 30 UCLA L. REv. 936, 965 (1983) (function of
initiative is to check narrow political and economic interests).
247. It is not clear that direct democracy has been successful in this regard. See generally Lowen-
stein, supra note 27, at 570, 576 (by one-sided spending, special interests-usually business corpora-
tions or trade associations-can block passage of initiative favored by majority). The power of well-
financed groups to oppose ballot propositions successfully without regard to any breadth of popular
feeling seriously interferes with the substitutive plebiscite's intended purpose. Id. at 608. Clayton
Gillette takes great delight in exposing what he believes are conflicting criticisms of the plebiscite: (1)
that it ignores the interests of the minority, and (2) that it can too easily be captured by special
interests. He takes Derrick Bell to task for being "oblivious" to the inherent conflict between the two.
Gillette, supra note 19, at 936-37. But it is Gillette who seems oblivious in his assumption that the
"small, organized interests" capable of capturing the plebiscite process are the same category of "mi-
nority" that Bell is worried about being neglected by electoral majorities. In a system where just
gathering the required signatures to get on the ballot can cost upwards of $1 million, and where the
amount expended in California's November 1988 initiative battle over insurance reform eclipsed the
amount spent nationwide by Michael Dukakis and George Bush, see Wolinsky, $23 a Vote, L.A.
Times, Mar. 31, 1989, at 3, col. 1, the poor and racial minorities will be doing little capturing. The
majority may not always win the plebiscite, but if it is thwarted, financially empowered minorities
will do the thwarting. Ironically, the very same "contradiction" that Gillette sees in Bell's fears traces
to THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 57 (J. Madison) (expressing fears of factions, whether majority or
minority).
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constitutionality should be relaxed.2 " On occasions when the people es-
chew representation, courts need to protect the Constitution's representa-
tional values. This approach might be called representation-enforcement
in contrast to John Ely's representation-reinforcement model for review of
legislative efforts. Where the structure itself is unable to guarantee a hear-
ing for a variety of voices or to prevent factional domination, courts must
pick up the slack and ensure that the majority governs in the interests of
the whole people.
I shall not attempt here to provide a detailed primer for judicial appli-
cation of such an intensified review. Substitutive plebiscites cover a daz-
zling array of subject matters"" and are challenged under a variety of
specific constitutional provisions, including equal protection, impairment
of contract, First Amendment,25 taking without just compensation, cruel
and unusual punishment, and procedural due process. With all signs ad-
vising caution, I nonetheless cannot resist a number of general
suggestions.
Because the harder look is prompted by a concern for individual rights
and equal application of laws, it is principally in these areas that the
courts should treat substitutive plebiscites with particular suspicion.
Where, on the other hand, the electorate acts to improve the processes of
legislative representation, the justification for judicial vigilance is absent.
Measures to enforce ethics in government,251 regulate lobbyists,'52 or re-
248. See 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citations omitted):
There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legis-
lation appears on its face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution ....
[L]egislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation ... [may] be subjected to more exacting judicial secur-
ity .... [Strict scrutiny may also apply to] statutes directed at particular religious, or na-
tional, or racial minorities ....
Instead of viewing review of substitutive plebiscite as a "fourth situation," it might be possible to fit it
under the second or third identified by Justice Stone-substitutive plebiscites both clog the channels of
political change (paragraph 2) and "curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be
relied upon to protect minorities" (paragraph 3). See Comment, Judicial Review of Lau, Enacted by
Popular Vote, supra note 4, at 204-06. Because it is clear that Stone had only the legislative process
in mind, however, I prefer to supplement his list rather than to distort it.
249. Recent initiatives have addressed subjects as diverse as public morality, governmental
processes, taxation, labor regulation, business regulation, utility rates, zoning and land use, health,
welfare reform, housing, homelessness, education, civil rights, environmental protection, and nuclear
power. For a listing of the November 1988 plebiscites grouped by subject matter, see 9 INITIATIVE
AND REFERENDUM REPORT, supra note 50, at 19-24.
250. For an interesting perspective on the intersection between First Amendment theory and judi-
cial review of plebiscitary action affecting free speech, see Schauer, The Role of the People in First
Amendment Theory, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 761, 779-80, 783-85 (1986) (Meiklejohnian theory of First
Amendment, dependent on popular sovereignty, gives substantial weight to views of electorate regard-
ing speech issues).
251. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. II, § 8 (requiring full financial disclosure by state and county
officials and candidates; enacted by voter initiative in November 1976); see also Fritz v. Gorton, 83
Wash. 2d 275, 517 P.2d 911 (1974) (upholding public disclosure initiative). A recent example is the
successful November 1988 Arkansas statutory initiative strengthening rules of legislative ethics and
requiring enhanced legislative disclosure of dealings with lobbyists. See 9 INITIATIVE AND REFEREN-
DUM REPORT, supra note 50, at 18.
252. E.g., California's Political Reform Act of 1974, CAL. GOV'T CODE, §§ 81000-91015 (West
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form campaign finance practices'" pose no distinctive threat of
majoritarian tyranny. These measures install new filters rather than seek-
ing to bypass the existing ones. Interestingly enough, only one of the
nearly three dozen plebiscites reviewed by the Supreme Court has in-
volved such a measure. 254
I am unwilling, however, to group alterations of government structure
and reapportionment efforts in the category of governmental reform. Too
often these "reforms" are a facade for disfranchising minorities; courts
should be watchful of such chicanery. 55 Neither do I ignore the threat of
majority tyranny in fiscal measures like taxation and spending limitations.
The beneficiaries of these so-called taxpayer revolts are principally upper
and upper-middle class white citizens. The brunt of the burdens, in con-
trast, is borne by the underrepresented poor and by racial minorities.25 '
1987) (voter initiative requiring lobbyists to register and to disclose transactions, and restricting their
ability to make gifts and political contributions). The California Supreme Court subsequently invali-
dated the contribution ban and many of the reporting requirements on the theory that they impinged
on the lobbyists' First Amendment rights. See Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 25
Cal. 3d 33, 599 P.2d 46, 157 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1979). Like the United States Supreme Court, the
California court seems hesitant to allow abridgement of speech in order to enhance the representative
process. Rulings such as Fair Political Practices Commission either are insensitive to the impact of
the inequality of resources on the operation of government, see supra note 163, or regard such ine-
qualities as an inevitable part of American life that government may not "remedy." When voters move
in an egalitarian direction to open up political channels-as California voters appear to have done in
1974-the initiative operates in the best traditions of the Constitution's representational values, and
Justice Black's call for enhanced judicial deference is at its most compelling. Further, popular action
directed at making government officials more responsive to their constituents augments rather than
threatens the checking function of the First Amendment. Cf. Schauer, supra note 250, at 782 (electo-
ral delineations of free speech rights must be assessed in context of substantive theory of First Amend-
ment that one embraces).
253. Again, the California Political Reform Act of 1974 provides an apt example. Chapter 5 of
that initiative placed limits on campaign spending. Under what it perceived as the compulsion of
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the California Supreme Court struck down several of the limita-
tions. See, e.g., Citizens for Jobs & Energy v. Fair Political Practices Comm'n, 16 Cal. 3d 671, 547
P.2d 1386, 129 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1976) (voiding aggregate expenditure limitations on supporters and
opponents of statewide ballot propositions). The factors that counsel against enhanced review of lob-
byist regulations challenged under the First Amendment, see supra note 252, are equally applicable
here.
254. See Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981). In that case the Court
struck down a municipal initiative imposing a $250 limitation on contributions to committees formed
to support or oppose ballot measures. Whatever the correctness of the Court's decision, plebiscites like
this do not warrant enhanced judicial suspicion. See supra note 252.
255. The Supreme Court has been willing to acknowledge only the most patent such trickery. See,
e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (invalidating popular referendum changing city charter
to require voter approval of open housing ordinances); Washington v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 458
U.S. 457 (1982) (voiding initiative altering powers of local school boards); see also Lucas v. Forty-
Fourth Gen. Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (striking down voter-adopted reapportionment scheme).
When the disfranchisement effort has been more subtle, the Court has seemed blind to the motivations
prompting the plebiscite's structural alterations. See, e.g., James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971)
(upholding voter amendment to state constitution requiring voter approval for low-income housing
projects on ground that it involved no racial distinctions); City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426
U.S. 668 (1976). Eastlake upheld a plebiscite making zoning changes more difficult, a change that an
Ohio Supreme Court Justice described as designed "to perpetuate the de facto divisions in our society
between black and white, rich and poor." Forest City Enters. v. City of Eastlake, 41 Ohio St. 2d 187,
200-01, 324 N.E.2d 740, 749 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 668 (1976).
256. Derrick Bell suggests that the success of California's initiative limiting property
taxes-Proposition 13-may in part be attributed to voter belief that approval would result in reduced
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This raises the problematic question of how to measure discrimination
against minorities. The traditional approach holds that "the invidious
quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose. '25 7 Disparate impact on ac-
knowledged minorities without more does not suffice to invite close judi-
cial scrutiny. The search for a bigoted decision-maker seems particularly
elusive in the context of substitutive plebiscites. Public debate is minimal
and voting is private. Furthermore, lower courts have barred inquiry into
motivations of individual voters.
According to a unanimous panel of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit, the First Amendment "assures every citizen the right
to 'cast his vote for whatever reason he pleases.' " Racial prejudice, while
"neither socially admirable nor civically attuned, [is] not constitutionally
proscribed." '258 The Fifth Circuit is not alone in creating insurmountable
obstacles to minorities' raising equal protection challenges to voter efforts.
Judge Cornelia Kennedy, the author of a recent unanimous opinion of the
Sixth Circuit, explicitly barred inquiry into electoral motivation unless ra-
cial discrimination is the only possible motivation behind the referendum
results.259 She offered two justifications for this rigid prohibition. First,
the secret ballot had to be protected. "Since a court cannot ask voters how
they voted or why they voted that way, a court has no way of ascertaining
what motivated the electorate."26 In this way, cases permitting inquiry
into the votes of legislators were inapposite. Second, although the record
before her revealed some racial slurs uttered in meetings leading to the
referendum, Judge Kennedy refused to infer racial bias in the total electo-
rate, noting that courts should "not lightly set aside the results of voter
referendums." If inquiry into the racial motivation of voters were allowed,
she feared, opponents of ballot measures would be encouraged to intro-
duce race as an issue in every election affecting minorities.26
Surely there is something faulty with this reasoning. Perhaps the Fifth
Circuit has it technically right when it concludes that individual citizens
are "entitled" to vote for the basest motives imaginable.262 Judge Kennedy
is no doubt correct that in any event we can neither discover nor prevent
welfare payments by the state. See Bell, supra note 4, at 19 n.72.
257. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 237 (1976).
258. Kirksey v. City of Jackson, 663 F.2d 659, 662 (5th Cir. 1981).
259. See Arthur v. City of Toledo, 782 F.2d 565, 574 (6th Cir. 1986).
260. Id. at 573; accord Southern Alameda Spanish Speaking Org. v. Union City, 424 F.2d 291,
295 (9th Cir. 1970) (probing of voters' motives "would entail an intolerable invasion of the privacy
that must protect an exercise of the franchise").
261. Arthur, 782 F.2d at 573.
262. Kirksev, 663 F.2d at 662. Lawrence Sager puts the claim more sympathetically. We would,
Sager points out, reject a challenge to a mayoral election on the ground that the voters favored candi-
date X because his opponent was black, even if the fact of the racial animus were firmly established.
"This solicitude for the sanctity of individual choice in the electoral context," Sager concludes, "logi-
cally extends to legislative plebiscites." Sager, supra note 144, at 1421.
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the casting of such votes. But the very recognition of the fundamental way
in which a voter's responsibility differs from a legislator's constitutional
obligation, as well as the inevitable evidentiary obstacles to assessing elec-
toral motivation, demands a different judicial treatment of the law pro-
duced by the electorate. As the Supreme Court noted in Pahnore v. Sidoti,
"[p]rivate biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot
. . .give them effect." 263
Two approaches are possible. We may relax the burden of proving dis-
criminatory purpose and be more imaginative about the sources we can-
vass-for example, ballot pamphlets, exit polls, campaign advertis-
ing -or we may abandon the purpose requirement altogether in certain
plebiscitary settings. 6 "
A patchwork of the two approaches can be observed in Washington v.
Seattle School District No. 1.266 The case arose out of the efforts of Seattle
school authorities to achieve racial balance by involuntary busing. A
group of Seattle residents who opposed "The Seattle Plan" introduced an
initiative (Initiative 350) to prohibit school districts from "requirfing] any
student to attend a school other than the school which is geographically
nearest or next nearest the student's place of residence. '267 A number of
exceptions permitted student reassignment to alleviate overcrowding or to
meet special educational needs of individual students. At the November,
263. 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984); see also City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S.
432, 448 (1985) (electorate as a whole cannot by referendum order government action violative of
equal protection clause).
264. See Bell, supra note 4, at 24 n.91 (public opinion polls, advertising campaigns, or even
statements by supporters might be used to show discriminatory purpose). But see Crawford v. Board
of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 545 (1982) (where nondiscriminatory objectives stated in text of ballot pro-
position, Court will ordinarily not "impugn the motives of the State's electorate"). A recent student
note exploring the somewhat different problem of statutory interpretation argues that popularly en-
acted legislation "produces a wealth of extrinsic materials that can serve as evidence of the intent of
the electorate." Note, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretation of Popularly Enacted Legisla-
tion, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 157, 164 (1989). But these "extrinsic materials," which include voter pam-
phlets, statutory statements of intent, and voter exit polls have serious limitations when racial motiva-
tions are the subject of inquiry. Statements of intent and ballot pamphlet explanations will seldom
sound the publicly unacceptable voice of bigotry. Further, ballot pamphlets are "campaign documents,
drafted for tactical purposes with the uncommitted voter in mind, and therefore do not necessarily
reflect the intent of either the authors of a proposition or the greater number of persons who vote for
it." Lowenstein, supra note 246, at 954 n.73. Finally, most voters will not have read, let alone under-
stood this material. See supra notes 21, 44-50, and accompanying text. The privacy of opinions ven-
tured to pollsters and the crassness of campaign advertising hold greater promise of ferreting out
impermissible motives. But methodologically sound polls will not always be available, and courts are
unlikely to assume that voters were swayed by scurrilous ad pitches. As Jesse Choper concludes, it
will be a real challenge to courts to determine what sort and what quantum of evidence will be
necessary to demonstrate illicit motivation in the plebiscitary context. See J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISAR &
L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 243.
265. One commentator calls for dispensing with a purpose inquiry whenever plebiscites are chal-
lenged under the equal protection clause. See Gunn, Initiatives and Referendums: Direct Democracy
and Minority Interests, 22 URB. L. ANN. 135, 158-59 (1981) (proposing that disproportionate impact
on minorities trigger strict scrutiny of citizen lawmaking).
266. 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
267. Id. at 462 (quoting initiative).
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1978, general election, the proposal received nearly two-thirds of the
statewide vote. A constitutional challenge followed.
A Federal district judge held Initiative 350 unconstitutional based on
his conclusions that (1) it facially classified according to race and, alterna-
tively, that (2) even if facially neutral, it had been adopted for discrimina-
tory purposes. 288 In reaching the latter conclusion, the judge acknowl-
edged that the secret ballot raised an "impenetrable barrier" to
determining whether the initiative's supporters "subjectively [had] a ra-
cially discriminatory intent or purpose,"2 69 and he conceded that the initi-
ative's proponents had not "directed [their] appeals to the racial biases of
the voters."2 ' Nonetheless, he found that the racially disproportionate im-
pact of Initiative 350, when coupled with its historical background, the
sequence of events leading to its adoption, and its departure from Wash-
ington's procedural norm of local school board autonomy, demonstrated
"that a racially discriminatory intent or purpose was at least one motivat-
ing factor in [its] adoption."2 1
A sharply divided Supreme Court agreed that Initiative 350 was uncon-
stitutional. The majority's route to that conclusion, however, cannot easily
be mapped. Initially, Justice Blackmun's opinion appears to reject the
trial court's characterization of the initiative as a facial classification,
choosing instead to note its "facial neutrality. '27 2 Nevertheless, he ac-
knowledges, the "reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority."2 3
Under case law, however, disparate impact without more is not sufficient
to trigger strict scrutiny-something the initiative's sponsors reminded the
Court at every turn. The Court's response to this obstacle is confused. At
times, Justice Blackmun appears to find impermissible motive, noting that
"there is little doubt that the initiative was effectively drawn for racial
purposes," a fact of which the Washington electorate was "surely . . .
aware." 2 4 Elsewhere in the opinion, he seems to be saying that where the
normal decision-making process is altered for issues of unique interest to
minority groups, inquiry into motivation is not necessary.27 5 Just when
268. Seattle School Dist. No. 1 v. State, 473 F. Supp. 996, 1011 (W.D. Wash. 1979). The district
judge offered yet a third justification for voiding the initiative-that it was overbroad because it barred
the school board from implementing mandatory student assignment programs even when the board
had a constitutional duty to eliminate segregation. Id.
269. Id. at 1013-14.
270. Id. at 1009.
271. Id. at 1014-16.
272. 458 U.S. at 471. An excellent critique of the Seattle decision to which I am indebted is
Sunstein, Public Values, Private Interests, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1982 Sup. CT. REv.
127.
273. Seattle, 458 U.S. at 475 (quoting from Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969)); see
also id. at 480 n.23 ("what we find objectionable about Initiative 350 is the comparative burden it
imposes on minority participation in the political process" (emphasis added)).
274. Id. at 471; see also id. at 486 n.30 ("[Slingling out the political processes affecting racial
issues for uniquely disadvantageous treatment inevitably raises dangers of impermissible
motivation.").
275. Id. at 485 (relying on Hunter v. Erickson).
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we take Justice Blackmun to be carving out some kind of third category
between facially discriminatory statutes that demand no showing of pur-
posefulness and facially neutral laws that do, he appears to abandon his
earlier description of Initiative 350 as facially neutral and to characterize
it as a racial classification.2 7 6
The majority opinion in Seattle thus provides some support for each of
three readings: (1) the initiative constitutes a facial classification based on
race; (2) the initiative is facially neutral but triggers strict scrutiny since it
was purposefully enacted "because" of its adverse impact on minorities; or
(3) the initiative falls into a twilight zone of laws altering the structure of
decision-making, where the Court will subject a facially neutral law to
strict scrutiny-even absent proof of purposefulness-because of the com-
parative burden it imposes on minority participation in the political
process.
As inartful as the Seattle opinion may be, the Court's intuition that
Initiative 350 deserved to be approached with more than the usual suspi-
cion was well founded. The Seattle School District had historically made
considerable efforts to alleviate the isolation of the district's sizable minor-
ity population. Local attempts to recall the Board members responsible for
some of these efforts had narrowly failed. 77 The sponsors of Initiative
350 therefore opted to circumvent the representative process that produced
the reassignment plan. The filtering system had trapped the majority's
worst inclinations and the initiative process afforded an opportunity to
bypass the filters.
The Seattle majority undoubtedly sensed this, but the Justices had two
problems. First, the Court's precedents offered no easy way to invalidate
the initiative. In no conventional sense of the word could the Washington
measure be called a facial classification; the dissent's critique on this point
is compelling.217 Yet to admit the facial neutrality of the initiative de-
manded an inquiry into electoral motive. The Court was reluctant to un-
dertake this inquiry despite the trial court's imaginative efforts to develop
a record. Second, the Court was understandably hesitant explicitly to an-
276. Although Justice Blackum never explicitly refers to Initiative 350 as a "racial classification,"
his comments suggest quite strongly that this is his conclusion. See id. (not "every attempt to address a
racial issue gives rise to an impermissible racial classification," but when decisionmaking mechanism
used to address racially conscious legislation is singled out for peculiar and disadvantageous treatment,
governmental action plainly rests on distinctions based on race).
277. Id. at 460 & n.1.
278. Id. at 494 (Powell, J., dissenting) (majority's argument that Initiative 350 created racial
classification where identical action by school board would have created no such classification "is not
an easy argument to answer because it seems to make no sense"); see also Sunstein, supra note 272,
at 157-58 (Court was incorrect to characterize Initiative 350 as a conventional racial classification).
Professor Sunstein believes, as I do, that notwithstanding the majority's erroneous premise, heightened
scrutiny was warranted by suspicions that improper motivations were at work in Seattle. His reasons,
however, are different. Id. at 158-59 (selective effort to prevent enactment of measures designed to
desegregate "may well be not an effort to promote a public value, but the sort of unprincipled redistri-
bution of wealth or opportunities" at which equal protection clause is aimed).
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nounce an exception to traditional doctrine when such an exception would
have to be grounded on a distrust of electoral majorities. In the end, the
majority opted for a patchwork, a combination of a relaxed standard for
assessing purpose27'9 and a recognition that there exists a category of laws
which, while not facially discriminatory, deserves a level of judicial scru-
tiny more exacting than ordinarily applied to facially neutral laws. 80
To assert that Seattle evinces a judicial willingness to look harder at
substitutive plebiscites overstates my point-but not by much. If, as Jus-
tice Powell points out, the school district had repealed its own integration
program, there seems little doubt that its action would have been held
constitutional." 8' What prompted the majority's action was not the simple
repeal but the manner by which it was achieved. Would the issue posed
have been altered had the school district's pupil reassignment authority
been eliminated by the Washington legislature instead of by voter
initiative?282
279. Although it would be a gross overstatement to say that the majority rests its affirmance on a
finding of illicit motivation, the Court's expansive use of the concept of "racial purpose" seems a far
cry from its miserly approach in Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980). Two days after Seattle was
decided, however, the Court seemed to loosen the Mobile criteria. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613
(1982).
280. See Sunstein, supra note 272, at 150 (lesson of Hunter line of cases is that category of
classifications exist "that qualify neither as facially neutral nor as facially discriminatory and that,
while not as suspicious as the latter, ought not to receive the deference due to the former").
281. 458 U.S. at 494 (Powell, J. dissenting) ("It is not questioned that the District itself...
could have changed its mind and canceled its integration program without violating the Federal Con-
stitution."); ee also Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 539 (1982) ("[Tjhe simple repeal or
modification of desegregation or antidiscrimination laws, without more, never has been viewed as
embodying a presumptively invalid racial classification.").
282. In Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), summarily affd, 402 U.S. 935
(1971), the New York legislature circumvented the state Commissioner of Education's effort to imple-
ment a school integration plan through Buffalo's appointed school board. The legislature enacted a
Ntatute barring state education officials and appointed local school boards from assigning students to
attend any school "on account of race. . . or for purpose of achieving [racial] equality in attendance
• . . at any school." 318 F. Supp. at 712. On the authority of Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385
(1969), a three-judge Federal court invalidated the statute, concluding that the legislation drew an
impermissible line "between the treatment of problems involving racial matters and that afforded
other problems in the same area." Id. at 718 (footnote omitted). The Supreme Court affirmed without
oral argument or opinion.
Justice Blackmun's opinion for the majority in Seattle invoked the summary affirmance in Lee,
concluding: "We see no relevant distinction between this case and Lee; indeed it is difficult to imagine
a more precise parallel." 458 U.S. at 482. Lee was no doubt correctly decided in view of the explicit
racial line drawn by the New York legislature, but Justice Blackmun's equation of the two cases is
not well thought out. To say that a representative body's reversal of the decision of appointed officials
(Lee) is in no relevant way different from an unfiltered majoritarian veto of a decision arrived at by a
deliberative, and very accountable, representative body (Seattle) is to fail to appreciate the nature of a
republican form of government. That legislatures may go astray is not denied. But this does not mean
that their facially neutral actions deserve the same degree of judicial skepticism as electoral circumven-
tions of the representative process.
It is not coincidental that Hunter v. Erickson, the principal case relied on by the Seattle majority,
itself involved a voter bypass of the legislature. In Hunter, the Court struck down a substitutive
plebiscite changing the city charter to require voter approval of open housing ordinances and declaring
that existing ordinances "shall cease to be effective until approved by the electors." 393 U.S. at 387.
As in Seattle, the majority, having been thwarted by its representatives' sensitivity to minority inter-
csts, sought to circumvent the filtering process. Nor can it be overlooked that Hunter rose in the
shadows of Reitman v. Mulkey, yet another substitutive plebiscite designed to silence the minority
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An interesting way to isolate the factors that triggered judicial suspicion
in Seattle is to compare it with Crawford v. Board of Education.283 In
many ways the cases look alike. The California Supreme Court had or-
dered pupil reassignment based on a finding of de facto discrimination
under the California Constitution. In response, the state's electorate rati-
fied Proposition 1, a constitutional amendment stripping state courts of
the power to order busing except in cases of Fourteenth Amendment vio-
lations. On the very same day that Seattle struck down Initiative 350, the
Justices upheld Proposition 1 by an eight to one vote. It is not uncommon
for commentators to express disbelief that the cases were decided by the
same Court, much less on the same day.284 I do not intend to try the
reader's patience by reviewing or analyzing the creative efforts of scholars
and judges to make some sense of these two opinions. I only wish to point
out a distinction that seems to have thus far gone virtually unnoticed. In
marked contrast to Initiative 350, Proposition 1 was a complementary
plebiscite. The electorate was not alone in its assessment that the judici-
ary's reading of the California Constitution had gone too far beyond the
Federal standard. Proposition 1 both received a popular mandate and
passed through the legislative filters. It was approved in the State Senate
by a vote of twenty-eight to six and the State Assembly by a similarly
lopsided margin of sixty-two to seventeen. 85 Here was not a case of the
people bypassing the legislative checking structure. Proposition 1 repre-
sented an electoral-legislative consensus.
The fact that Proposition 1 reflected an augmented rather than trun-
cated version of lawmaking does not mean that racially impermissible
purposes did not drive its passage. But it does begin to explain why the
Supreme Court was unwilling to look with added intensity for such illicit
motivations, following instead a more traditional line than it used in Seat-
tle."'8 Admittedly, none of this is explicit in the two opinions. *87 Perhaps
voice heard too loudly in representative councils. In Reitmnan, 387 U.S. 369 (1967), the justices invali-
dated a California constitutional initiative which superseded state fair housing legislation and with-
drew legislative authority to regulate private discrimination in the housing market.
283. 458 U.S. 527 (1982).
284. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 272, at 155; see also L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 1486-88;
Choper, The Repeal of Remedies for De Facto School Desegregation, in J. CHOPER, Y. KANsISAR &
L. TRIBE, supra note 4, at 35-53 (1983); The Supreme Court, 1981 Terra-Leading Cases, 96
HARV. L. REV. 62, 120-30 (1982). In fact, five of the Court's members-Marshall, who dissented in
Crauford, and Powell, Burger, Rehnquist and O'Connor, who dissented in Seattle-viewed the cases
as irreconcilable.
285. Crauford, 458 U.S. at 532 n.5.
286. In holding that Proposition I was "not motivated by a discriminatory purpose," the eight-
Justice majority in Crawford completely deferred to the conclusion of the California Court of Ap-
peals. 458 U.S. at 545. The Court prefaced its deferral by noting how the California court was
"armed ... with the knowledge of the facts and circumstances concerning the passage" of the Pro-
position. Id. at 543 (quoting from Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 378 (1967)). What made this
statement so odd was that the California court had conducted no evidentiary hearing on the question
of motive. See id. at 562 n.7 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("How can any deference be given to the state
court's 'knowledge of the facts'. . . when no such findings were ever made."). Despite the fact that
challengers flooded the California court with newspaper clippings suggesting that the proposition was
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it is even fanciful to believe that any Justice would acknowledge the cor-
rectness of the interpretation presented here. However, a harder judicial
look is what the Washington initiative called for and a harder judicial
look is what the Justices gave it. In Crawford, on the other hand, where
the checking structure had not been bypassed, the Court deferred to the
political process.2 88 If that is not what was running through the Justices'
minds, it is at least what this Article urges ought to have been.
New threats to minority rights have emerged in the latest batch of sub-
stitutive plebiscites. Recent initiatives in Arizona, California, and Colo-
rado declare English the official language. Large portions of these mea-
sures are symbolic and offer little opportunity for courts to remedy the
gratuitous insult they represent to the twenty million Americans whose
native tongue is not English.289 It is likely, however, that these declara-
tions will be invoked in efforts to terminate states' bilingual programs.
California's constitutional initiative, for example, grants any resident
standing to challenge any law that "diminishes or ignores the role of Eng-
lish as the common language of the State."'2 90 Traditional equal protection
doctrine may be ill-equipped to afford protection from these efforts. At-
tempts to demonstrate that the initiatives are motivated by animus against
non-English speaking persons will encounter the proof difficulties identi-
fied earlier. Nor is it clear that language-based classifications, even if
specifically designed to maintain segregated schools, see Fischer, supra note 28, at 74 n.152, the court
simply reasoned that legitimate purposes had been stated in the Proposition itself. Crawford v. Board
of Educ., 113 Cal. App. 3d 633, 655, 170 Cal. Rptr. 495, 509 (1981). The lower court's ruling on
motive turned not on a factual inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the passage of Proposition
1, but on whether courts can or should look beyond these self-serving statements. The Supreme Court
was better equipped for such a ruling than the California Court of Appeals. What was clear was that
the justices had no interest in looking too deeply at what "really" happened, an approach in sharp
contrast with the penetrating realism of Seattle.
Crawford manifests an inclination to replace realism with formalism in yet another way. The im-
aginative reworking of the conventional definition of racial classification at work in Seattle, see supra
note 278 and accompanying text, was nowhere in evidence in Crawford. See Sunstein, supra note
272, at 155-56 ("In Seattle, the Court read Hunter to suggest that race-specific classifications are to
be treated like conventional racial classifications. . . . In Crawford, the Court indicated that decisions
that single out racial problems are not to be treated like racial classifications at all."). Nor was the
single footnote reference to Seattle in the Crawford opinion, 458 U.S. at 536 n.12, helpful in recon-
ciling the widely divergent conceptions.
287. The majority opinion in Crawford does recite the legislative vote. See 458 U.S. at 532 n.5.
On the other hand, when the Court concludes its opinion by stating a refusal to "impugn the motives
of the State's electorate" in its approval of Proposition 1, id. at 545, it fails to take note of the fact that
the legislature reached similar results by overwhelming margins.
288. I do not mean to suggest here that I think Crawford was correctly decided. My point is
simply that the Court was correct in perceiving Seattle as the more serious problem. In Part III.B I
discuss my conception of the proper judicial role where complementary plebiscites are under review.
289. See generally K. KARSr, supra note 223, at 98-100. An imaginative Federal district judge
recently invalidated the Arizona measure on First Amendment grounds, concluding that it prohibited
any state employee from using a language other than English in the performance of official duties.
Thus read, it impeded the ability of state legislators to communicate with constitutents, created barri-
ers to the judicial performance of marriage ceremonies, and impaired the First Amendment rights of
all public employees to comment officially on matters of public concern. See Yniguez v. Mofford, No.
CIV 88-1854 (D. Ariz. Feb. 6, 1990) (1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1161).
290. CAL. CONST. art. III, § 6(c).
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demonstrated, warrant enhanced scrutiny under current doctrine. 91 The
harder judicial look warranted by these xenophobic substitutive plebiscites
may call for enhanced sensitivity to the quality of suspectness as well as a
relaxed standard for assessing motivation. It is obviously unmanageable
for courts to maintain different lists of suspect classifications depending on
the nature of the lawmaker doing the classifying. On the other hand, there
is more than a little illogic in testing for suspectness by examining "legis-
lative response" to a minority's problems292 when the plebiscitary bypass
is being traveled precisely because the legislature has proved too
responsive.
Altering the manner in which discrimination is measured is just a por-
tion of what I mean to convey by the concept of a hard judicial look.
There are scores of other situations in which courts might take account of
the ways in which the substitutive plebiscite operates differently from the
legislative process. In the hope that it will leave the reader with some
small sense of the breadth of possibilities, a few brief examples follow.
Rationality review under the equal protection clause entails enormous
deference to the lawmakers' classification scheme. Courts have generally
been willing to uphold any classification based upon facts that reasonably
can be conceived to constitute a distinction. It has made little difference
whether the conceivable facts actually exist, justify the classification, or
were ever presented to the lawmakers.293 In part, this deferential ap-
proach is premised on a presumption that legislatures conduct hearings,
that it is impossible for courts to review all that the legislature considered,
and that legislatures are more competent factfinders than the courts.
Courts sporadically move away from this deferential stance to a height-
ened scrutiny in response to factors they regard as suspect in some sense
but are unwilling to label as such. 29 ' The absence of structured factfind-
ing in the substitutive plebiscite29 5 and the dangers of classification inher-
ent in a process of naked aggregation suggest that the substitutive plebi-
scite may be one of those situations that warrants heightened ends-means
review. 296
Whether economic regulation by substitutive plebiscite also deserves a
harder judicial look presents one of the more difficult questions under the
291. On language minorities and the equal protection clause, see generally Califa, Dedaring Eng-
lish the Official Language: Prejudice Spoken Here, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 293 (1989), and
Note, "Official English": Federal Limits on Efforts to Curtail Bilingual Services in the State,, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1345, 1352-61 (1987). See also Moran, Bilingual Education as a Status Conflict, 75
CALIF. L. REV. 321 (1987).
292. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 443-45 (1985).
293. See L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 1443.
294. Id. at 1445.
295. See supra text accompanying notes 143-144.
296. Cf Linde, supra note 144, at 227-28 (voter initiatives prove that due process clause does not
demand that lawmakers evaluate means-ends rationality of laws since the initiative process "flies in
the face of the idea").
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thesis I offer. Economic regulation generally receives only a passing judi-
cial glance when enacted through ordinary legislative channels. Courts
have virtually abdicated rationality review of these kinds of laws under
the due process or equal protection clauses and, despite some recent anom-
alies, claims of contractual impairment and regulatory takings seldom en-
counter a sympathetic judiciary. The wisdom of this "hands-off" approach
is beyond the scope of this Article.29 What is worthy of inquiry, however,
is the extent to which this traditional judicial restraint, grounded in large
part on deference to legislative judgment, is equally appropriate when ap-
plied to the more haphazard, less deliberative plebiscitary arena.
In November 1988, California voters, fed up with spiraling automobile
insurance premiums and frustrated by (1) a legislature which seemed un-
willing or unable to address the problem and (2) an insurance industry
whose closed records made public scrutiny of profit margins impossible,
were offered an opportunity to vent their anger in a financially lucrative
manner. Proposition 103, an initiative spearheaded by Ralph Nader, pro-
posed to reduce insurance rates immediately to a level "at least 20 percent
less" than those in effect in November 1987. Rates were to be frozen at
that level until November 1989, unless the state's insurance commissioner
granted exemptions to individual insurers found to be "substantially
threatened with insolvency."29
The complexity of Proposition 103299 was just a small part of the con-
siderable difficulty voters faced in sorting out their vote. Three "alterna-
tive" insurance initiatives, some sponsored by the insurance industry itself,
appeared on the November ballot.300 Voters unable to grasp the finer dis-
tinctions between Proposition 103 and the competing Propositions 100,
101, and 104 could hardly be faulted. The text and analysis of the insur-
ance reform proposals filled forty-two pages of microscopic print in the
ballot pamphlets mailed to voters. Nor was there a shortage of campaign
advertising designed to "elucidate" the issues. The staggering sum of $100
million was spent by the competing factions-most of it by the insurance
industry-in the battle over insurance reform.30'
If among the nine million voters there were some who purported to
understand the pros and cons of the various measures, I was not one of
them. For reasons about which one can only speculate-my own guess is
that many voters were guided by a trust in Ralph Nader-Proposition
297. I have considered its wisdom in Eule, Process Protection and the Economic Rights Provi-
sions of the Constitution, GEORGE MASON L. REv., Winter 1988, at 73.
298. See California Ballot Pamphlet for the Not. 8, 1988, General Election, at 99.
299. In addition to rate roll-backs, Proposition 103 contained a wide assortment of collateral regu-
lations covering subjects as diverse as the authorization of insurance activities by banks, the creation of
a consumer advocacy corporation, provisions for an elected Insurance Commissioner, and abrogation
of the industry's antitrust immunity. Id. at 99, 140-44.
300. A fourth "alternative" to Proposition 103 proposed to reduce insurance rates indirectly by
limiting attorney fees in tort actions.
301. See Wolinsky, supra note 247, at 3, col. 1.
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103 alone passed, and only by the barest of margins.3 02 If this vote did not
constitute legislation by lottery, it represented at least lawmaking that was
more visceral than considered.
Standing to lose an estimated $4 billion as a consequence of Proposition
103 in the first year alone,30 3 the insurance industry carried the battle lost
at the ballot box to the California Supreme Court. The challengers' attack
focused on the rate roll-back and subsequent adjustment procedures, con-
tending that the figures used were arbitrary and confiscatory. The justices
unanimously upheld the facial validity of the twenty percent roll-back but
struck down the standards for individual adjustments. The United States
Constitution, concluded the court, demands that insurance companies get a
"fair and reasonable" rate of return. The ballot measure's assurance only
of protection from insolvency fell short of that guarantee.30 4 Challengers
sought to parlay this partial victory into a total one by contending that
Proposition's 103 severability clause should be ignored and the entire
measure invalidated because of the taint of the impermissible adjustment
procedures. The court rejected the argument, asserting that the voters
would likely have enacted the initiative "had they foreseen the invalidity
of the insolvency standard.
3 0 5
It is hard to feel particularly sorry for the insurance industry. Having
effectively paralyzed every legislative effort to resolve the statewide insur-
ance crisis, it mounted a well-financed and well-organized battle to stymie
the electorate as well. True, the insurance companies ultimately lost, but
not because their voice went unheard. The case for a filtering check here
does not appear a compelling one.
But the problem is more complex. It is not immediately evident what
warrants judicial deference to electoral policy judgments that the electo-
rate never actually made. On one level Proposition 103 represents a clear
expression of citizen sentiment. It effectively conveyed to the legislature
the level of voter concern and dissatisfaction on an issue marked by legis-
302. Proposition 103 received 4,580,818 or 51.1% of the votes cast, while 4,376,916 or 48.9% of
the electorate voted against the measure. See L.A. Times, Nov. 10, 1988, at 26, col. 3.
303. The estimate comes from John Crosby, the insurance industry's campaign coordinator. See
Wolinsky, supra note 247, at 23, col. 2.
304. See Calfarm Ins. Co. v. Deukmejian, 48 Cal. 3d 805, 816-21, 771 P.2d 1247, 1252-56
(1989). The court reached the same result under the California Constitution. 48 Cal. 3d at 821, 771
P.2d at 1256. Once the insolvency provisions were struck, the only insurers who remained subject to
the 20% roll-back were those whose rates provided a reasonable rate of return even after application
of the rate reduction. Each of the state's top 15 sellers of insurance subsequently contended that the
roll-back would leave them without a reasonable rate of return. Their applications for exemptions are
now pending before California's insurance commissioner. See 443 Insurers Seek Rollback Exemnp-
tions, L.A. Times, June 27, 1989, at 3, col. 2.
305. Calfarm, 48 Cal. 3d at 822, 771 P.2d at 1256. Although this conclusion is undoubtedly
sound, courts ought to give little credence to the presence of a severability clause in a voter initiative.
It is safe to say that scarcely any voter was aware that Proposition 103 contained a severability clause.
Its inclusion offers little evidence of anything save the drafter's intent. Cf Brockett v. Spokane Ar-
cades, Inc., 454 U.S. 1022, 1024 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (criticizing lower court for ignoring
explicit severability clause in voter initiative).
[Vol. 99: 15031570
Judicial Review of Direct Democracy
lative cowardice. The particulars of the enacted reforms, however, re-
present little more than the speculative musings of the drafters 06 who
were then able to harness a frustrated, angry, and financially drained
electorate into passage, based largely on Ralph Nader's endorsement and
the promise of lower premiums. To suggest that the voters approved, let
alone understood, the many facets of Proposition 103 is pure mythology.
Having said all this, it is not obvious to me what the judicial response
ought to be. Courts do not always correct irrationality in the legislative
process. In United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz,3"' the
Court turned a deaf ear to the claim that Congress had been unaware-or
even misinformed-of the bizarre statutory classification it had created
governing eligibility requirements for "windfall" retirement benefits. The
opinion, authored by Justice Rehnquist, argued that if the test of legisla-
tive awareness "were applied literally to every member of any legislature
that ever voted on a law, there would be fev laws which would survive
it." Where the language of the law is clear, Rehnquist concluded, we will
assume that the legislative body intended what it enacted."0 When the
Court on occasion departs from the deferential stance to socio-economic
regulation manifested in Fritz, it is usually because some powerless group
has been disadvantaged.309
Now, I have no wish to defend Fritz's refusal to consider reality. It
appears to me that if Congress had no idea that it was depriving certain
persons of retirement benefits, there is little sense in deferring to its judg-
ment. But if Fritz represents the proper approach, the question must be
whether such an approach is equally appropriate in a process considera-
bly more susceptible to uninformed decision-making. Two factors seem to
argue for extending Fritz to plebiscites. First, how can a court accurately
gauge what the voters knew? Although I am prepared to testify as to the
enormous voter confusion-including my own-regarding the four insur-
ance reform initiatives, do we really think that courts can monitor confu-
sion on a systematic basis? Second, the costs of such an approach are high.
306. There is not the slightest hint, for example, of what relation the 20% figure has to industry
profits or why November 1987, was chosen as the base for the roll-back. Admittedly, the drafters
cannot be blamed for having to pick numbers out of a hat. The insurance industry's refusal to open its
financial records voluntarily, and the absence of laws requiring such public disclosure, left them little
choice. But ratemaking by guesswork deserves little judicial deference.
307. 449 U.S. 166 (1980).
308. Id. at 179. But see id. at 197-98 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (that courts ought not second-
guess wisdom of legislative efforts does not mean that courts must defer to statutory results that legis-
lature did not intend).
309. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985) (invalidat-
ing zoning ordinance requiring special permit for home for mentally retarded on grounds of irration-
ality); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) (invalidating law denying free public education to children
of undocumented aliens on grounds of irrationality). An argument can be made that the dispossessed
retirees in Fritz were indeed a powerless group whose rights were traded away by representatives of
railroad management and labor to enhance benefits for currently employed railroad workers. See 449
U.S. at 191 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing District Court Findings of Fact).
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As I shall discuss shortly, setting aside electoral preferences is always
risky judicial business. It is one thing to expend scarce judicial good will
in order to protect the powerless whose voices are stifled in the unfiltered
setting of the substitutive plebiscite. It is quite another to do so on behalf
of a group that spent in excess of $60 million conveying its message to the
voters.310 A harder judicial look in this type of setting thwarts the highest
aspirations of the initiative process-to overcome the impediments to pub-
lic interest legislation posed by financially powerful lobby groups.
It is difficult to assess whether the California Supreme Court altered its
approach because the law under review originated with the voters rather
than the legislature. Nothing in the language of the opinion itself suggests
a departure from the ordinary standard of review. Yet in an effective, if
somewhat subtle manner, the California Supreme Court was sensitive to
the dilemma described above. It seemed to sense that the twenty percent
roll-back figure came out of nowhere, that it bore no relationship to any
factual findings regarding industry profits. Its across-the-board applicabil-
ity to all insurers, regardless of a company's particular financial circum-
stances and the type of policy involved, was merely a crude effort to pun-
ish the insurers. The court also sensed, however, that consumers were
angry, that Proposition 103 was a venting of that anger, and that judicial
invalidation might redirect the focus of their ire. Its solution was to re-
write rather than void the proposition. The twenty percent roll-back
would theoretically remain in place but the reality was that the insurance
commissioner-soon to be an elected official-would individually set each
insurer's rate at a "fair and reasonable level," a standard which nowhere
appears in the ballot measure itself.31' The voice of the plebiscite would
be heard at a general level but the particulars-heavily dependent on fac-
tual determinations-would be administratively set. Small wonder that
both sides claimed victory in the wake of the California Supreme Court's
decision.
I do not perceive the concept of a hard judicial look to be a rigid one.
Unlike "strict scrutiny"-a standard which on paper at least can be re-
duced to precise formulation-it is not intended to take on a unitary form.
310. If the electorate was indeed confused about Proposition 103, it was largely as a result of the
insurance industry's own efforts.
311. The initiative contained a section, § 1861.05, prohibiting the insurance commissioner from
permitting any rate "which is excessive, inadequate, [or] unfairly discriminatory." California Ballot
Pamphlet, supra note 298, at 99 (emphasis added). The section was qualified by limiting rate adjust-
ments prior to November 1989 to insurers substantially threatened with insolvency. The court rea-
soned that once it struck the insolvency qualification, the commissioner was required to permit insur-
ers "fair and reasonable" rates of return. It read "inadequate" in § 1861.05 to mean "confiscatory"
and "confiscatory" to mean a rate that was not "fair and reasonable." 48 Cal. 3d at 822-23, 771 P.2d
at 1256-57. No insurer would thus be subject to the 20% roll-back unless it either acquiesced in such
a reduction or was unable to prove to the commissioner that a higher rate was needed to ensure a fair
rate of return. 48 Cal. 3d at 825, 771 P.2d at 1258-59. By June of 1989 it was clear that acquies-
cence was not something the insurers were considering. See supra note 304.
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What I have in mind is more a general notion that courts should be will-
ing to examine the realities of substitutive plebiscites 3 1-that the unspo-
ken assumptions about the legislative process that so often induce judicial
restraint deserve less play in a setting where they are more fanciful.
Sometimes a hard judicial look will take the form-as it does in Seat-
tle-of a candid "We know what's going on here and we won't allow any
of it." In other situations-like Proposition 103 and similar corporate reg-
ulation-recognition that the burden of plebiscitary action falls on politi-
cal actors able to defend their interests in the popular arena, combined
with a need to conserve limited judicial capital, will appropriately lead to
a more modest form of review. 313
B. Judicial Review of Complementary Plebiscites
Complementary plebiscites are birds of a different feather. Because they
originate in the legislature, they must pass through its elaborate filtering
system. The drafting reflects a more experienced hand. Committees are
consulted. Hearings usually precede passage. Most importantly, the end
result generally reflects compromise. Opposition not anticipated by the
drafters may be corrected by amendment. The measures sent on to the
voters for ratification tend to be less divisive than a ballot effort initiated
by a special interest group without the benefit of a legislative hand to
guide it toward the political center. It is hardly surprising that voters ap-
prove complementary plebiscites at almost twice the rate that they pass
substitutive ones. 1
At first glance, the enhanced judicial role advanced in the preceding
pages would appear to have no place in the review of complementary
plebiscites. This initial intuition may be only half right. A more consid-
ered analysis requires that we divide complementary plebiscites into two
312. This realism might reasonably be extended to review of legislation seeking to reform the
plebiscitary process. Many state legislatures are engaged in admirable efforts to limit the impact of
money on the qualification of initiatives and the campaigns that follow. Thus far, the Supreme Court
has stymied those efforts based on an idealized vision of the process which refuses to acknowledge the
corrupting influence of wealthy and powerful corporate interests on citizen lawmaking. Meyer v
Grant, 108 S. Ct. 1886 (1988) (invalidating Colorado statute prohibiting use of paid circulators for
qualifying initiative proposals); First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (voiding
Massachusetts statute forbidding use of corporate funds to influence referendum votes on issues having
no connection with corporation's business). For a penetrating attack on Meyer v. Grant, see Stern &
Lowenstein, Paid Initiative Circulators and the First Amendment, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
(forthcoming 1990); see also Lowenstein, supra note 27, at 583-602 (recommending adoption of con-
tribution limits in ballot measure campaigns).
313. A full picture of a hard judicial look might embrace different rules of statutory construction
as well as different standards of constitutional interpretation. Courts reviewing substitutive plebiscites
might exhibit a greater willingness to find Federal preemption, or they might opt for narrow rather
than liberal construction of ambiguous language. Cf Macey, supra note 121, at 226 (constitutional
requirement that judiciary serve as check on statutory excesses can be fulfilled through statutory inter-
pretation). But see Note, supra note 264, at 157 (courts should not use statutory interpretation to
muffle unfiltered voice of people).
314. See supra note 191.
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subgroups depending on the voter outcome-the "positive" form in which
the voters endorse the legislative choice and the "negative" one in which
they obstruct it.
When voters ratify the legislative choice, judicial deference is well de-
served. The statutory product reflects extraordinary consensus. A filtered
legislative result has received popular endorsement. Supporters of par-
ticipatory democracy and representative government can join hands to cel-
ebrate the result. Although an argument can be made that electoral-
legislative consensus deserves more than the usual presumption of consti-
tutionality which attaches to ordinary legislation, two factors argue
against relaxed scrutiny. First, the process of "referred" legislation often
excludes the executive branch. The signature of the governor may not be
required for laws which must be submitted for electoral approval.31 5
More important, the legislature may not take its responsibilities as seri-
ously when it is only a waystation on the route to a plebiscite. The refer-
endum process may promote legislative laziness or cowardice. Associate
Justice Michael Gillette of the Oregon Supreme Court recently observed
the increasing tendency of his state's legislature to use referenda as a way
to pass the buck on difficult public policy decisions." 6 It will be difficult
of course for a judicial body to gauge when such shirking has occurred,
but the danger that a legislature will go about its task halfheartedly when
it knows the electorate will be making the final decision counsels against
affording this augmented process more than the ordinary judicial
deference. 3 1 7
When voters veto the legislative choice there is no electoral-legislative
consensus. The participatory and representative processes arrive at com-
peting conclusions and the electorate prevails. In the sense that it bypasses
the legislative result, the "negative" complementary plebiscite operates
very much like the substitutive plebiscite. There is, however, a critical
difference. The substitutive plebiscite enables popular majorities to pass
legislation that minorities have managed to prevent in the legislature. In
315. See, e.g., ARiz. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6). Sometimes, as is typical in the constitutional
amendment process, the absence of an executive check is offset by the requirement of a legislative
super-majority. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
The impact of circumventing the executive check was graphically illustrated in a November 1988
Michigan referendum. Opponents of abortion had repeatedly won legislative victories cutting back on
Medicaid abortion funding only to see Governor William Milliken and his successor James Blanchard
veto the bans. By virtue of a legislative victory confirmed by the 1988 complementary plebiscite,
however, the anti-abortion forces were able to bypass the governor and enact the ban. See INITIATIVE
AND REFERENDUM REPORT, supra note 50, at 1-2.
316. See Gillette, The Legislative Function: Initiative and Referendum, 67 OR. L. REV. 55, 63
(1988); see also S. HAYS, supra note 38, at 229 n.38 (referendum popularized by legislative bodies
seeking to resolve impasses or to pass responsibility for decision to public).
317. This scenario is applicable only to the "compulsory" or "voluntary" forms of referenda. See
supra text accompanying notes 33-37. In a "popular" referendum the voters only petition for electo-
ral input after the legislature has already passed the legislation. Thus the legislature will probably be
unaware that its voice is not the last one at the time it goes about its legislative duties.
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contrast, "negative" complementary plebiscites result not in new law but
in the preservation of the status quo. I1
Nonetheless, these "negative" complementary plebiscites pose a distinc-
tive threat of majority tyranny. Complementary plebiscites enable popular
majorities to prevent legislation that minorities have managed to convince
legislative majorities to enact. Sometimes legislative sensitivity to minority
interests, as well as debts incurred by the process of logrolling and com-
promise, result in minorities' being able to assert their legislative power in
a positive rather than negative manner. Where the minority's legislative
victory takes the form of passing rather than preventing legislation, com-
plementary plebiscites-which make lawmaking more difficult-may de-
serve enhanced judicial attention.
Why should a constitutional vision of checks and filters be offended by
the operation of an additional check? The protection the Constitution of-
fers minorities is chiefly one against legislative action, not inaction. 19 As
Jesse Choper correctly notes, the great bulk of the antimajoritarian ele-
ments found in our system are negative ones. "They work to prevent the
translation of popular wishes into governing rules rather than to produce
laws that are contrary to majority sentiment."' 32 Checks and filters might
screen out "good laws," but Federalists like Alexander Hamilton deemed
this price worth paying. "[E]very institution calculated to restrain the ex-
cess of law-making, and to keep things in the same state in which they
may happen to be at any given period," he argued, is "much more likely
to do good than harm." The injury done by defeating a few good laws
"will be amply compensated by the advantage of preventing a number of
bad ones." '32 '
318. On rare occasions, a substitutive plebiscite may attempt to repeal existing legislation rather
than enact new law. See, e.g., Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967) (constitutional initiative used
to supersede legislatively promulgated fair housing laws). Yet, because the substitutive plebiscite re-
peals existing law, while the "negative" complementary plebiscite prevents a law from ever taking
effect, only the former changes the status quo.
319. This is simply a corollary of the principle that the Constitution limits government rather
than imposes affirmative obligations on it. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs.
109 S. Ct. 998 (1989). But see L. TRIBE, supra note 28, at 1305 ("freedom cannot be defined wholly
in the negative language of containing the wayward state;" meaningful freedom requires imposition of
affirmative duties on government as well as demanding that it refrain from certain controls of con-
duct); Amar, Republicanism and Minimal Entitlements: Of Safety Valves and the Safety Net,
GEORGE MASON L. REV., Winter 1988, at 47, 49 (Thirteenth Amendment envisions government
provision of minimum property entitlement to all citizens); Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968
Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV.
7 (1969) (government has affirmative obligation to provide at least minimum level of services neces-
sary to avoid severe deprivation).
320. See J. CHOPER, supra note 122, at 26 (emphasis in original). But see AMAR, supra note 2,
at 1084.
321. See THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 496 (A. Hamilton). But see id. No. 22, at 141, where
Hamilton appears to take a 180 degree turn. Opposing the imposition of super-majority requirements,
he argues:
Where the concurrence of a large number is required by the constitution to the doing of any
national act, we are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper will be likely
to be done; but we forget how much good can be prevented, and how much ill may be pro-
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The picture of complementary plebiscite as additional check is a super-
ficially appealing one. Viewed this way it looks a lot like bicameralism or
executive veto or judicial review. Of course the complementary plebiscite
is a filter that the Federal Constitution did not install, but surely the
states are not barred from making it more difficult for government to
act. 22 The problem with this portrayal is that it assumes a filtering sys-
tem that applies equally to all lawmaking. But that is not the reality of
complementary plebiscites, which instead provide selective augmentation
of the ordinary legislative process.
Not all complementary plebiscites are suspect merely because of their
selectivity. It is entirely legitimate. for states to require complementary
plebiscites for constitutional amendment. Preventing momentary majori-
ties-whether legislative or electoral-from altering the state's constitutive
document appropriately calls for a procedure incorporating extra checks.
The difficulty arises when subjects that disproportionately affect unpopu-
lar minorities-like blacks, latinos, aliens, or the poor-are singled out for
an augmented checking system.
I have argued in this Article that substitutive plebiscites demand addi-
tional judicial attention because they bypass the legislative filtering system
designed to protect minority interests. Complementary plebiscites pose a
danger of a different sort. We frequently hear the praises of allowing the
electorate to pass on the action of their representatives in a more focused
manner than that afforded by periodic retention elections. But when the
road to legislation is lengthened only sporadically, we must be extremely
wary about the process for picking those moments. For while nothing may
be wrong with allowing the voters to reject their agents' decisions, the
selective use of the voter veto is fraught with danger to unpopular
minorities.
When a state constitution or a city charter mandates that specific cate-
gories of legislation receive the dual approval of legislators and voters,
courts should scrutinize this requirement itself for impermissible anti-
minority bias. Thus it will not be necessary for judges to pass on the
individual exercise of the plebiscitary veto-and indeed it may not be pos-
sible. The Court has taken precisely this approach in Hunter v. Erick-
son,323 James v. Valtierra,32 4 and City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enter-
duced, by the power of hindering the doing what may be necessary, and of keeping affairs in
the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at particular periods.
322. See, e.g., Gordon v. Lance, 403 U.S. 1 (1971) (upholding requirement that political subdivi-
sions of West Virginia may not incur bonded indebtedness or increase tax rates without approval of
60% of voters in referendum).
323. 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (striking down city charter provision requiring complementary plebi-
scites for any open housing ordinances). Although the voter action adopting the city charter also re-
pealed an existing open housing ordinance, the Court took pains to point out that it was the selective
imposition of the plebiscitary procedure and not the "mere repeal" that violated the fourteenth
amendment. Id. at 390 n.5.
324. 402 U.S. 137 (1971) (upholding state constitutional provision requiring complementary pleb-
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prises. 2 5 In each of these cases, a state constitution (in the case of James)
or a city charter provision (in the case of Hunter and Eastlake) required
complementary plebiscites for specified governmental actions. The Court's
attention was correctly directed not at a particular electoral veto but at the
constitutionality of the structural provision requiring submission of the
issue to the voters. In Part III.A, I advocated an enhanced substantive
review of the individual product of substitutive plebiscites. When it comes
to complementary plebiscites my claim is rather that courts must look
harder at the fairness of the selective use of the process.2
The two approaches come together in an ironic manner. The selective
imposition of complementary plebiscites, it turns out, is ordinarily
achieved by voter initiatives. It is seldom the legislature that chooses to
implement electoral filters. It is instead the voters who, bypassing their
representatives, opt to augment the legislative process. In Hunter, in
James, and in Eastlake, the constitutional amendments imposing the ref-
erendum requirements all resulted from substitutive plebiscites. Thus the
plebiscitary tiers were doubly suspect. They represented a selectively im-
posed additional burden on lawmaking and they were accomplished by
legislative bypass. The Supreme Court decisions paid some-although too
little-attention to the selectivity problem.327 They ignored or overlooked
the unfiltered, electoral origins of the referendum requirements. 32 8
iscites for low-rent public housing projects). Even though proposals for low-rent housing had been
defeated by referendum, id. at 139, the case involved only a challenge to the constitutional provision
mandating such an electoral submission.
325. 426 U.S. 668 (1976) (upholding city charter provision requiring complementary plebiscites
for City Council proposed changes in land use). Once again, the Court's opinion focused on the
structural provision and not on the voters' defeat of the specific proposed zoning change. Id. at
671-72.
326. In most cases this review would take place under the equal protection clause. Cf. Bell, supra
note 4, at 28 (precedents protecting voting rights and integrity of electoral system can be applied
against efforts to subvert gains made by minorities through participation in representative govern-
ment); Seeley, The Public Referendum and Minority Group Legislation: Postscript to Reitman v.
Mulkey, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 881, 909 (1970) ("A system that subjects pro-minority group legisla-
tion already passed by representative government to [electoral] approval . . . [is] an obvious denial of
a republican form of government."); see also Sager, supra note 144, at 1418 (use of plebiscite cannot
be justified under due process clause where substantial constitutional values are placed in jeopardy
and substantive review of voter enactment is largely unavailable).
327. In Hunter the Court took appropriate note of the selectivity problem. Even though Akron
might have proceeded by complementary plebiscite on "all" its municipal legislation, having chosen to
do something less, it "may no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to
enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person's vote." 393 U.S. at 392-93. Two years
later the Court was in full retreat. A lawmaking procedure that "disadvantages" a particular group,
said five justices in James, does not always deny equal protection. Such a holding, they warned, would
prohibit a state from requiring referenda on any subject "unless referendums were required on all,
because they would always disadvantage some group." 402 U.S. at 142. The Court's rejection of a per
se rule of invalidity for any selective imposition of the complementary plebiscite was no doubt sound,
but it is hard to condone its refusal meaningfully to review the justifications for singling out low-rent
housing proposals for electoral veto. As Justice Marshall correctly notes in dissent, the Court sub-
jected the state constitutional provision mandating complementary plebiscites "to no scrutiny whatso-
ever," treating it as if it were a technical economic classification. Id. at 145.
328. Indeed the Court often fails even to mention the specific method by which the requirements
of complementary plebiscites were adopted. In James, for example, the Court notes simply that the
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A second form of "negative" complementary plebiscite, the "spot refer-
endum," is discretionary rather than mandatory. In fourteen states, for
example, a legislature may "voluntarily refer" a particular measure to the
voters for passage. 2 Substantial practical impediments block judicial re-
view of either the legislative referral or the electoral veto. There is simply
no law to pass on. Because legislative passage in this setting is contingent
upon electoral acceptance, any claim that electoral veto repeals the legisla-
tive choice seems frivolous. Nor would the contention that these sorts of
referrals constitute an impermissible delegation of legislative power be ex-
pected to meet with any success.330
A theoretically more serious "spot referendum" from the vantage point
of minorities is the so-called "popular" or "petition referendum." This
device, available in twenty-four states,3 1 permits voters to force the legis-
lature to refer an already enacted measure to the voters before it can go
into effect. In several ways the popular referendum has the potential to be
the most dangerous of direct democracy devices. Like the mandatory refer-
endum, it affords an opportunity for inflamed majorities to take away
gains that minority groups have struggled to achieve through the repre-
sentative system. Because popular referenda will occur on an ad hoc
rather than a structured basis, however, they may elude the type of judi-
cial oversight evidenced by Hunter v. Erickson.33 2 Indeed, a court willing
to review these electoral vetoes would have to rely on a thesis never ac-
cepted by a Supreme Court decision-that a "mere repeal" of a single
piece of legislation unaccompanied by a broader restructuring of the polit-
ical decision-making process can itself violate the Constitution. 3 For the
California voters "adopted" the low-rent housing referendum procedure as a constitutional provision.
Id. at 139. The California Constitution may be amended, however, either by voter initiative or by the
joint action of the legislature and the voters. It is only by going back to the California voting pamphlet
for 1950 that one learns that the legislature played no role in the promulgation of the structural
provision under review. See Proposed Amendments to Constitution, General Election, November 7,
1950, at 9 (Initiative Constitutional Amendment No. 10).
329. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
330. See, e.g., City of Eastlake v. Forest City Enters., 426 U.S. 668, 675 (1976) (delegation doc-
trine is "inapplicable where . . . we deal with a power reserved by the people to themselves"); Cf.
Gillette, supra note 316, at 63-64 (urging that new Oregon Constitution include provisions to ensure
that legislature does not use referenda "as a way in which . . . [to] shirk[] its responsibilities").
331. See supra note 37.
332. 393 U.S. at 394 (Harlan, J., concurring) (suggesting that if Akron voters petitioned for
referendum and vetoed fair housing legislation instead of amending city charter to subject fair housing
to automatic referendum, equal protection clause would not have been violated).
333. On a number of occasions the Court has stressed that a "mere repeal" of race-related legisla-
tion does not violate the equal protection clause. See, e.g., Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. at 390 n.5;
Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 376 (1967). When an entity other than that which passed the law
in the first place is responsible for the repeal, the Court may view the constitutional challenge more
sympathetically. See Crawford v. Board of Educ., 458 U.S. 527, 557 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
But it is doubtful that a veto of a statute that never took effect can even be called a "repeal."
Whatever the constitutional vulnerability of "mere repeals," the failure to enact legislation in the first
place is ordinarily beyond substantive judicial review. Cf. Spallone v. United States, 110 S. Ct. 625
(1990) (Federal judge abused discretion by imposing contempt sanctions against city council members
for failure to adopt affordable housing ordinance in compliance with consent decree provisions).
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present, however, the threat of popular referenda is purely speculative.
Because the time period for gathering the requisite signatures tends to be
short-typically no more than ninety days after the adjournment of the
legislative session that produced the law"3 4-the device has seldom been
used."3 5
C. Are State Courts Up to the Task?
Although it is under the Federal Constitution, not those of the states,
that enhanced judicial review of direct democracy is warranted,"'6 the
question remains which judicial system is best suited for this role. State
and Federal courts share responsibility for the enforcement of Federal
constitutional rights. Much has been written about the relative compe-
tence and enthusiasm of state courts in the performance of this duty. 3 7
While I have no desire to take up the general question of parity here,
judicial scrutiny of ballot measures provides a unique setting in which to
contemplate the implications of state judicial elections. The sitting judges
of the highest courts of all but two of the states that permit substitutive
plebiscites are ultimately held directly accountable to the voters for their
decisions. 3 8 In approximately half of these states the judges serve a lim-
ited term-generally either six or eight years-and must thereafter run
for reelection.3 39 In the remaining half, the electorate is periodically asked
to vote on whether the judge should be "retained" in office.3 40 The fre-
334. The time frames for the various states are set forth in D. MAGLEBY, supra note 16, at
38-39 (Table 3.1).
335. According to Thomas Cronin, there was one popular referendum on the ballot in 1982, none
in 1984 and four in 1986. See T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 197 (Table 8.1); cf P. McGUIGAN,
supra note 15, at 28 (quoting somewhat larger numbers). There is at least some evidence of increased
use of the popular referendum, In 1989, communities in California, Ohio, and Washington used such
devices to void legislative gains achieved by gay and lesbian lobbying efforts, see 11 Family, Law &
Democracy Report, No. 12, at 9-10, 18 (Dec. 1989), and the people of North Dakota overturned no
fewer than seven previously enacted statutory measures on a wide array of subject matters. See FAM-
ILY, LAW & DEMOCRACY REPORT, Jan. 1990, at 9-10.
336. See supra Part II.D.2.
337. The competing claims are ably reviewed in Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a
Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233 (1988). See also Bator, The State Courts and
Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605 (1981); Neuborne, The Myth of
Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977).
338. Of the states with substitutive plebiscites, only Maine and Massachusetts shield the judges of
their highest court from direct ballot review. In Maine there is an indirect accountability. Every seven
years the members of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court must be reappointed by the governor and
confirmed by a legislative commission. ME. CONST. art. V, pt. 1, § 8; art. VI, § 4. In contrast, the
justices of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court serve for life. MASS. CONST. art. 82. As Law-
rence Sager has noted, however, the ease with which a state constitution can be amended partially
undermines the security of such grants of life tenure. See Sager, The Supreme Court 1980
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17, 63 n.149 (1981). But see MASS. CONST. arts. of amend.
152 & 168 (tenure of judges may not be subject of voter initiative or popular referendum).
339. These states (with the term of office in parenthesis) include Arkansas (8), Idaho (6), Michi-
gan (8), Montana (8), Nevada (6), North Dakota (10), Ohio (6), Oregon (6), Utah (initial 3 years;
then 10), and Washington (6). See infra Appendix B.
340. The substitutive plebiscite states that conduct so-called "retention" elections include Alaska,
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quency of retention elections varies greatly but averages about once every
eight years. 41 Because the judges in these "retention" states are ordinarily
appointed rather than elected, the initial retention vote is usually set at a
shorter time interval than subsequent ones. Thus, for example, the justices
of the Colorado Supreme Court must submit for their first vote of confi-
dence two years after their initial appointment to the bench, but thereafter
they only receive electoral scrutiny every ten years.3 42
The electoral accountability of the state judiciary leaves little hope that
state courts will have either the ability or the desire to take a leading role
in filtering plebiscitary results. When Federal constitutional rights are at
risk, the judicial role must be played by an independent judiciary. And the
independence demanded must insulate the courts from the people as well
as from the legislature.3 43
The Constitution does not, of course, demand that a state afford life
tenure to its judiciary. Nor does it demand that periodic renewal of a
judge's tenure be handled by merit panel rather than by popular vote.
The Constitution does, however, require that the rights it confers upon
every member of the citizenry be enforced by an independent judiciary. As
Chief Justice Rehnquist notes: "The independence of [the judiciary] . . .
is every bit as important in securing the recognition of the rights granted
by the Constitution as is the declaration of those rights themselves." 34' If
the states cannot offer such independence, the Federal courts must be pre-
pared to carry the full responsibility of enforcement.
The empirical evidence that ballot accountability threatens judicial in-
dependence is admittedly slim. Although the average margin of victory in
retention elections has steadily declined over the past two decades, 345 thus
Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Illinois, Missouri, Nebraska, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and
Wyoming. Montana and Utah provide for retention elections in the event that an incumbent has no
opponent in a reelection bid. See infra Appendix B.
341. The range runs from every six years-in Arizona, Florida, Nebraska, and Oklahoma-to
every 12 years in Missouri. See infra Appendix B.
342. See COLO. CONsT. art. VI, § 25. Nearly every substitutive plebiscite state which conducts
retention elections provides for an initial ballot review within a very short time after the judge's
appointment. With the time period in parentheses, these include Alaska (3 years), Arizona (2 years),
California (next general election), Florida (1 year), Missouri (1 year), Nevada (3 years), Oklahoma
(1 year), South Dakota (3 years) and Wyoming (1 year). See infra Appendix B.
343. See THE FEDERAUST No. 78, at 527 (A. Hamilton) (judicial independence needed to "guard
the constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humours which the arts of
designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people
themselves"). Indeed, as Hamilton suggests, the need for judicial independence may be even greater
where the constitutional invasions are "instigated by the major voice of the community." Id. at 528.
344. Rehnquist, An Independent Judiciary: Bulwark of the Constitution, 9 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 1,
8 (1988).
345. See, e.g., Aspin & Hall, Political Trust and Judicial Retention Elections, 9 LAw & POL'Y
451, 461 (1987) [hereinafter Political Trust] (mean affirmative vote in retention elections for state
trial courts was 85.7% in 1964, 78.2% in 1972, and 74.7% in 1980); Hall & Aspin, What Twventy
Years of Judicial Retention Elections Have Told Us, 70 JUDICATURE 340, 344 (1987) [hereinafter
Twenty Years] (in 1964, 92.9% of state trial court judges received affirmative votes of at least 80%, in
1972 only 50%, and by 1984, only 26.4%). A similar pattern can be observed among state appellate
judges. In California, for example, the 21 Supreme Court justices who faced the electorate from 1942
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far relatively few incumbent appellate judges have actually been defeated.
One recent article therefore scoffs at the "much-heralded and feared polit-
ical accountability of the state bench," pointing out that only nine state
court judges failed to win retention elections in 1985 and 1986.346 Because
voters in judicial elections are too ignorant and apathetic to punish judges
for unpopular decisions, the article argues, judges have no reason to live
in fear of electoral reprisal and will be unlikely to denigrate Federal con-
stitutional rights to curry local favor.3 47
These conclusions paint with too broad a brush. The extent to which
judicial elections impair judicial independence necessarily varies from is-
sue to issue.348 In no area would judges seem more at risk than when they
overturn plebiscites. That voters are generally unaware and unmoved
when legislative action is voided is not surprising. Judicial nullifications of
ballot measures are different matters altogether. They tend to be highly
visible decisions, which one recently deposed California justice has called
"political hot potatoes. '349
Several studies have tentatively demonstrated that the likelihood of vot-
ing against judicial retention increases in direct proportion to a voter's
level of knowledge. 5 Most retention elections are issueless and colorless,
and voters entering the voting booth do little besides registering their gen-
eral confidence in the judicial system. As one study concludes, however,
"the more the public knows about what the judges really do, the less in-
clined they are to support them."35  And-as three incumbent members of
the California Supreme Court recently learned-nowhere are the voters
likely to be more knowledgeable than on issues they have already been
asked to pass upon.
It is admittedly simplistic to attribute the 1986 electoral defeat of Chief
Justice Rose Bird and Associate Justices Joseph Grodin and Cruz Rey-
to 1962 received an average retention vote of 90%. The fifteen who faced the voters from 1970 to
1982-not including Rose Bird who had peculiar problems at the polls-averaged an affirmative vote
of 69%. See Uelmen, Supreme Court Retention Elections in California, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
333, 343 (1988).
346. Solimine & Walker, State Court Protection of Federal Constitutional Rights, 12 HARV.
JL. & PUB. POL'Y 127, 136 & n.41 (1989). The authors are strangely untroubled by a trend in the
other direction. In 1986, three California Supreme Court justices lost retention elections, three justices
of the North Carolina Supreme Court lost partisan elections, and the Chief Justice of the Ohio Su-
preme Court was defeated in a non-partisan contest. See Uelmen, supra note 345, at 348; see also
Hill, Taking Texas Judges Out of Politics: An Argument for Merit Election, 40 BAYLOR L. REV.
339, 340 (1988) (describing trend toward electoral defeats of incumbent Texas judges).
347. See Solimine & Walker, supra note 346, at 136; see also P. DUBois, FROM BALLOT TO
BENCH 243-46 (1980) (describing generally low level of voter turnout and knowledge in judicial
elections); Hall & Aspin, Twenty Years, supra note 345, at 340 (voters in retention election have little
information on which to base their decisions).
348. See gnerally Neuborne, supra note 337, at 1128.
349. J. GRODIN, supra note 12, at 105; see also Lowenstein, supra note 246, at 967-68 (decision
on validity of initiative almost inevitably has high visibility).
350. See Aspin & Hall, Political Trust, supra note 345, at 454 (citing several such studies).
351. Uelmen, supra note 345, at 349.
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noso principally to voter dissatisfaction with their rulings on plebiscites.3 2
But it is equally erroneous to discount this factor. Bird and her colleagues
were wounded deeply by their opinions undermining a death penalty ini-
tiative and-to a lesser extent-by a series of judicial blows administered
to electoral control of legislative redistricting. The public perceived these
actions as thwarting the will of the people, and the justices' opponents
exploited this angle in their campaign literature.35 3
Nor were the 1986 elections the first in which California Supreme
Court justices were called to account for their invalidation of plebiscitary
action. In 1966, for example, those who voted in Reitman to strike down
the initiative authorizing racial discrimination in the private housing mar-
ket saw their margin of victory dramatically cut.3"" In a 1982 preemptive
attack, the justices up for reelection were the subject of a campaign
designed to influence their votes on a pending challenge to a wide-ranging
criminal justice initiative.3 55
The greater visibility of judicial decisions respecting plebiscites is not
the only factor that renders such cases high risk for an elected judiciary.
Plebiscites pass as a result of well-organized-and usually well-
financed-organizations behind them. These groups are in place to mount
anti-retention campaigns should the judiciary thwart their efforts. Monied
special interests that have sunk considerable resources into the passage of
a ballot measure may be willing to spend more to bump off the judges
352. See Thompson, supra note 189, at 2022-27, 2035-36 (attributing election results in part to
Rose Bird's personality and to her perceived political agenda).
353. See id. at 2035 (barrage of public attacks from prosecutors and Governor led public to view
court as thwarting public will on death penalty); see also id. at 2028-32 (describing court's handling
of redistricting plebiscites). It may well be, however, that the death penalty is an issue of such high
visibility that it mattered little that the Bird Court was dismantling an electoral command rather than
a legislative one.
354. See id. at 2040 (justices who voted to declare housing initiative unconstitutional faced opposi-
tion like that seen in 1986 campaign). Chief Justice Roger Traynor's 65% retention vote represented a
substantial drop from the 90% support he received just four years earlier. In 1962, only 360,000
Californians opposed retention. In 1966, principally as a result of this single decision invalidating a
voter initiative, that figure rose to more than 1.7 million. Associate Justice Paul Peek, who was re-
tained in 1964 with an 88% positive vote, saw his support dip to 62% just two years (and one initia-
tive invalidation) later. See generally Uelmen, supra note 345, at 341, 343, 345. If one compares the
negative votes cast against the justices who declared the housing initiative unconstitutional (averaging
1.76 million votes) with those cast against the one dissenter who appeared on that year's ballot
(slightly less than 1 million votes) it appears that the judicial cost for thwarting the plebiscitary direc-
tion was a loss of approximately three-quarters of a million votes. See id. at 345 (Table II).
355. See Uelmen, Commentary: Are We Reprising a Finale or an Overture?, 61 S. CAL. L. REv.
2069, 2071 (1988). Senatorial candidate Pete Wilson, for example, threatened personally to oppose
any justice who voted against the initiative's validity. See Uelmen, supra note 345, at 342. Ultimately
the initiative was upheld by a four to three decision issued eight weeks before Election Day. Three of
the four justices up for reelection-including two of the court's most liberal members-voted with the
majority. This prompted a significant number of suggestions-some rather harsh-of judicial coward-
ice. See Lowenstein, supra note 246, at 937 nn.12 & 13. Subsequently Justice Otto Kaus candidly
revealed uncertainty as to whether the campaign rhetoric affected his decision in the case. See Grodin,
Judicial Elections: The California Experience, 70 JUDICATURE 365, 368 (1987).
Similar threats of electoral reprisal were leveled at the California justices on the 1978 ballot as they
prepared to hear a challenge to the constitutionality of Proposition 13, the property tax initiative. See
L.A. Times, Aug. 12, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
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who stand in the way of the measure's enforcement. Judges considering
the constitutionality of voter efforts are not likely to be blind to the specter
of an interest-group structure energized to carry out the same kind of
voter campaign in displacing offending judges that was used in getting the
plebiscite passed in the first place.
Enhanced judicial accountability for the invalidation of electoral legisla-
tion was not unintended by those who championed direct democracy. The
reformers who sought greater electoral control over legislators foresaw the
possibility of legislative bypasses being thwarted by an independent judici-
ary."56 It is not surprising, therefore, that the concept of retention elections
was developed at the same time that states were embracing the initiative
and the referendum.3 57 Reduction of judicial independence in the review
of ballot measures was an integral part of the movement toward popular
rule and away from filtered government.
It may well be impossible to establish empirically that the threat of
electoral reprisal affects judicial behavior.358 We have little more to go on
than occasional anecdote. For example, former California Supreme Court
Justice Otto Kaus has confessed that his 1982 vote to uphold the constitu-
tionality of a ballot initiative may have been induced-at a subconscious
level-by the pendency of his retention election.3 59 Similar candor has
been forthcoming from his former colleague, Joseph Grodin. Regarding
whether his votes in a number of critical cases in 1986 were influenced by
the upcoming election, Grodin's appraisal is a refreshingly honest "I just
can't be sure. '3' 0 A judge may hope that conscience will triumph over
concern about retention, but as Otto Kaus put it, ignoring the political
consequences of visible decisions is "like ignoring a crocodile in your bath-
tub." '61 In spite of the obstacles to empirical validation, it hardly seems
far-fetched that the most principled of jurists will hesitate-consciously or
unconsciously-to void an electoral mandate in the face of a pending elec-
tion. 62 Furthermore, even if we are to assume that some judges will be
356. See supra notes 183-87 and accompanying text.
357. See S. CARBON & L. BERKSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1980).
358. See Thompson, supra note 189, at 2057 ("Given the confidential workings of courts, it is a
formidable, if not impossible task to establish empirically the proposition that the prospect of a reten-
tion election influences the outcomes reached by appellate judges."). But see Solimine & Walker,
Constitutional Litigation in Federal and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis ofJudicial Parity, 10
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 230-31 (1983) (suggesting that electoral accountability does not influ-
ence rulings of state court judges).
359. See Hager, Kaus Urges Reelection of Embattled Court Justices, L.A. Times, Sept. 28, 1986,
at 3, col. 5.
360. See Grodin, Developing a Consensus of Constraint. A Judge's Perspective on Judicial Re-
tention Elections, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 1969, 1980 (1988).
361. See Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, 52 A.B.A. J., Apr. 1987, at 52, 58. The ability to
ignore the crocodile doubtless depends on how long before you have to take a bath. When there is a
substantial time gap between the rendering of a decision and the next election in which the judge must
face the voters, he or she is likely to feel more independent.
362. It is no answer to say that judges who are unwilling to serve as crocodile food for the sake of
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able to ignore the prospect of voter reprisal and engage in serious "check-
ing," the voters have the final word. Judges who fail to heed voter
messages may soon find themselves replaced by those with better hearing.
Judicial review is most essential in the presence of unfiltered majoritar-
ianism. Yet it is precisely the examination of voter action that puts elected
judges at greatest risk. A judiciary that is directly accountable to the iden-
tical political forces which shaped the judgment under review may find it
difficult to provide sustained enforcement of countermajoritarian constitu-
tional norms."' Direct democracy thus poses a peculiar threat to state
judicial independence. Judicial filtering of plebiscitary action calls for
nonaccountable judges. The Supreme Court ought to be sensitive to this
special need when it decides which state court cases to review on certiorari
and when it shapes the various federalism-inspired abstention doctrines.
While the Constitution's guarantee of a republican form of government
does not demand that the states provide a structure with the panoply of
Federal protections against factions, when the state departs from the vi-
sion reflected in each of the first three Articles-a bicameral legislative
body, an executive with the power to veto, and an independent judici-
ary-the republican ideal is in danger of fading away. Here Federal court
invocation of the Bill of Rights is more than a safety net-it may well be
the only line of defense against majoritarian tyranny.
CONCLUSION: A LINGERING DOUBT
I have not arrived at these conclusions easily. Limitations placed upon
majoritarian preferences smack of paternalism and elitism. Of course, this
difficulty recurs continually with our written Constitution and its judicial
expositors. 3" But somehow its specter is more vivid when constitutional
commands are invoked to negate popular preferences. Listen, for example,
to Archibald Cox's response to Learned Hand's classic attack on judicial
activism. "It would," decried Hand, "be most irksome to be ruled by a
bevy of Platonic Guardians. 311 5 How, asked Cox, could one feel that way
about the Supreme Court's invalidation of a statute passed by the Massa-
chusetts legislature? Modern government is "too remote and too few is-
sues are fought out in elections, for a citizen to feel much more sense of
principle should not be judges in the first place. See Thompson, supra note 189, at 2062 (outcomes
reached by judges with characteristics justifying their appointment are not likely to be influenced by
prospect of retention elections). It is precisely the principled judges-like Kaus and Grodin-whose
candor and integrity will compel them to question their own fortitude in the face of the crocodile. The
unprincipled ones will simply step out of the tub without telling us about it.
363. See Neuborne, supra note 337, at 1127.
364. See Schauer, supra note 250, at 787-88 (suggesting that it may be time to face up to pater-
nalism of Constitution).
365. If Platonic Guardians were in charge, Hand went on to say, "I should miss the stimulus of
living in a society where I have, at least theoretically, some part in the direction of public affairs." L.
HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 73-74 (1958).
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participation in the legislative process than the judicial." But, conceded
Cox, "I should be no less irked than Judge Hand if the Supreme Court
were to void an ordinance adopted in the open Town Meeting in the New
England town in which I live."'3 66
Now plebiscites-especially statewide ones-are not quite the same as
the New England town meeting, but citizens are likely to feel substan-
tially more connected and personally involved with them than with the
remote action of their elected representatives. It is one thing for a court to
undertake the task of protecting the people from their government and
quite another to protect the people from themselves. True, the people of a
state are very different from "the People" of the United States, but that is
a cute academic argument, and I am not sure how it would play in
Peoria.
Precisely because judicial actions regarding ballot measures are highly
visible, there is a substantial danger that these decisions will engender
popular cynicism to a degree not ordinarily found when courts toil unseen
in the legislative vineyards. 67 By appearing to remove popular majorities
from meaningful input into the making of public policy, we run the risk
that these majorities will cease to see these issues as something they ought
to care about.3 6
Plebiscites serve as an escape valve for the frustrations of day-to-day
encounters with faceless, unresponsive, and oppressive bureaucracies. If
courts afford this spleen-venting little deference, and we block judicial ac-
countability by placing the dirty task of checking in the Federal court, will
something have to give? Could it take the form of diminished respect for
and obedience to the courts, resentment toward Washington by an increas-
ingly alienated populace, or apathetic retreats from civic responsibility?
Our level of electoral participation is already the lowest among any West-
ern nation. There is a real danger that the few citizens who still vote will
cease to do so as they perceive that small power elites make all basic deci-
sions, that elections change little or nothing, and that government does not
really care what the "little person" thinks.369
But courts can minimize the impact of invalidating voter legislation.
Judges should steer clear of reviewing ballot measures before enact-
ment. 70 It is no doubt likely that visibility will be greater after a measure
366. A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 116 (1976).
367. See P. MCGUIGAN, supra note 15, at 141 ("As the courts move increasingly to thwart popu-
lar decision making, it is difficult to see how popular cynicism and discontent can be contained.").
368. Cf. Schauer, supra note 250, at 783 (by removing majorities from meaningful input into free
speech issues, we risk those majorities' ceasing to see free speech as something they ought to care
about).
369. See W. BURNHAM, supra note 41, at 153; see also C. PATEMAN, supra note 19, at 104
(discussing correlation between apathy and low feelings of political efficacy); Frug, supra note 19, at
1070 (power and participation are inextricably linked; sense of powerlessness tends to produce
apathy).
370. See J. GRODIN, supra note 12, at 106 (outlining advantages of post-election review over pre-
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has been passed, but the possibility that the measure may not pass is sig-
nificant. Voters occasionally demonstrate surprising sensitivity to the
rights of minorities. Witness the 1978 defeat of a California ballot initia-
tive designed to restrict the rights of homosexual public school teachers,
and the 1986 defeat of Lyndon LaRouche's attempt to empower Califor-
nia health authorities to quarantine AIDS victims."7 1 There is no need for
courts to step in on behalf of minorities unless it is clear that there is no
other way to protect their interests. The judiciary's ability to command
popular acceptance is a limited resource and should not be squandered on
hypothetical transgressions.3 7 2
There is no denying that protecting republicanism is a high-stakes pro-
position. The very volatility of transient passions both warrants stricter
review of direct democracy and renders execution of this task by the Fed-
eral judiciary a treacherous venture. People care deeply about many of
these plebiscitary issues. Unless, however, we are willing to abandon our
commitment to the principles upon which our government is founded, we
must be willing to confront the danger to minority rights and individual
liberty posed by a device that aggregates without filtering.
election review of ballot measures); Gordon & Magleby, Pre-Election Judicial Review of Initiatives
and Referendums, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 298 (1989) (arguing impropriety of pre-election adjudi-
cation of challenges to measures' substantive validity); see also Legislature v. Deukmejian, 34 Cal. 3d
658, 669 P.2d 17, 194 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1983) (constitutional challenges to substance of ballot measures
are usually more appropriately reviewed after election).
371. See T. CRONIN, supra note 16, at 96.
372. The route to Federal court may in any event be foreclosed for pre-election challenges because
of justiciability or abstention problems. See generally Gordon & Magleby, supra note 370, at 304-11
(discussing advisory opinion and ripeness bars to pre-election substantive review).
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a - pertains to the legislative article of constitution only.
b - although these states permit voters to initiate referenda on legislative enactments, these so-called
popular referenda are better characterized as complementary plebiscites.
c - recent efforts to provide for substantive plebiscites narrowly defeated by the voters.













mandatory voluntary popular constitutional
referendum referendum referendum referendum
a - pertains to the legislative article of constitution only.
b - although these states permit voters to initiate referenda on legislative enactments, these so-called
popular referenda are better characterized as complementary plebiscites.
c - recent efforts to provide for substantive plebiscites narrowly defeated by the voters.
d - applies only to legislation classifying property and to property taxes.
Sources: COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK OF THE STATES, 1988-89, at 18, 217-19;
REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 71-72 (D. Butler & A. Ran-
ney eds. 1978); Voter Initiative Constitutional Amendment, 1977: Hearings on S.J. Res. 67 Before
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a - retention election held if judge is unopposed.
b - states which have shorter initial terms subject judges to retention vote at the next general election
but establish a minimum number of years within which the judges need not come before the
voters. The numbers provided denote that minimum.
c - initial retention election held at first general election subsequent to appointment.
d - California Supreme Court justices may be subject to a second election in less than the 12 year
period if they have filled an unexpired term of a prior justice.
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TYPE OF
ELECTION
partisan nonpartisan retention no electoral








a - retention election held if judge is unopposed.
b - states which have shorter initial terms subject judges to retention vote at the next general election
but establish a minimum number of years within which the judges need not come before the
voters. The numbers provided denote that minimum.
c - initial retention election held at first general election subsequent to appointment.
d - California Supreme Court justices may be subject to a second election in less than the 12 year
period if they have filled an unexpired term of a prior justice.
Sources: L. BERKSON, S. BELLER & M. GRIMALDI, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES: A
COMPENDIUM OF PROVISIONS 18-21 (1980); S. CARBON & L. BERKSON, JUDICIAL RETENTION
ELECTIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 70-78 (1980); COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, THE BOOK
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